Seven-Sky v. Holder - Plaintiffs\u27 Motion for Summary Judgement by Seven-Sky, Susan
Santa Clara Law
Santa Clara Law Digital Commons
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation Research Projects and Empirical Data
1-1-2011
Seven-Sky v. Holder - Plaintiffs' Motion for
Summary Judgement
Susan Seven-Sky
Follow this and additional works at: http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca
Part of the Health Law Commons
This Motion is brought to you for free and open access by the Research Projects and Empirical Data at Santa Clara Law Digital Commons. It has been
accepted for inclusion in Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act Litigation by an authorized administrator of Santa Clara Law Digital Commons.
For more information, please contact sculawlibrarian@gmail.com.
Automated Citation
Seven-Sky, Susan, "Seven-Sky v. Holder - Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgement" (2011). Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act
Litigation. Paper 238.
http://digitalcommons.law.scu.edu/aca/238
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT 
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA 
 
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD; 
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN 
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH RUFFO; and 
GINA RODRIGUEZ, 
 
            Plaintiffs, 
 
 -vs.- 
 
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND 
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN 
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES 
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; 
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, 
 
            Defendants. 
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_______________________________________/ 
 
PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 Plaintiffs Margaret Peggy Lee Mead, Charles Edward Lee, Susan Seven-Sky, Kenneth 
Ruffo, and Gina Rodriguez, by and through their undersigned counsel, bring this Motion for 
Summary Judgment on all counts of their Amended Complaint, pursuant to Federal Rule of Civil 
Procedure 56 and Local Civil Rule 7, as there is no genuine issue of material fact and they are 
entitled to judgment as a matter of law.  In support of this Motion, Plaintiffs have submitted a 
Statement of Material Facts, a Memorandum of Points and Authorities, Exhibits, including 
declarations, and a Proposed Order.  Plaintiffs request oral hearing on this Motion.  Plaintiffs 
reserve consideration of their reasonable attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses and any other issue 
or relief for further hearing or trial.  Based on the submissions, Plaintiffs respectfully request that 
this Court grant this Motion for Summary Judgment in full (or in part as the Court may deem 
appropriate) and award them the following relief: 
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A. Enter judgment in favor of all Plaintiffs, declaring unconstitutional Section 1501 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act as exceeding the powers of Congress; 
B. Enter judgment in favor of Plaintiffs Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky declaring that the 
application of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act to them violates their rights under 
the Religious Freedom Restoration Act; 
C. Enter a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Section 1501 of the 
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act; and 
D. Enter an order invalidating the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in its 
entirety and enjoining its enforcement because Section 1501 of the Act is not severable from the 
rest of the Act. 
Respectfully submitted on this 10th day of August, 2010, 
/s/ Edward L. White III   
Edward L. White III (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
5068 Plymouth Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48105 
Tel. 734-662-2984; Fax. 734-302-1758 
ewhite@aclj.org 
 
/s/ Erik M. Zimmerman   
Erik M. Zimmerman (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
1000 Regent University Dr. 
Virginia Beach, VA 23464 
Tel. 757-226-2489; Fax. 757-226-2836 
ezimmerman@aclj.org 
 
Miles Landon Terry (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
1305 Clinton Street, Suite 230 
Nashville, TN 37203 
Tel. 864-569-9344; Fax. 615-327-0007 
mterry@aclj.org 
 
Jay Alan Sekulow 
(D.C. Bar No. 496335) 
Stuart J. Roth 
(D.C. Bar No. 475937) 
Colby M. May 
(D.C. Bar No. 394340) 
 
/s/ James Matthew Henderson Sr.  
James Matthew Henderson Sr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 452639) 
Counsel of Record 
American Center for Law & Justice 
201 Maryland Avenue, NE 
Washington, DC 20002 
Tel. 202-546-8890; Fax. 202-546-9309 
sekulow@aclj.org 
sjr@aclj-dc.org 
cmmay@aclj-dc.org 
jmhenderson@aclj-dc.org 
 
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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PLAINTIFFS’ STATEMENT OF MATERIAL FACTS 
IN SUPPORT OF MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 Pursuant to Local Civil Rule 7(h)(1), Plaintiffs Margaret Peggy Lee Mead, Charles 
Edward Lee, Susan Seven-Sky, Kenneth Ruffo, and Gina Rodriguez, submit this Statement of 
Material Facts as to which they contend there are no genuine issues, in support of their Motion 
for Summary Judgment: 
Jurisdiction and Venue 
1. This is an action arising under the United States Constitution, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb 
et seq., and 28 U.S.C. §§ 2201-2202 seeking declaratory and injunctive relief to cure alleged 
deprivations of the federal rights of Plaintiffs.  This Court has jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. §§ 
1331 and 1346. 
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2. Venue is appropriate in this Court, pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1391(e), because a 
substantial part of the acts giving rise to Plaintiffs’ claims have occurred in the District of 
Columbia and because Defendants reside in the District of Columbia. 
The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act 
3. The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (“PPACA” or “the Act”), Pub. L. 
No. 111-148, 124 Stat. 119, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., was signed into law by President Barack 
Obama on March 23, 2010, and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act, Pub. L. No. 
111-152, 124 Stat. 1029, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., which amended it, became law on March 30, 
2010.  (Exs. A-B.)1/ 
4. Section 1501 of the PPACA requires individuals and their dependents to purchase 
and maintain a level of minimum health insurance coverage.  (Ex. A, p. 4.) 
5. The individual mandate of Section 1501 of the PPACA states that “[a]n applicable 
individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any 
dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential 
coverage for such month.”  (Ex. A, p. 4.) 
6. Through this individual mandate, Section 1501 seeks to further Congress’s stated 
purpose of requiring millions of Americans who do not have health insurance, but could afford 
such insurance if they re-adjusted their fiscal affairs and lifestyles, to purchase health insurance 
policies from private companies.  (Ex. A, pp. 2-14.) 
                                                 
 
1/ Plaintiffs have filed separately excerpts of both the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act (Ex. A), the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (Ex. B), and declarations 
from Plaintiff Mead (Ex. C), Plaintiff Lee (Ex. D), Plaintiff Seven-Sky (Ex. E), Plaintiff Ruffo 
(Ex. F), and Plaintiff Rodriguez (Ex. G).  
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7. The individual mandate requires “applicable individuals” to pay money to private 
insurance companies, not the government, and such coerced payments to private insurance 
companies are not a tax.  (Ex. A, pp. 6, 13.) 
8. Section 1501 excludes certain persons from the definition of “applicable 
individual.”  Every person is an “applicable individual” unless he or she qualifies for a limited 
religious conscience exemption, is a part of a particular type of “health care sharing ministry,” 
“is not a citizen or national of the United States or an alien lawfully present in the United States,” 
or is incarcerated.  (Ex. A, pp. 6, 13.) 
9. Exemptions are provided for “applicable individuals” who 1) live in a household 
with a household income below the amount that triggers the requirement to file a tax return, 2) 
would have to spend more than 8 percent of their household income to purchase an eligible 
employer sponsored program or “the lowest cost bronze plan available in the individual market . 
. . ,” 3) are members of an Indian tribe, 4) have a short coverage gap, or 5) have suffered a 
“hardship” according to the Secretary of Health and Human Services.  (Ex. A, pp. 6-8, 13.) 
10. Among the PPACA’s other provisions that have some connection to the 
individual mandate is a provision stating that those who do not meet the requirements of the 
individual mandate will be subject to an annual shared responsibility payment (also called a 
“penalty”) to the government.  (Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 12-13.) 
11. While other provisions of the PPACA impose a “tax” on individuals or entities in 
certain circumstances, the provision requiring those who do not purchase and maintain health 
insurance to pay money to the government imposes a “penalty.”  (Compare Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 12-
13, with Ex. A, pp. 15-20.) 
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12. In general, the shared responsibility payment is imposed for any month in a given 
year that an applicable individual fails to maintain minimum essential coverage and is included 
on a taxpayer’s income tax return for that taxable year.  (Ex. A, pp. 4, 12.) 
13. Taxpayers are liable for any shared responsibility payment imposed upon their 
dependents, and spouses are jointly liable for any shared responsibility payments if they file a 
joint return.  (Ex. A, p. 4.) 
14. Under the PPACA’s shared responsibility payment structure, the minimum shared 
responsibility payment amount per year for each adult who lacks minimum essential coverage 
will be $95 for 2014, $325 for 2015, $695 for 2016, and $695 or more for 2017 or later, 
increased due to cost-of-living adjustments.  The minimum shared responsibility payment 
amount per year for minors under age eighteen who lack minimum essential coverage is one half 
of the amounts previously listed.  When this calculation is used, the total shared responsibility 
payment amount per household for each taxable year cannot exceed 300 percent of the applicable 
dollar amount for that calendar year (disregarding the rule for minors under 18).  (Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 
12-13; Ex. B, pp. 2-3.) 
15. The above-mentioned shared responsibility payment calculation is disregarded 
when a certain percentage of the taxpayer’s household income that exceeds the applicable 
threshold for filing a tax return is greater than the amounts listed above for the taxable year.  The 
applicable percentages are 1.0 percent of the excess amount in 2014, 2.0 percent of the excess in 
2015, and 2.5 percent in 2016 or later.  (Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 12-13; Ex. B, pp. 2-3.) 
16. When the percentage of the excess over the filing threshold is greater than the 
specific amounts listed above for the taxable year, the taxpayer must pay the amount of the 
excess with no specific dollar cap.  For example, where a taxpayer’s household income (minus 
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the amount of the applicable threshold for filing a tax return) is $50,000, the shared 
responsibility payment amount per year would be, at a minimum, $500 for 2014, $1,000 for 
2015, and $1,250 for 2016 or later.  (Ex. A, pp. 4-6, 12-13; Ex. B, pp. 2-3.) 
17. The “administration and procedure” subsection of Section 1501 creates “special 
rules” ensuring that key traditional methods of tax enforcement are not available for the Section 
1501 penalty.  The subsection declares that “[t]he penalty provided by this section shall be paid 
upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and except as provided in paragraph (2) [entitled 
“Special Rules”], shall be assessed and collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty 
under subchapter B of chapter 68 [26 U.S.C. § 6671 et seq.].”  The Special Rules subsection 
declares that, “[i]n the case of any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed by 
this section, such taxpayer shall not be subject to any criminal prosecution or penalty with 
respect to such failure.”  In addition, “[t]he Secretary shall not . . . file notice of lien with respect 
to any property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty imposed by this 
section,” or “levy on any such property with respect to such failure.”  (Ex. A, p. 9.) 
18. The Tenth Amendment highlights the inherent limitations upon the authority of 
the federal government, including Congress, by stating:  “The powers not delegated to the United 
States by the Constitution, nor prohibited by it to the States, are reserved to the States 
respectively, or to the people.”  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 93; U.S. Const. amend. X.) 
19. The Commerce Clause of Article I, Section 8 gives Congress the power “[t]o 
regulate Commerce with foreign Nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian 
Tribes.”  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 103; U.S. Const. art. I, § 8.) 
20. Section 1501 of the PPACA relies exclusively upon Congress’s power to regulate 
interstate commerce as the sole basis for Congressional authority to enact the individual 
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mandate, and sets forth congressional findings regarding the effects of health spending and 
health insurance regulation on the national economy and interstate commerce.  (Ex. A, pp. 2, 4, 
10-12.) 
21. Mandating that individuals purchase health insurance is unprecedented, as 
Congress has never before required individuals to involuntarily buy a good or service under the 
guise of its Commerce Clause authority.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 108.) 
22. The Supreme Court has never held that Congress’s power to regulate commercial 
or economic activities that substantially affect interstate commerce includes the much broader 
power to reach inactivity and require persons who are not engaged in economic or commercial 
activities to become so engaged.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 111.) 
23. The PPACA requires all uninsured persons to purchase health insurance coverage 
not because they are engaged in the production, distribution, or consumption of goods or 
commodities or any other commercial activity but simply because they are uninsured residents of 
the United States.  (Exs. A-B.) 
24. Merely existing in the United States without health insurance is not an economic 
or commercial “class of activity” that falls within Congress’s authority to regulate under the 
Commerce Clause.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 112.) 
The Plaintiffs 
25. Each Plaintiff is an adult United States citizens, a resident of a state, and a federal 
taxpayer.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 1; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 1; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 1; Ex. F, 
Ruffo Decl. ¶ 1; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 1.) 
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12    Filed 08/10/10   Page 8 of 64
 7
26. Each Plaintiff is not eligible for Medicare and does not qualify for Medicaid.  (Ex. 
C, Mead Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 2; Ex. 
G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 2.) 
27. Each Plaintiff is generally in good health.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. D, Lee 
Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 3.) 
28. Each Plaintiff could afford health insurance coverage, but has elected not to 
purchase such insurance and desires not to do so now or in the future.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 4; 
Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 3; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. 
¶ 4.) 
29. Each Plaintiff is not covered by anyone else’s health insurance.  (Ex. C, Mead 
Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. G, 
Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4.) 
30. Each Plaintiff has not been covered by health insurance for a number of years.  
(Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 4; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 4; 
Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 4.) 
31. Each Plaintiff does not qualify for any of the exemptions under the PPACA, and it 
is highly unlikely that each Plaintiff will be exempted from the individual mandate over the next 
several years.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. F, 
Ruffo Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 5.) 
32. Each Plaintiff strongly objects to being required by the PPACA to either buy 
minimum essential coverage or pay an annual shared responsibility payment.  (Ex. C, Mead 
Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 5; Ex. G, 
Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 5.) 
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33. Each Plaintiff strongly believes that the federal government lacks the authority to 
force them to buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 
8; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 8; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. G, Rodriguez 
Decl. ¶ 8.) 
34. Plaintiff Seven-Sky believes in natural forms of healing and Plaintiffs Ruffo and 
Rodriguez believe in a holistic or eastern approach to health care, and none of them needs, or 
wants to be forced to purchase, health insurance coverage.  (Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. F, 
Ruffo Decl. ¶ 6; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 6.) 
35. Plaintiffs Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky have a sincerely-held religious belief that 
God will provide for their physical, spiritual, and financial well-being.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 7; 
Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 7; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) 
36. Plaintiffs Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky believe in trusting God to protect them from 
illness or injury, and to heal them of any afflictions, no matter the severity of the health issue, 
and they do not need, or want to be forced to buy, health insurance coverage.  (Ex. C, Mead 
Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶¶ 6-7.) 
37. Being forced to buy health insurance conflicts with the religious faith of Plaintiffs 
Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky because they believe that they would be indicating that they need a 
backup plan and are not really sure whether God will, in fact, provide for their needs.  (Ex. C, 
Mead Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶¶ 7-8; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶¶ 7, 9.) 
38. The PPACA imposes direct and substantial religious and/or financial burdens 
upon the Plaintiffs by requiring them to either 1) purchase and maintain minimum essential 
coverage, without any consideration of their individual needs, Christian faith, and/or financial 
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situation, or 2) pay an annual shared responsibility payment.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. D, Lee 
Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 9; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 8; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 9.) 
39. As a direct result of the PPACA’s inevitable impact upon the finances and 
lifestyle of each Plaintiff, they are compelled to adjust their finances now, by setting aside 
money, and will continue to do so, to pay the annual shared responsibility payment.  As a result, 
each Plaintiff will be unable to use that money for other purposes now, such as discretionary 
spending, charitable donations, college funds, retirement, or paying debts, and will have to adjust 
their lifestyles accordingly, all of which will unjustly and adversely burden each Plaintiff and 
continue to do so while the PPACA is in existence, and either is threatened to be enforced, or is 
enforced against them.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 12; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. 
¶ 11; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 10; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 11.) 
40. Under the shared responsibility payment provisions of the PPACA, Plaintiffs 
Mead, Lee, Seven-Sky, and Ruffo will be required to each pay, at a minimum, $3,895 to the 
government through 2020 for their lack of minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared 
responsibility payment of $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016, and $695 or greater in 2017 
or later).  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 12; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 13; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 12; Ex. F, 
Ruffo Decl. ¶ 11.) 
41. Under the shared responsibility payment provisions of the PPACA, Plaintiff 
Rodriguez and her husband will be responsible to pay—on behalf of themselves and their three 
children—at a minimum, $11,685 to the government through 2020 for their lack of minimum 
essential coverage (a minimum shared responsibility payment of $285 in 2014, $975 in 2015, 
$2,085 in 2016, and $2,085 or greater in 2017 or later).  (Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 12.) 
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42. The total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government will 
require each Plaintiff to pay through 2020 may be greater depending upon their household 
income levels during each taxable year, and each Plaintiff will be required to continue making 
shared responsibility payments in 2021 and beyond.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶ 12; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 
13; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 12; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. ¶ 11; Ex. G, Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 12.) 
43. The PPACA will also negatively impact Plaintiff Seven-Sky’s business because 
health insurance generally does not cover the services that she provides as a chiropractor and 
massage therapist, and her clients and prospective clients will have less money to pay for her 
services out-of-pocket if they have to buy minimum essential coverage or pay an annual shared 
responsibility payment.  (Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 13.) 
44. The PPACA’s requirement that Plaintiffs Mead, Lee, and Seven-Sky purchase 
health insurance, under the threat of significant financial penalties, substantially burdens the 
exercise of their religion.  They are forced to either join a health insurance system that 
contradicts the tenets of their faith or pay substantial penalties for following the tenets of their 
faith.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. ¶¶ 7-10; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶¶ 6-11; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶¶ 6-10.) 
45. As a direct and proximate result of the PPACA, each Plaintiff is concretely and 
continuously harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the PPACA against 
them—through either a coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment—and 
also the need to currently arrange their fiscal affairs now to prepare themselves to pay thousands 
of dollars over the next several years as required by the individual mandate.  (Ex. C, Mead Decl. 
¶ 13; Ex. D, Lee Decl. ¶ 14; Ex. E, Seven-Sky Decl. ¶ 14; Ex. F, Ruffo Decl. 12; Ex. G, 
Rodriguez Decl. ¶ 13.) 
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The Defendants 
46. Defendant Eric H. Holder, Jr., is the Attorney General of the United States and is 
the chief law enforcement officer of the federal government.  As such, he will be responsible for 
enforcing the PPACA.  He is sued in his official capacity.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 76.) 
47. Defendant United States Department of Health and Human Services (HHS) is 
established by 5 U.S.C. § 101 and is an executive department of the United States government 
charged with the principal protection of the health of all Americans.  HHS’s duties involve 
administering portions of the PPACA.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 77.) 
48. Defendant Kathleen Sebelius is the Secretary of the Department of Health and 
Human Services and is the principal authority within HHS.  She is responsible for enforcing and 
administering the PPACA.  She is used in her official capacity.  (Doc. 10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 78.) 
49. Defendant United States Department of the Treasury is an executive department 
of the United States government charged with collecting federal taxes and enforcing federal tax 
laws.  The United States Treasury’s duties include administering portions of the PPACA.  (Doc. 
10, Amend. Compl. ¶ 79.) 
50. Defendant Timothy F. Geithner is the Secretary of the Department of the Treasury 
and is responsible for overseeing the duties of the Department of the Treasury, including the 
collection of taxes and the enforcement of tax laws.  He is responsible for enforcing the shared 
responsibility payment provisions of the PPACA.  He is sued in his official capacity.  (Doc. 10, 
Amend. Compl. ¶ 80.) 
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Respectfully submitted on this 10th day of August, 2010, 
/s/ Edward L. White III   
Edward L. White III (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
5068 Plymouth Road 
Ann Arbor, MI 48105 
Tel. 734-662-2984; Fax. 734-302-1758 
ewhite@aclj.org 
 
/s/ Erik M. Zimmerman   
Erik M. Zimmerman (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
1000 Regent University Dr. 
Virginia Beach, VA 23464 
Tel. 757-226-2489; Fax. 757-226-2836 
ezimmerman@aclj.org 
 
Miles Landon Terry (adm. phv) 
American Center for Law & Justice 
1305 Clinton Street, Suite 230 
Nashville, TN 37203 
Tel. 864-569-9344; Fax. 615-327-0007 
mterry@aclj.org 
 
Jay Alan Sekulow 
(D.C. Bar No. 496335) 
Stuart J. Roth 
(D.C. Bar No. 475937) 
Colby M. May 
(D.C. Bar No. 394340) 
 
/s/ James Matthew Henderson Sr.  
James Matthew Henderson Sr. 
(D.C. Bar No. 452639) 
Counsel of Record 
American Center for Law & Justice 
201 Maryland Avenue, NE 
Washington, DC 20002 
Tel. 202-546-8890; Fax. 202-546-
9309 
sekulow@aclj.org 
sjr@aclj-dc.org 
cmmay@aclj-dc.org 
jmhenderson@aclj-dc.org 
 
 
Counsel for Plaintiffs 
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INTRODUCTION 
 In 1994, the Congressional Budget Office stated, “[a] mandate requiring all individuals to 
purchase health insurance would be an unprecedented form of federal action.  The government 
has never required people to buy any good or service as a condition of lawful residence in the 
United States.”2/  Sixteen years later, Congress took that unprecedented step by enacting Section 
1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act (hereinafter “PPACA” or “Act”),3/ which 
requires Plaintiffs and many other Americans to buy and maintain health insurance under the 
threat of financial penalties.  This individual mandate exceeds the authority granted to Congress 
by Article I of the United States Constitution and is, therefore, unconstitutional.  It also violates 
the rights of Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee as set forth in the Religious Freedom 
Restoration Act of 1993 (RFRA), 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq.  Because there is no jurisdictional 
or statutory bar to this action, this Court should grant Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment. 
ISSUES PRESENTED 
 
 I. Whether this Court has jurisdiction to decide the merits of Plaintiffs’ claims. 
 II. Whether Section 1501 of the PPACA, which requires Plaintiffs to buy and 
maintain health insurance under the threat of penalties, exceeds Congress’s authority. 
 III. Whether Congress intended Section 1501 to be severable from the PPACA which, 
unlike previous versions of federal health care legislation, does not include a severability clause. 
                                                 
 
2/ Congressional Budget Office, The Budgetary Treatment of an Individual Mandate to 
Buy Health Insurance, Aug. 1994, at 1, http://www.cbo.gov/ftpdocs/48xx/doc4816/doc38.pdf. 
 
 
3/ 111 Pub. L. No. 148, 124 Stat. 119, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 23, 2010, as amended 
by Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act (“HCERA”), 111 Pub. L. No. 152, 124 Stat. 
1029, 111th Cong., 2d Sess., Mar. 30, 2010.  The most relevant sections of these statutes are 
provided as Exhibits A and B. 
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 IV. Whether the imminent, threatened enforcement of Section 1501 against Plaintiffs 
Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee violates their rights under RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
SUMMARY OF KEY MATERIAL FACTS 
 Section 1501 of the PPACA begins with a findings section that focuses exclusively upon 
the purported Commerce Clause authority to enact the “individual responsibility requirement,” 
that is, the requirement that every person buy and maintain health insurance.4/  PPACA § 
1501(a), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 2-4, 10-12; Pl. SMF at 5-6.  The first substantive 
provision of Section 1501 is the individual mandate, which states that “[a]n applicable individual 
shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the 
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum essential coverage for 
such month.”  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(a); Ex. A, p. 4; Pl. SMF at 2-3. 
 Under the heading of “shared responsibility payment,” a separate subsection of Section 
1501 imposes a “penalty” upon a taxpayer for each applicable individual within his or her 
household who lacks health insurance coverage.  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(b)(1), as 
amended by § 10106(b)(1); Ex. A, p. 4, 12; Pl. SMF at 3.  The “administration and procedure” 
subsection of Section 1501 creates “special rules” ensuring that key traditional methods of tax 
enforcement are not available for the Section 1501 penalty.  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(g); 
Ex. A, p. 9; Pl. SMF at 5.  Section 1501 sets a “flat dollar amount” of the penalty per uninsured 
person per year—$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016 and later (increased in 2017 and later 
in relation to cost-of-living adjustments)—although the amount may be raised or lowered in 
certain circumstances.  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(c), as amended by § 10106(b)(2), (3), and 
as amended by HCERA § 1002; Ex. A, p. 4-6, 12-13 & Ex. B, p. 2-3; Pl. SMF at 4-5.  Section 
                                                 
 
4/ This short factual summary is drawn from Plaintiffs’ Statement of Material Facts 
(hereinafter Pl. SMF). 
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1501 then excludes certain persons from the definition of “applicable individual” and provides a 
few exemptions.  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(d), (e), as amended by § 10106(c), (d), and as 
amended by HCERA § 1002(b); Ex. A, pp. 6-8, 13 & Ex. B, pp. 2-3; Pl. SMF at 3.  None of 
these provisions excuse Plaintiffs from having to comply with the individual mandate.  See id.  
Also, the PPACA does not include a severability provision. 
 Plaintiffs are United States citizens who do not currently have health insurance and do 
not want or need such insurance.  Pl. SMF at 6-8.  Plaintiffs are not excluded or exempted from 
Section 1501’s requirements, and it is highly likely that they will be required to either buy and 
maintain health insurance or pay significant annual penalties on a continuing, indefinite basis 
beginning in 2014.  Pl. SMF at 7.  For example, it is highly likely that Plaintiff Rodriguez will be 
required to pay, at a minimum, $11,685 in penalties on behalf of herself and her household 
through 2020.  Pl. SMF at 9.  As a direct result of Section 1501’s inevitable impact upon 
Plaintiffs’ finances and lifestyle, they are compelled to adjust their finances now, by setting aside 
money, and will continue to do so, to pay the annual penalty.  Pl. SMF at 8-10.  As a result, 
Plaintiffs will be unable to use that money for other purposes now, directly limiting their ability 
to prudently plan for the future.  Pl. SMF at 8-10. 
SUMMARY JUDGMENT STANDARD 
 
 A motion for summary judgment should be granted when “the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as to any 
material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. R. Civ. P. 
56(c)(2).  As established herein, Plaintiffs are entitled to a grant of summary judgment. 
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ARGUMENT 
 
I. PLAINTIFFS’ CHALLENGE TO SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS RIPE 
BECAUSE THEY ARE PRESENTLY INJURED, AND WILL CONTINUE TO BE 
INJURED, DUE TO THE EXISTENCE AND THREATENED ENFORCEMENT 
OF SECTION 1501. 
 
 As explained in Plaintiff’s Statement of Material Facts, each Plaintiff would be forced to 
purchase and maintain health insurance or pay annual penalties for failing to do so if Section 
1501 were effective immediately, and it is highly likely that each Plaintiff will continue to be 
subject to Section 1501’s requirements for the indefinite future.  As such, they are compelled to 
adjust their financial affairs now to prepare to pay thousands of dollars to the government.  The 
imminent threat of annual penalties, coupled with the immediate and significant impact upon 
Plaintiffs’ financial priorities, gives rise to current, ripe injuries for purposes of Article III 
standing. 
 The Supreme Court has explained that Article III standing consists of three elements: 
First, the plaintiff must have suffered an “injury in fact”—an invasion of a legally 
protected interest which is (a) concrete and particularized, and (b) “actual or 
imminent, not ‘conjectural’ or ‘hypothetical.’”  Second, there must be a causal 
connection between the injury and the conduct complained of—the injury has to 
be “fairly . . . trace[able] to the challenged action of the defendant, and not . . . the 
result [of] the independent action of some third party not before the court.”  Third, 
it must be “likely,” as opposed to merely “speculative,” that the injury will be 
“redressed by a favorable decision.” 
 
Lujan v. Defenders of Wildlife, 504 U.S. 555, 560-61 (1992) (citations omitted).  “The party 
invoking federal jurisdiction bears the burden of establishing these elements.”  Id. at 561. 
 A “particularized” injury is one that “affect[s] the plaintiff in a personal and individual 
way,” id. at 560, n.1, while the element of “imminent” harm is “a somewhat elastic concept,” id. 
at 564 n.2, that “requires only that the anticipated injury occur within some fixed period of time 
in the future, not that it happen in the colloquial sense of soon or precisely within a certain 
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number of days, weeks, or months.”  Florida State Conference of NAACP v. Browning, 522 F.3d 
1153, 1161 (11th Cir. 2008).  The likelihood needed to establish the elements of standing, as 
explained by the D.C. Circuit, is a “substantial probability,” not absolute certainty.  St. John’s 
United Church of Christ v. FAA, 520 F.3d 460, 462 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (citing Sierra Club v. EPA, 
292 F.3d 895, 899 (D.C. Cir. 2002)).  Regarding the second and third elements, the D.C. Circuit 
has stated that “[t]he requirement is only that the injury be ‘fairly’ traceable to governmental 
action and that it is ‘likely’ to be assuaged by judicial resolution.  Certainty is not a prerequisite.”  
Int’l Union of Bricklayers & Allied Craftsmen v. Meese, 761 F.2d 798, 803 (D.C. Cir. 1985). 
 Concerning the ripeness of a plaintiff’s injury, courts “evaluate both the fitness of the 
issues for judicial decision and the hardship to the parties of withholding court consideration.”  
Abbott Labs. v. Gardner, 387 U.S. 136, 149 (1967).  The primary rationale of the ripeness 
doctrine is “to prevent the courts, through avoidance of premature adjudication, from entangling 
themselves in abstract disagreements. . . .”  Id. at 148.  A case presenting purely legal questions 
(such as the present case) is more fit for immediate review than one with key unresolved factual 
issues.  Id. at 149; Office of Commc’n of United Church of Christ v. FCC, 826 F.2d 101, 105 
(D.C. Cir. 1987); cf. Nat’l Ass’n of Home Builders v. United States Army Corps of Eng’rs, 417 
F.3d 1272 (D.C. Cir. 2005) (noting that “a purely legal claim in the context of a facial challenge . 
. . is ‘presumptively reviewable’”). 
 In addition, hardship to the parties is present when the challenged law places the plaintiff 
in a “very real dilemma,” “has a direct effect on the [plaintiff’s] day-to-day business,” or 
“requires an immediate and significant change in the plaintiffs’ conduct of their affairs.”  Abbott 
Labs., 387 U.S. at 152-53.  Moreover, in Blanchette v. Connecticut General Insurance Corp. 
(Regional Rail Reorganization Act Cases), 419 U.S. 102 (1974), the Supreme Court stated that, 
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“[w]here the inevitability of the operation of a statute against certain individuals is patent, it is 
irrelevant to the existence of a justiciable controversy that there will be a time delay before the 
disputed provisions will come into effect.”  Id. at 143 (citations omitted).  Two key factors 
leading the Court to conclude that a challenge to provisions governing the final conveyance of 
rail properties was ripe, despite the absence of an immediate threat of enforcement, were the 
absence of significant factual disputes and the fact that “decisions to be made now or in the short 
future may be affected by whether or not the ‘conveyance taking’ issues are now decided.”  Id. at 
143-44 (emphasis added) (citations omitted). 
 For Plaintiffs, maintaining the pre-PPACA status quo for their personal finances is not an 
option.  Section 1501 forces Plaintiffs to choose now between two financially burdensome 
alternatives:  restructure their finances to free up money to buy unwanted health insurance that 
must be maintained indefinitely, or restructure their finances to free up money to pay penalties to 
the government indefinitely on an annual basis.  As in Blanchette, Plaintiffs’ financial decisions 
“to be made now or in the short future” are directly affected by whether the merits of their claims 
are decided now.  See id.; see also Ex. H, Virginia ex rel. Cuccinelli v. Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-
188, Memorandum Opinion Denying Motion to Dismiss, slip op. at 16 (E.D. Va. Aug. 2, 2010) 
(holding that Virginia’s challenge to the PPACA is ripe because states, insurance companies, 
employers, and individuals need to start preparing now to comply with the individual mandate).5/ 
 Consistent with Abbott Labs. and Blanchette, many cases have held that hardship is 
present for ripeness purposes when a statute poses an imminent, unwelcome dilemma for the 
plaintiff, even when the government’s enforcement of the provision will be delayed.  See, e.g., 
Pac. Gas & Elec. Co. v. State Energy Res. Conservation & Dev. Comm’n, 461 U.S. 190 (1983) 
                                                 
 
5/ A copy of the Sebelius decision has been provided as Exhibit H.  
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(holding that a challenge to a statutory provision was ripe because uncertainty over the 
provision’s legality affected plaintiff’s financial planning); Lake Carriers’ Ass’n v. Macmullan, 
406 U.S. 498 (1972) (holding that a claim was ripe because the plaintiff was compelled by 
practical circumstances to make changes to its sewage disposal systems in order to comply with 
a state law that depended, in part, on the future availability of pump-out facilities); Triple G 
Landfills, Inc. v. Bd. of Comm’rs of Fountain Cnty., 977 F.2d 287, 290 (7th Cir. 1992) (holding 
that a claim was ripe because the plaintiff’s decisions “now or in the short future may be 
affected” by the court’s decision to hear the case, while “[p]ostponing judicial action . . . would 
force an unwarranted dilemma upon [the plaintiff]”).6/ 
 The present case is similar to Riva v. Massachusetts, 61 F.3d 1003 (1st Cir. 1995), in 
which the court held that plaintiff Robert Keenan’s challenge to a state accidental disability 
retirement scheme was ripe.  In 1994, Keenan (age 56 at the time) was notified that the monthly 
amount of accidental disability benefits that he received would likely be reduced in 2002 when 
he reached age 65 due to the law.  Id. at 1006.  Keenan promptly joined a suit challenging the 
law despite the seven-year gap until his benefits would be reduced; as the court phrased it, he 
“subscrib[ed] to the adage that an ounce of prevention is sometimes worth a pound of cure.” Id. 
 In discussing Abbott Labs, the court noted that the hardship prong entailed an analysis of 
whether “the challenged action creates a ‘direct and immediate’ dilemma for the parties’” and 
whether “the sought-after declaration would be of practical assistance in setting the underlying 
controversy to rest.”  Id. at 1009-10 (citations omitted).  The government argued that whether 
                                                 
 
6/ McConnell v. FEC, 540 U.S. 93, 224-26 (2003), is distinguishable because there is a 
key difference between a challenge to a provision that might affect decisions that the plaintiff 
will make five years later (such as the decisions that Senator McConnell would make 
immediately before a future election) and a challenge to a provision that has a direct impact on 
the plaintiffs’ decision-making now (such as Plaintiffs’ current financial planning in this case). 
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Keenan’s benefits would actually be reduced was speculative because he could die before age 
65, he could no longer be disabled at that age, or the state law could be amended over the next 
seven years.  Id. at 1011.  The court held that, despite these potential contingencies, Keenan’s 
injury was “highly probable.”  Id.  The court explained: 
In all events, a litigant seeking shelter behind a ripeness defense must 
demonstrate more than a theoretical possibility that harm may be averted.  The 
demise of a party or the repeal of a statute will always be possible in any case of 
delayed enforcement, yet it is well settled that a time delay, without more, will not 
render a claim of statutory invalidity unripe if the application of the statute is 
otherwise sufficiently probable. . . . The degree of contingency is an important 
barometer of ripeness in this respect. . . . 
 
Id. (emphasis added) (citing Blanchette, 419 U.S. at 143; Macmullan, 406 U.S. at 503-08). 
 Additionally, the court held that “the most immediate harm to Keenan comes in the form 
of an inability prudently to arrange his fiscal affairs.”  Id. at 1012 (emphasis added).  The court 
explained: 
If Keenan anticipates that his benefits will not be reduced, and guesses wrong, he 
may find himself inadequately prepared to subsist on the unwanted birthday 
present—a drastically reduced pension—that will accompany his attainment of 
age 65. Conversely, if he anticipates that the statute will be upheld, and guesses 
wrong, he may needlessly deprive himself in the intervening seven years, 
preparing for a rainy day that never dawns. We believe that this uncertainty and 
the considerations of utility that we have mentioned coalesce to show that Keenan 
is suffering a sufficient present injury to satisfy the second prong of the Abbott 
Labs paradigm. 
 
Id. (citing, inter alia, Pac. Gas, 461 U.S. at 201).7/ 
 Moreover, the harm to Plaintiffs’ ability to arrange their fiscal affairs is similar in 
principle to forms of ripe economic injuries recognized in other cases.  For example, in Stilwell 
                                                 
 
7/ Riva is consistent with cases within the D.C. Circuit recognizing that various forms of 
economic harm can give rise to a ripe injury for standing purposes.  See generally Brooks v. Air 
Line Pilots Ass’n, Int’l, 630 F. Supp. 2d 52 (D.D.C. 2009) (stating that the harm in Riva of the 
receipt of less benefits was more likely to occur than the speculative harm alleged in Brooks; the 
court did not question or criticize Riva’s holdings concerning ripeness). 
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v. Office of Thrift Supervision, 569 F.3d 514 (D.C. Cir. 2009), an investor challenged a 
regulation allowing subsidiaries of mutual holding companies to prevent any person from 
acquiring more than 10% of the subsidiary’s stock within five years of the stock’s issuance.  The 
government argued that the plaintiff’s claim was speculative because, although he had acquired 
more than 10% of minority stock in certain subsidiaries in the past and wanted to do so again in 
the future, it was impossible to determine at that time whether any specific mutual holding 
companies the plaintiff might decide to invest in would choose to adopt a 10% rule in the future. 
 The D.C. Circuit Court held that the plaintiff could show a ‘“substantial probability’ of 
injury as a result of the rule” in light of his “past practice and future investment plans.”  Id. at 
518 (quoting St. John’s, 520 F.3d at 462).  The court concluded that it was likely that at least 
some mutual holding companies would adopt the 10% rule which would, in turn, likely “harm 
Stilwell’s investment prospects” and “economic interests” because he expressed an intent to 
continue to obtain more than 10% of certain subsidiaries.  Id. at 518-19. 
 Similarly, there is a substantial probability that Plaintiffs will be required to pay 
thousands of dollars to the government in penalties due to their unwillingness to purchase and 
maintain health insurance.  This imposes a direct and substantial harm upon Plaintiffs’ 
“economic interests” because they are required to readjust their fiscal affairs now to prepare to 
pay these penalties.  See id.  The injury to Plaintiffs’ economic interests falls within the general 
class of economic or aesthetic injuries that courts have held to be sufficient to establish Article 
III standing.8/  In sum, Plaintiffs’ claims are ripe, and they have standing to proceed with their 
claims, which present pure questions of law that should be resolved on the merits. 
                                                 
 
8/ See Friends of the Earth, Inc. v. Laidlaw Envtl. Servs., Inc., 528 U.S. 167, 183-84 
(2000) (noting that a negative impact upon a plaintiff’s “recreational, aesthetic, and economic 
interests” can constitute an injury-in-fact); Clinton v. City of New York, 524 U.S. 417, 432-33 
                     (Text of footnote continues on following page.) 
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II. SECTION 1501 OF THE PPACA IS UNCONSTITUTIONAL BECAUSE IT 
EXCEEDS CONGRESS’S AUTHORITY UNDER ARTICLE I OF THE UNITED 
STATES CONSTITUTION. 
 
 The Supreme Court has noted that “[t]he Constitution creates a Federal Government of 
enumerated powers.  See U.S. Const. Art. I, § 8.  As James Madison wrote, ‘the powers 
delegated by the proposed Constitution to the federal government are few and defined.  Those 
which are to remain in the State governments are numerous and indefinite.’”  United States v. 
Lopez, 514 U.S. 549, 552 (1995) (quoting The Federalist No. 45, pp. 292-93 (C. Rossiter ed. 
1961)).  Section 1501 of the PPACA exceeds the “few and defined” powers of Congress, 
including those provided by the Commerce, Necessary and Proper, and Taxing Clauses, and is 
therefore unconstitutional.  See id. 
 A. Section 1501 is not authorized by the Commerce Clause. 
 
 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o regulate 
commerce with foreign nations, and among the several States, and with the Indian tribes.”  Pl. 
SMF at 5.  Although the scope of this power has been broadened from the original understanding 
of a power to “prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed,” Gibbons v. Ogden, 22 
U.S. (9 Wheat.) 1, 196 (1824), the Supreme Court has consistently held that Congress’s assertion 
and exercise of this power is not unlimited. 
 A review of four key Commerce Clause cases demonstrates that Section 1501 of the 
PPACA exceeds the outer bounds of this power.  In particular, the Commerce Clause does not 
authorize Congress to “regulate” inactivity by requiring individuals to buy a good or service 
                                                                                                                                                             
(1998) (finding a “sufficient likelihood of economic injury” and quoting a treatise that noted that 
the Court “routinely recognizes probable economic injury resulting from [governmental actions] 
that alter competitive conditions as sufficient to satisfy [Article III]”); Assoc. of Data Processing 
Serv. Orgs., Inc. v. Camp, 397 U.S. 150, 152 (1970) (holding that standing can be based on non-
economic or economic injuries, such as increased competition that “might entail some future loss 
of profits”). 
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(such as health insurance) as a condition of their lawful residence in the United States, nor does it 
give Congress carte blanche to include unconstitutional provisions within a larger scheme of 
regulation of commercial activity.  Pl. SMF at 5-6. 
1. Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942). 
 
 In Wickard v. Filburn, 317 U.S. 111 (1942), the Supreme Court upheld provisions of the 
Agricultural Adjustment Act that authorized a penalty to be imposed on the plaintiff for growing 
more wheat than the marketing quota set for his farm.  The Act limited wheat production to limit 
supply and stabilize market prices.  Id. at 115-16.  The plaintiff grew more than twice the quota 
for his farm; he typically sold a portion of his wheat in the marketplace, used a portion for 
feeding his livestock and home consumption, and kept the rest for future use.  Id. at 114-15. 
The plaintiff argued that the Act exceeded Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause 
because the activities regulated were local and had only an indirect effect upon interstate 
commerce.  Id. at 119.  The Court upheld the Act, stating “even if appellee’s activity be local and 
though it may not be regarded as commerce, it may still, whatever its nature, be reached by 
Congress if it exerts a substantial economic effect on interstate commerce . . . .”  Id. at 125.  The 
Court emphasized that the key question was whether the economic activity at issue substantially 
affected interstate commerce.  Id. at 124. 
 The Court reviewed a summary of the economics of the wheat industry, which outlined 
the interrelationship between market prices and wheat supply in local communities, the United 
States, and the world, id. at 125-28, and observed that “[t]he effect of the statute before us is to 
restrict the amount [of wheat] which may be produced for market and the extent as well to which 
one may forestall resort to the market by producing to meet his own needs.”  Id. at 127 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, the penalty targeted farmers who, like the plaintiff, grew far more wheat 
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than the amount needed to fill their own demand in order to sell most of the excess in the market; 
as such, Wickard does not stand for the proposition that Congress may regulate non-economic 
activity, or inactivity, that may have some relationship to interstate commerce.  Rather, the Court 
held that Congress may regulate purely local economic activity (growing a marketable 
commodity that may be sold in the market or consumed by the grower) when that economic 
activity, taken in the aggregate, is directly tied to and substantially effects interstate commerce. 
 Wickard provides no support for Section 1501 of the PPACA.  The statute in Wickard 
targeted a specific economic activity—the over-production of wheat, the excess of which was 
often sold in the market for commercial gain—which substantially affected prices in the 
interstate market for that commodity.  Congress could not have dealt with the issue of low wheat 
prices by declaring that all Americans must buy a specific amount of wheat or pay a penalty for 
failing to do so.  An individual’s decision to not buy a specific amount of wheat, when viewed in 
the aggregate, would certainly have impacted overall demand for wheat as well as wheat prices, 
yet the power “[t]o regulate commerce . . . among the several States,” U.S. Const. art. I, § 8, 
would not authorize a mandate that individuals who do not want to buy wheat must do so. 
Similarly, Wickard provides no support for Section 1501’s mandate that individuals who do not 
want to engage in a commercial transaction (purchasing health insurance) must do so. 
2. United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995). 
 
 United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (1995), illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds 
Congress’s authority.  In Lopez, the Court held the Gun Free School Zones Act, which prohibited 
the possession of a firearm within 1,000 feet of a school, exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause 
authority because it was a law that “has nothing to do with ‘commerce’ or any sort of economic 
enterprise, however broadly one might define those terms.”  Id. at 561.  The Court discussed 
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12    Filed 08/10/10   Page 35 of 64
 13 
 
Gibbons v. Ogden—the Court’s first comprehensive review of the Commerce Clause—which 
stated, “‘[c]ommerce, undoubtedly, is traffic, but it is something more:  it is intercourse.  It 
describes the commercial intercourse between nations, and parts of nations, in all its branches, 
and is regulated by prescribing rules for carrying on that intercourse.’”  Id. at 553 (quoting 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 189-90).  The Gibbons Court observed that the power to “regulate” interstate 
commerce is the power to “‘prescribe the rule by which commerce is to be governed’” and noted 
that “‘[t]he enumeration [of the power] presupposes something not enumerated.’” Id. (quoting 
Gibbons, 22 U.S. at 194-95, 196); see also id. at 585-88 (Thomas, J., concurring) (noting that the 
original understanding of “commerce” and the Commerce Clause was much more limited than 
the Court’s modern interpretation). 
 The Lopez Court reiterated the observation made in NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel 
Corp., 301 U.S. 1 (1937), that the Commerce Clause “‘must be considered in the light of our 
dual system of government and may not be extended so as to embrace effects upon interstate 
commerce so indirect and remote that to embrace them, in view of our complex society, would 
effectually obliterate the distinction between what is national and what is local and create a 
completely centralized government.’”  Id. at 557 (quoting Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 
37).  In light of this concern, the Court identified three “categories of activity” that the 
Commerce Clause authorizes Congress to regulate: 
First, Congress may regulate the use of the channels of interstate commerce. 
Second, Congress is empowered to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of 
interstate commerce, or persons or things in interstate commerce, even though the 
threat may come only from intrastate activities.  Finally, Congress’ commerce 
authority includes the power to regulate those activities . . . that substantially 
affect interstate commerce. 
 
Id. at 558-59 (citations omitted). 
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 The Court summarized previous cases dealing with the third category of activity as 
holding that, “[w]here economic activity substantially affects interstate commerce, legislation 
regulating that activity will be sustained.”  Id. at 560 (emphasis added).  As such, the Act 
exceeded Congress’s authority because possessing a gun in a school zone was clearly not 
economic activity, nor was the Act “an essential part of a larger regulation of economic activity, 
in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless the intrastate activity were regulated.  It 
cannot, therefore, be sustained under our cases upholding regulations of activities that arise out 
of or are connected with a commercial transaction, which viewed in the aggregate, substantially 
affects interstate commerce.”  Id. at 561.  The Court found it significant that the Act “‘plows 
thoroughly new ground and represents a sharp break with the long-standing pattern of federal 
firearms legislation.’”  Id. at 563 (citation omitted). 
 The government argued that the Court should focus on whether, through a chain of 
inferences, possession of guns in a school zone may, in the aggregate, substantially affect 
interstate commerce, rather than focusing on whether the statute targeted economic activity.  For 
example, the government cited the cost-shifting impact on the insurance system, arguing that gun 
possession may lead to violent crime, and “the costs of violent crime are substantial, and, 
through the mechanism of insurance, those costs are spread throughout the population.”  Id. at 
563-64.  In rejecting these arguments, the Court responded by stating: 
We pause to consider the implications of the Government’s arguments.  The 
Government admits, under its “costs of crime” reasoning, that Congress could 
regulate not only all violent crime, but all activities that might lead to violent 
crime, regardless of how tenuously they relate to interstate commerce. . . . 
Similarly, under the Government’s “national productivity” reasoning, Congress 
could regulate any activity that it found was related to the economic productivity 
of individual citizens: family law (including marriage, divorce, and child 
custody), for example.  Under the theories that the Government presents in 
support of § 922(q), it is difficult to perceive any limitation on federal power, 
even in areas such as criminal law enforcement or education where States 
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historically have been sovereign.  Thus, if we were to accept the Government’s 
arguments, we are hard pressed to posit any activity by an individual that 
Congress is without power to regulate. 
 
Id. (emphasis added). 
 The Court noted, in rejecting the government’s unduly expansive view of congressional 
power, that the Constitution “withhold[s] from Congress a plenary police power that would 
authorize enactment of every type of legislation,” id. at 566, and stated, 
[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile inference 
upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority 
under the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the 
States. . . .  To [expand the scope of the Commerce Clause] would require us to 
conclude that the Constitution’s enumeration of powers does not presuppose 
something not enumerated, . . . and that there never will be a distinction between 
what is truly national and what is truly local. This we are unwilling to do. 
 
Id. at 567-68 (citations omitted); see also id. at 577-78 (Kennedy, J., concurring) (noting the 
importance of federalism principles in interpreting the scope of the Commerce Clause). 
 Section 1501 does not withstand scrutiny under Lopez.  Being lawfully present within the 
United States, like possessing a gun within 1,000 feet of a school, is not a commercial or 
economic activity that substantially affects interstate commerce.  It is significant that the cases 
Lopez relied upon refer to ongoing commercial or economic activities that Congress may 
regulate.9/  These cases provide no support for the assertion that the power to “‘prescribe the rule 
by which commerce is to be governed’” includes the power to force those who do not want to 
engage in a commercial or economic activity to do so.  See id. at 553 (quoting Gibbons, 22 U.S. 
at 196).  As in Lopez, “[t]o uphold the Government’s contentions here, we would have to pile 
                                                 
 
9/ See, e.g., United States v. Wrightwood Dairy Co., 315 U.S. 110, 119 (1942); United 
States v. Darby, 312 U.S. 100, 118 (1941); Jones & Laughlin Steel, 301 U.S. at 37; Gibbons, 22 
U.S. at 196. 
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inference upon inference in a manner that would bid fair to convert congressional authority under 
the Commerce Clause to a general police power of the sort retained by the States.”  Id. at 567.  
 A review of Section 1501’s findings illustrates that Congress’s assertion of Commerce 
Clause power is unprecedented in its reach.  First and foremost, Congress sought to obscure 
entirely the distinction between inactivity and economic activity, stating “[t]he requirement 
regulates activity that is commercial and economic in nature:  economic and financial decisions 
about how and when health care is paid for, and when health insurance is purchased.”  PPACA § 
1501(a)(2)(A), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 10 (emphasis added).  In other words, 
Congress asserted that being lawfully present in the United States without health insurance is the 
economic activity of deciding to not buy health insurance; as such, Congress may “regulate” that 
economic activity by requiring individuals to make a different economic decision, i.e., buy health 
insurance.  Under this reasoning, virtually any decision to not buy a good or service would be 
“economic activity” that can be targeted by a law requiring individuals to buy that good or 
service. 
 Congress’s attempt to convert inaction into action is fundamentally flawed because it 
equates abstract economic decision-making with concrete economic activity.  Most American 
adults make numerous choices on a daily basis concerning when and whether to spend money on 
an array of goods and services.  A person may choose to buy X and choose not to buy Y. Under 
Congress’s reasoning, so long as Congress has the authority to regulate the interstate market for 
Y (which is often the case), it can mandate that all individuals take part in the market for Y as 
consumers.  Congress would merely need to assert that decisions about whether to purchase Y 
are commercial and economic in nature, and that individuals’ decisions to not buy Y 
substantially affect interstate commerce. 
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 In addition, Congress stated in Section 1501 that “[t]he economy loses up to 
$207,000,000,000 a year because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the uninsured,” and 
Section 1501 would “significantly reduce this economic cost.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(E), as 
amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 11.  If the economic impact of Americans’ poorer health and 
shorter lifespans provided a sufficient basis for Congress to mandate that individuals buy health 
insurance, then Congress could also mandate that individuals take other actions that Congress 
deems necessary to improve health and lengthen life expectancies—such as requiring Americans 
to buy a gym membership, maintain a specific body weight, or eat a healthier diet—or pay 
penalties for failing to do so.  
 Congress also alleged that Section 1501 would lower the cost of health insurance 
premiums because “[t]he cost of providing uncompensated care to the uninsured was 
$43,000,000,000 in 2008,” which was passed on to private insurers and individuals who have 
private insurance.  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(F), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 11.  The 
government made a virtually identical cost-shifting argument in Lopez,10/ but the Supreme Court 
held that Congress can only reach “economic activity” that substantially affects interstate 
commerce; neither gun possession nor lawful presence in the United States is economic activity. 
                                                 
 
10/ The government stated in its merits brief in Lopez: 
 
The economic consequences of criminal behavior are substantial . . . and, through 
the mechanism of insurance, spread throughout the population. 
. . . . 
 
See, e.g., Ruttenberg, The Limited Promise of Public Health Methodologies To 
Prevent Youth Violence, 103 YALE L.J. 1885, 1887 n.11 (1994) (noting that “one 
study calculated the average cost of hospital treatment for gunshot victims at 
$13,200, with individual cases ranging as high as $495,000”). 
 
Brief for the United States, at *28, n.9, United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S. 549 (No. 93-1260), 1994 
U.S. S. Ct. Briefs LEXIS 410 (footnote omitted). 
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 Moreover, Congress declared that requiring individuals to buy health insurance will 
benefit those who participate in the health insurance market in various ways, such as by 
“increasing the supply of, and demand for, health care services,” “reduc[ing] administrative costs 
and lower[ing] health insurance premiums,” “broaden[ing] the health insurance risk pool to 
include healthy individuals,” and “creating effective health insurance markets in which improved 
health insurance products that are guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-existing 
conditions can be sold.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(C), (I), (J), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, pp. 
11-12.  The Commerce Clause has never been understood, however, to authorize Congress to 
force unwilling purchasers into a market to remedy perceived market shortcomings or increase 
demand, and Congress has never previously attempted to do so.  Pl. SMF at 6.  As Judge Henry 
Hudson recently noted in a case involving the PPACA, Section 1501 “literally forges new 
ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its current high water mark.”  Ex. H, 
Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188, slip op. at 18; see also id. at 25 (“Never before has the Commerce 
Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far”). 
 There have been many times throughout American history when changing market 
conditions was a desirable goal, yet 
never before has [Congress] used its commerce power to mandate that an 
individual person engage in an economic transaction with a private company. 
Regulating the auto industry or paying “cash for clunkers” is one thing; making 
everyone buy a Chevy is quite another.  Even during World War II, the federal 
government did not mandate that individual citizens purchase war bonds. 
 
Randy E. Barnett, Is health-care reform constitutional?, WASH. POST., Mar. 21, 2010, at B2.  
Although the PPACA is the first federal law to cross the line between encouraging increased 
market activity and mandating individual purchases, it will certainly not be the last if Section 
1501 is upheld. 
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3. United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000). 
 
 United States v. Morrison, 529 U.S. 598 (2000), also demonstrates that Section 1501 
exceeds Congress’s power.  In Morrison, the Court held that Section 13981 of the Violence 
Against Women Act, which provided a civil remedy for victims of gender-motivated violence, 
exceeded Congress’s Commerce Clause authority because “[g]ender-motivated crimes of 
violence are not, in any sense of the phrase, economic activity.”  Id. at 613 (emphasis added).  
Congress found that gender-motivated violence deters interstate travel and commerce, 
diminishes national productivity, increases medical costs, and decreases the supply of and 
demand for interstate products, id. at 615, but the Court rejected the argument “that Congress 
may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal conduct based solely on that conduct’s aggregate 
effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 617-18.  The Court observed that cases in which it had 
upheld an assertion of Commerce Clause authority due to the substantial effects on interstate 
commerce of the regulated activity involved the regulation of “commerce,” an “economic 
enterprise,” “economic activity,” or “some sort of economic endeavor” that substantially affects 
interstate commerce.  Id. at 610-11.  The Court observed that the government’s attenuated 
method of reasoning was similar to the reasoning offered in Lopez and raised concerns that 
“Congress might use the Commerce Clause to completely obliterate the Constitution’s 
distinction between national and local authority.”  Id. at 615. 
 Morrison illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s Commerce Clause authority 
for the same reasons cited above with respect to Lopez.  Following the attenuated chain of 
inferences offered in support of Section 1501 would lead to an unchecked federal police power 
allowing Congress to, for the first time, mandate a host of purchases by individuals. 
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4. Gonzalez v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005). 
 
 Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U.S. 1 (2005), does not support Section 1501 either.  In Raich, the 
Court considered “whether Congress’ power to regulate interstate markets for medicinal 
substances encompasses the portions of those markets that are supplied with drugs produced and 
consumed locally.”  Id. at 9.  The Controlled Substances Act (CSA) created a “closed regulatory 
system” governing the manufacture, distribution, and possession of controlled substances in 
order to “conquer drug abuse and to control the legitimate and illegitimate traffic in controlled 
substances.”  Id. at 12-13.  Under the CSA, the manufacture, distribution, or possession of 
marijuana was a criminal offense.  Id. at 14. 
 California residents who wanted to use marijuana for medicinal purposes under state law 
brought an as-applied challenge to the CSA.  Importantly, the Court emphasized that 
Respondents in this case do not dispute that passage of the CSA, as part of the 
Comprehensive Drug Abuse Prevention and Control Act, was well within 
Congress’ commerce power. . . . Nor do they contend that any provision or 
section of the CSA amounts to an unconstitutional exercise of congressional 
authority.  Rather, respondents’ challenge is actually quite limited; they argue that 
the CSA’s categorical prohibition of the manufacture and possession of marijuana 
as applied to the intrastate manufacture and possession of marijuana for medical 
purposes pursuant to California law exceeds Congress’ authority under the 
Commerce Clause. 
 
Id. at 15 (emphasis added). 
 The Court held that “[t]he CSA is a valid exercise of federal power, even as applied to the 
troubling facts of this case.”  Id. at 9.  The Court stated, “[o]ur case law firmly establishes 
Congress’ power to regulate purely local activities that are part of an economic ‘class of 
activities’ that have a substantial effect on interstate commerce.”  Id. at 17 (emphasis added) 
(citing Perez v. United States, 402 U.S. 146, 151 (1971); Wickard, 317 U.S. at 128-29).  
Moreover, “[w]hen Congress decides that the ‘total incidence’ of a practice poses a threat to a 
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national market, it may regulate the entire class.”  Id. (citing Perez, 402 U.S. at 154-55).  As 
such, “when ‘a general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de 
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no consequence.’”  Id.  
(citation omitted). 
 The Court stated that Wickard’s key holding was that “Congress can regulate purely 
intrastate activity that is not itself ‘commercial,’ in that it is not produced for sale, if it concludes 
that failure to regulate that class of activity would undercut the regulation of the interstate market 
in that commodity.”  Id. at 18.  The Court declared that in both Wickard and the case before it, 
“the regulation is squarely within Congress’ commerce power because production of the 
commodity meant for home consumption, be it wheat or marijuana, has a substantial effect on 
supply and demand in the national market for that commodity.”  Id. at 19.  Moreover, “the 
activities regulated by the CSA are quintessentially economic. . . .  The CSA is a statute that 
regulates the production, distribution, and consumption of commodities for which there is an 
established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26 (emphasis added). 
 The Court reiterated that, “‘[w]here the class of activities is regulated and that class is 
within the reach of federal power, the courts have no power to excise, as trivial, individual 
instances of the class.’”  Id. at 23 (quoting Perez, 402 U.S. at 154).  Since the manufacture and 
distribution of marijuana was an economic class of activity that Congress could regulate, 
Congress had a rational basis for believing that failure to regulate the intrastate 
manufacture and possession of marijuana would leave a gaping hole in the CSA.  
Thus, as in Wickard, when it enacted comprehensive legislation to regulate the 
interstate market in a fungible commodity, Congress was acting well within its 
authority to “make all Laws which shall be necessary and proper” to “regulate 
Commerce . . . among the several States.” U.S. Const., Art. I, § 8.  That the 
regulation ensnares some purely intrastate activity is of no moment.  As we have 
done many times before, we refuse to excise individual components of that larger 
scheme. 
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Id. at 22.  The Court described the marijuana ban as “merely one of many ‘essential part[s] of a 
larger regulation of economic activity, in which the regulatory scheme could be undercut unless 
the intrastate activity were regulated.’”  Id. at 24-25 (quoting Lopez, 514 U.S. at 561). 
 Raich provides no support for Section 1501.  Unlike Raich, this is not an as-applied 
challenge to a concededly valid regulatory scheme.  Rather, Plaintiffs contend that Section 1501 
exceeds Congress’s authority and should be declared unconstitutional.  Thus, Raich’s emphasis 
on the reluctance of courts to prohibit individual applications of a valid statutory scheme due to 
the de minimis nature of the impact of the plaintiff’s local conduct is not implicated by this case. 
 In addition, the statute in Raich (like the statute in Wickard) sought to discourage an 
ongoing “quintessentially economic” activity:  “the production, distribution, and consumption of 
commodities for which there is an established, and lucrative, interstate market.”  Id. at 25-26.  
The Court repeatedly emphasized that the substantial effects test governs the authority of 
Congress to target “activities that are part of an economic ‘class of activities.’”  Id. at 17 
(emphasis added) (citation omitted).  Since the statutory scheme was concededly valid, the Court 
presupposed that “the [regulated] class of activities . . . [was] within the reach of federal power.” 
Id. at 23.  By contrast, Section 1501 does not regulate an ongoing economic class of activities 
“within the reach of federal power.”  See id.  Lawful presence in the United States, without more, 
is not an economic class of activities akin to the production and distribution of a marketable 
commodity.  Raich does not support the idea that the targeted economic class of activities does 
not need to consist of activity but includes abstract decisions to not purchase a good or service. 
 Through the PPACA, Congress is not seeking to regulate existing local economic activity 
as a necessary component of regulating that type of economic activity nationwide but rather is 
forcing individuals who are not engaged in the economic activity of buying and maintaining 
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health insurance to do so.  Pl. SMF at 6.  The government can find no support from Wickard, 
Raich, or other cases for the proposition that Congress can—for the first time in our Nation’s 
history—declare that individuals who are not engaging in a particular economic activity must do 
so solely because other statutory provisions are attached to and connected with that mandate.11/ 
B. Section 1501 is not authorized by the Necessary and Proper Clause. 
 Article I, Section 8 of the Constitution grants Congress the power “[t]o make all Laws 
which shall be necessary and proper for carrying into Execution the foregoing Powers, and all 
other Powers vested by this Constitution in the Government of the United States, or in any 
Department or Officer thereof.”  Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s authority under this Clause, a 
provision that the Supreme Court has characterized as “the last, best hope of those who defend 
ultra vires congressional action.”  Printz v. United States, 521 U.S. 898, 923 (1997). 
 In a recent case, United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct. 1949 (2010), the Court upheld a 
federal civil commitment statute that authorized the continued detention of mentally ill, sexually 
dangerous federal prisoners beyond their normal release date.  The Court based its conclusion 
“on five considerations, taken together”: 
(1) the breadth of the Necessary and Proper Clause, (2) the long history of federal 
involvement in this arena, (3) the sound reasons for the statute’s enactment in 
light of the Government’s custodial interest in safeguarding the public from 
dangers posed by those in federal custody, (4) the statute’s accommodation of 
state interests, and (5) the statute’s narrow scope. 
                                                 
 
11/ In addition, statements in Lopez and Raich concerning Congress’s ability to enact a 
regulatory scheme targeting interstate economic activity that encompasses some purely local 
economic activity have no bearing upon Section 1501.  Although the Court noted in Raich that 
the laws upheld in Wickard and Raich were essential parts of a regulatory scheme, Raich does 
not stand for the broad proposition that Congress has free reign to pass otherwise 
unconstitutional laws by including them within a larger regulatory program.  Wickard and Raich 
held only that federal regulation of a particular type of economic activity—the production and 
consumption of a marketable commodity—can, in some circumstances, be applied to reach that 
type of existing economic activity at a purely local level when doing so is necessary and proper 
to the effective national regulation of that economic activity. 
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Id. at 1956, 1965. 
 Regarding the first factor, the Court stated that “the Necessary and Proper Clause grants 
Congress broad authority to enact federal legislation.”  Id. at 1956.  The Court quoted McCulloch 
v. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 Wheat.) 316 (1819), which stated, “‘[l]et the end be legitimate, let it be 
within the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate, which are plainly 
adapted to that end, which are not prohibited, but consist with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution, are constitutional.’”  Id. (quoting McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421).  A statute based upon 
the Necessary and Proper Clause must be “a means that is rationally related to the 
implementation of a constitutionally enumerated power.”  Id.  For example, the Clause allows 
Congress to create federal crimes that are tied to an enumerated power, authorize the creation of 
federal prisons to hold offenders, and set rules governing prisons and prisoners.  Id. at 1957-58. 
 With regard to the second and third factors, the Court characterized the statute as “a 
modest addition to a set of federal prison-related mental-health statutes that have existed for 
many decades.”  Id. at 1958.  The statute at issue, enacted in 2006, was a relatively minor 
supplement to another statute “which, since 1949, has authorized the postsentence detention of 
federal prisoners who suffer from a mental illness and who are thereby dangerous (whether 
sexually or otherwise).”  Id. at 1961.  The statute satisfied “‘review for means-end rationality’” 
because it “represent[ed] a rational means for implementing a constitutional grant of legislative 
authority.”  Id. at 1962.  The Court held that the statute was “reasonably adapted” to “Congress’ 
power to act as a responsible federal custodian.”  Id. at 1961. 
 The Court also held that the statute met the fourth factor of “properly account[ing] for 
state interests.”  Id. at 1962.  The statute “require[d] accommodation of state interests” by 
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providing the state in which the prisoner lived or was tried with a right to assume responsibility 
for the prisoner, which would end federal government involvement.  Id. at 1962-63. 
 Finally, the Court held that “the links between [the statute] and an enumerated Article I 
power are not too attenuated.  Neither is the statutory provision too sweeping in its scope.”  Id. at 
1963.  The link between the power to criminalize conduct that interferes with the exercise of an 
enumerated power and the power to imprison offenders is a close one, as is the link between the 
power to imprison and the power to maintain rules that ensure that prisoners do not endanger the 
safety of other prisoners or the public.  Id. at 1964.  Importantly, the Court’s holding would not 
“confer[] on Congress a general ‘police power, which the Founders denied the National 
Government and reposed in the States’” because the statute was “narrow in scope.”  Id. (quoting 
Morrison, 529 U.S. at 618).  The statute had “been applied to only a small fraction of federal 
prisoners,” and its reach was “limited to individuals already in the custody of the Federal 
Government.”  Id. (citations omitted).  As such, the Court concluded that the statute was “a 
reasonably adapted and narrowly tailored means of pursuing the Government’s legitimate 
interest as a federal custodian in the responsible administration of its prison system.”  Id. at 1965. 
 Comstock illustrates that Section 1501 exceeds Congress’s authority under the Necessary 
and Proper Clause.  Unlike the statute at issue in Comstock, Section 1501 is not “a modest 
addition” to previous federal law but rather is “sweeping in its scope.”  See id. at 1958, 1963.  
There is no long history of congressional mandates requiring individuals to purchase health 
insurance, or to purchase any good or service for that matter.  It takes an immense (and 
unconstitutional) leap to go from imposing regulations upon the health insurance industry and 
providing public insurance programs to mandating individual participation in the health 
insurance market. 
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 Moreover, Section 1501 tramples upon state interests.  Prior to Section 1501, states were 
free to determine for themselves whether to adopt a mandatory insurance system similar to 
Massachusetts’s or maintain a voluntary free market system.  See PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(D), as 
amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 11.  That is no longer the case.  If Section 1501 is upheld, 
many similar federal laws requiring individuals to buy goods or services would be possible 
(perhaps likely), further eroding state and local government authority in favor of a broad federal 
police power. 
 In addition, the Constitution does not give Congress carte blanche to enact any and every 
statute of its choosing so long as it bears some rational connection to a larger regulatory scheme.  
See generally Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 1970 (Alito, J., concurring) (“The Necessary and Proper 
Clause does not give Congress carte blanche”).  Section 1501’s findings section declares: 
Under the Employee Retirement Income Security Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et 
seq.), the Public Health Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the 
Federal Government has a significant role in regulating health insurance.  [Section 
1501] is an essential part of this larger regulation of economic activity, and the 
absence of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of the health 
insurance market. 
 
PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(H), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 11.  Congress made a similar 
argument with respect to Section 1501’s connection to PPACA provisions prohibiting insurance 
companies from denying coverage based upon preexisting medical conditions, arguing that 
Section 1501 will “broaden the health insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which 
will lower health insurance premiums.”  PPACA § 1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. 
A, p. 11.  The implications of this line of reasoning are stunning.  Congress has declared that it 
has the authority to mandate individual participation in an interstate market so long as 1) it has 
the authority to regulate the market itself, and 2) mandating individual participation in the market 
would, in Congress’s view, benefit the market’s present participants by, for example, lowering 
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prices, increasing demand, or making better products available.  Such a broad, unprecedented 
assertion of power clearly fails the test for “means-end rationality,” see Comstock, 130 S. Ct. at 
1961-62, and is by no means “appropriate” or “consist[ent] with the letter and spirit of the 
constitution,”  McCulloch, 17 U.S. at 421. 
 For example, Congressional power to regulate the interstate market for automobiles does 
not include the power to mandate that individuals buy an automobile or pay a penalty, even 
though such a mandate would increase demand and likely lower prices, and virtually all 
individuals will, at some point, participate in the broader market for transportation.  Similarly, 
Congress’s authority to regulate banking and the stock market does not give rise to a power to 
mandate that all individuals maintain a certain amount of money in a bank account or buy stocks 
or pay a penalty, even though such a mandate could benefit the economy.  Like Section 1501, 
such broad assertions of Congressional power would greatly exceed the bounds of Congress’s 
constitutional authority. 
C. Section 1501 is not authorized by the taxing power. 
 
 Congress based Section 1501 solely upon its assertion of Commerce Clause power 
(coupled with the Necessary and Proper Clause).  PPACA § 1501(a), as amended by § 10106(a), 
Ex. A, pp. 2-4, 10-12; Pl. SMF at 5-6.  Because Section 1501 exceeds those constitutional grants 
of authority, Plaintiffs anticipate that the government will seek to save Section 1501 by invoking 
Congress’s taxing power.  This attempt to breathe new life into Section 1501 is flawed for 
several reasons. 
 It is important to note that, when a court is presented with the question of which 
Congressional power(s) a statute was enacted under, the character of the statute itself is 
determinative, not the federal government’s characterization of the statute during litigation.  See, 
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e.g., Railway Executives Ass’n v. Gibbons, 455 U.S. 457, 465-66 (1982) (rejecting the 
government’s argument that Congress enacted a statute under the Commerce Clause rather than 
under the Bankruptcy Clause); Bd. of Trs. of the Univ. of Ill. v. United States, 289 U.S. 48, 58-59 
(1933) (stating that courts should be reluctant to recharacterize a statute that, on its face, has the 
purpose of imposing a Commerce Clause regulatory penalty as one that is merely a revenue-
raising tax measure). 
1. Congress relied exclusively upon its assertion of Commerce Clause 
power in Section 1501 and included the “penalty” as a regulatory 
measure expressly tied to the individual mandate, not a tax. 
 
 Several aspects of Section 1501 demonstrate that the “penalty” or “shared responsibility 
payment” for failing to maintain health insurance was enacted as a regulatory penalty under 
Congress’s assertion of Commerce Clause authority, not a “tax.”  See generally Randy E. 
Barnett, The Insurance Mandate in Peril, WALL ST. J., Apr. 29, 2010, at A19 (discussing the 
11th hour attempt of PPACA supporters to recharacterize the Section 1501 penalty as a “tax” 
rather than a regulatory penalty, and observing that “the Supreme Court will not consider the 
penalty enforcing the mandate to be a tax because, in the provision that actually defines and 
imposes the mandate and penalty, Congress did not call it a tax and did not treat it as a tax”). 
 First, the congressional findings subsection of Section 1501 relies exclusively upon the 
Commerce Clause as the constitutional basis for the “individual responsibility requirement” (the 
mandate to buy health insurance).  PPACA § 1501(a), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, pp. 2-4, 
10-12; Pl. SMF at 5-6.  The first finding declares that the mandate to purchase health insurance 
“is commercial and economic in nature, and substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result 
of the effects described in paragraph (2).”  PPACA § 1501(a)(1); Ex. A, p. 2.  The second 
paragraph, entitled “[e]ffects on the national economy and interstate commerce,” includes 
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statements made to bolster Congress’s assertion of Commerce Clause power and focuses 
exclusively on the goal of forcing people into the insurance market.  PPACA § 1501(a)(2), as 
amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, pp. 3-4, 10-12.  The findings do not mention the tax power, 
which is unsurprising given that the obvious purpose of Section 1501 is to force millions of 
Americans into the health insurance market rather than generate tax revenue.  See id. 
 Second, Congress expressly linked the penalty to the individual mandate such that the 
penalty provision becomes meaningless and unenforceable if the individual mandate is declared 
invalid.  The first substantive provision of Section 1501 is the individual mandate which states, 
“[a]n applicable individual shall for each month beginning after 2013 ensure that the individual, 
and any dependent of the individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under minimum 
essential coverage for such month.”  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(a); Ex. A, p. 4.  The 
provision that triggers the penalty states: 
If a taxpayer who is an applicable individual, or an applicable individual for 
whom the taxpayer is liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of 
subsection (a) [i.e., the individual mandate] for 1 or more months, then, except as 
provided in subsection (e) [which provides certain exemptions], there is hereby 
imposed on the taxpayer a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount 
determined under subsection (c). 
 
PPACA § 1501(b), at § 5000A(b)(1), as amended by § 10106(b)(1); Ex. A, pp. 4, 12 (emphasis 
added).  In other words, since Congress rested both the individual mandate and the penalty 
provision exclusively on its assertion of Commerce Clause power, a holding that the individual 
mandate exceeds the Commerce Clause power would invalidate the penalty provision as well. 
 In addition, Congress clearly differentiated between a “tax” and a “penalty” throughout 
the PPACA.  While Section 1501 uses the term “penalty” while expressly relying upon the 
Commerce Clause, several other sections of the PPACA impose a “tax” on particular activities or 
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entities.  See, e.g., PPACA §§ 9001, 9004, 9015, 9017; Ex. A, pp. 15-20; Pl. SMF at 3.  The 
distinction between a tax and a regulatory penalty is significant: 
“[A] tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of 
supporting the Government.”  On the other hand, a penalty imports the notion of a 
punishment for an unlawful act or omission.  “The two words [tax vs. penalty] are 
not interchangeable . . . and if an exaction [is] clearly a penalty it cannot be 
converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such.” 
 
Ex. H, Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188, slip op. at 26, n.7 (citations omitted).  Although the “practical 
operation” of a provision is more informative than “the precise form of descriptive words which 
may be applied to it,” Nelson v. Sears, Roebuck & Co., 312 U.S. 359, 363 (1941), it is telling that 
both the practical operation of the penalty and the words Congress used to create it are tied to the 
congressional purpose of forcing many more Americans into the health insurance market.  See 
Ex. H, Sebelius, No. 3:10-cv-188, slip op. at 1, 4, 11, 15, 16, 24, 30, 31 (consistently referring to 
the Section 1501 penalty as a “penalty,” “fine,” or “monetary assessment” rather than as a “tax”). 
 Moreover, Congress prohibited the use of key traditional tax enforcement measures to 
limit the government’s ability to collect the penalty for failing to maintain health insurance.  The 
Special Rules subsection of Section 1501 declares that a person “shall not be subject to any 
criminal prosecution or penalty” for failing to timely pay the penalty.  PPACA § 1501(b), at § 
5000A(g)(2)(A); Ex. A, p. 9; Pl. SMF at 5.  In addition, “[t]he Secretary shall not . . . file notice 
of lien with respect to any property of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the penalty 
imposed by this section,” or “levy on any such property with respect to such failure.”  PPACA § 
1501(b), at § 5000A(g)(2)(B); Ex. A, p. 9; Pl. SMF at 5.12/ 
                                                 
 
12/ The Anti-Injunction Act (“AIA”) does not preclude Plaintiffs’ claims.  Neither the 
AIA’s text nor its purpose justify applying it to a case in which, as here, the provision at issue 
has not yet taken effect, no tax-incurring conduct is yet possible, and no collection, assessment, 
withholding, or investigatory activities relating to currently owed or past due revenues are 
ongoing or even possible.  Simply put, the present suit cannot possibly be “for the purpose of 
                     (Text of footnote continues on following page.) 
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2. Section 1501’s penalty provisions exceed Congress’s taxing power 
because they exist solely to further a regulatory provision—the 
individual mandate—that is “extraneous to any tax need” and exceeds 
Congress’s Commerce Clause power. 
 
 The key question concerning the alleged tax authority for Section 1501 is whether the 
statute’s text demonstrates that the penalty provisions 1) are primarily regulatory in nature, in 
furtherance of regulatory provisions “extraneous to any tax need” that exceed Congress’s power 
to regulate, see United States v. Kahriger, 345 U.S. 22, 31 (1953), overruled in part on other 
grounds by Marchetti v. United States, 390 U.S. 39 (1968); or 2) are in the nature of a true tax, 
that is, an “exaction for the support of the Government,” see United States v. Butler, 297 U.S. 1, 
61 (1936).  
 As discussed previously, Section 1501’s text clearly indicates that Congress included the 
penalty for failing to maintain health insurance as a regulatory penalty under its assertion of 
Commerce Clause authority, not as “an exaction for the support of the Government” divorced 
from any purely regulatory provisions.  See Butler, 297 U.S. at 61.  The key provision of Section 
1501 is the individual mandate, which exceeds Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause.  
The individual mandate is clearly a regulatory provision “extraneous to any tax need,” see 
Kahriger, 345 U.S. at 31, since requiring individuals to purchase private health insurance does 
not produce revenues for the government.  Section 1501’s penalty provisions exist solely to 
                                                                                                                                                             
restraining the assessment or collection of any tax,” see 26 U.S.C. § 7421(a), because the 
individual mandate and the separate penalty provisions do not become effective until 2014.  The 
constitutional nature of Plaintiffs’ claims also does not affect the AIA’s inapplicability.  See, e.g., 
United States v. Clintwood Elkhorn Mining Co., 553 U.S. 1, 10 (2008); Alexander v. “Americans 
United,” 416 U.S. 752, 759–60 (1974).  In addition, the Declaratory Judgment Act, 28 U.S.C. § 
2201, is coterminous in its coverage with the Anti-Injunction Act.  See, e.g., Investment Annuity 
v. Blumenthal, 609 F.2d 1, 4 (D.C. Cir. 1979).  But see Cohen v. United States, Case No. 08-
5088, 599 F.3d 652 (D.C. Cir. 2010) (petition for rehearing en banc granted) (issues to be 
considered include “should D.C. Circuit precedent interpreting the Anti-Injunction Act and the 
Declaratory Judgment Act as ‘coterminous’ be overruled?”). 
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further the individual mandate, and courts should not look past the text for other “hidden 
motives.”  See Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506, 513-14 (1937).  As such, they exceed 
Congress’s taxing power.13/ 
3. The penalty for being lawfully present in the United States without 
health insurance is an unconstitutional direct or capitation tax, not an 
income or excise tax. 
 
 Even if this Court considers the penalty under Section 1501 to be a tax, it is an 
unconstitutional, unapportioned capitation or direct tax.  The Constitution recognizes the 
following types of taxes within Congress’s power: income taxes, direct taxes that are 
apportioned, and indirect taxes (excises, duties, and imposts) that are uniform.  U.S. Const. art. I, 
§§ 2, 8, 9, amend. XVI.  The case of Murphy v. IRS, 493 F.3d 170 (D.C. Cir. 2007), provides the 
relevant framework for considering whether Section 1501’s penalty provisions impose a direct or 
capitation tax or an income or excise tax. 
                                                 
 
13/ A footnote in Bob Jones University v. Simon, 416 U.S. 725 (1973), stating that the 
Court had abandoned “distinctions between regulatory and revenue-raising taxes” in Sonzinsky, 
as the government will no doubt argue in this case, did not signal the demise of Bailey v. Drexel 
Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U.S. 20 (1922), or Butler, cited in the text above.  
416 U.S. at 741 n.12.  Given that Sonzinsky cited Child Labor Tax Case with approval, the 
footnote merely reiterated what Sonzinsky itself held:  that a court should not look for a 
regulatory “hidden motive” when a statute’s text does not reveal one.  Child Labor Tax Case and 
Butler have continued to be quoted or cited with approval on various points since Bob Jones 
University.  See, e.g., Rosenberger v. Rector & Visitors of the Univ. of Virginia., 515 U.S. 819, 
840-41 (1995) (quoting Butler, 297 U.S. at 61) (distinguishing a university student activities fee 
program from “an exaction for the support of the Government”); Dep’t of Revenue v. Kurth 
Ranch, 511 U.S. 767, 779 (1994) (stating, “we have . . . recognized that ‘there comes a time in 
the extension of the penalizing features of the so-called tax when it loses its character as such 
and becomes a mere penalty with the characteristics of regulation and punishment’”) (quoting 
Magnano Co. v. Hamilton, 292 U.S. 40, 44, 46 (1934) (quoting Child Labor Tax Case, 259 U.S. 
at 38)); South Dakota v. Dole, 483 U.S. 203, 206-07, 209-10 (1987) (citing with approval 
Butler’s discussion of the scope of Congress’s spending authority); id. at 212-13, 216-17 
(O’Connor, J., dissenting) (noting that Butler’s discussion of the spending power is still 
instructive, although its view of the Commerce Clause is questionable); City of Pittsburgh v. 
Alco Parking Corp., 417 U.S. 369, 375-78 (1974) (citing Child Labor Tax Case and Sonzinsky in 
holding that an ordinance that recited as its purpose “to provide for the general revenue by 
imposing a tax” was valid). 
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 In Murphy, the court held that a tax imposed on compensatory damages for emotional 
distress was within Congress’s taxing power.  Id. at 171.  The court explained: 
[Article I, Section 9 of the Constitution states,] “No capitation, or other direct, tax 
shall be laid, unless in proportion to the census or enumeration herein before 
directed to be taken.”  See also U.S. CONST. art. I, § 2, cl. 3 (“direct taxes shall 
be apportioned among the several states which may be included within this union, 
according to their respective numbers”). 
. . . . 
 
Only three taxes are definitely known to be direct:  (1) a capitation, U.S. CONST. 
art. I, § 9, (2) a tax upon real property, and (3) a tax upon personal property. . . . 
Such direct taxes are laid upon one’s “general ownership of property,” . . . as 
contrasted with excise taxes laid “upon a particular use or enjoyment of property 
or the shifting from one to another of any power or privilege incidental to the 
ownership or enjoyment of property.” . . .  More specifically, excise taxes include, 
in addition to taxes upon consumable items, . . . taxes upon the sale of grain on an 
exchange, . . . the sale of corporate stock, . . . doing business in corporate form, . . 
. gross receipts from the “business of refining sugar,” . . . the transfer of property 
at death, . . . gifts, . . . and income from employment. . . . 
 
Id. at 180-81 (citations omitted). 
 The Murphy court considered “whether the tax [on emotional distress damages] . . . is 
more akin, on the one hand, to a capitation or a tax upon one’s ownership of property, or, on the 
other hand, more like a tax upon a use of property, a privilege, an activity, or a transaction.”  Id. 
at 184.  Similarly, this Court must determine whether Section 1501’s penalty is triggered by a 
particular use of property or an activity, privilege, or transaction—as the government will likely 
argue—or by one’s ownership (or non-ownership) of property or one’s existence.  Section 
1501’s penalty is not an excise tax upon the occurrence of a specific event or a particular use of 
property, but rather applies to persons who have done nothing other than be lawfully present in 
the United States without health insurance.  See id. at 180-81 (listing examples of excise taxes). 
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The penalty can be properly characterized as a penalty for one’s non-ownership of property (a 
health insurance policy) rather than on any use of property, privilege, activity, or transaction.14/ 
 Put another way, “a direct tax is a tax directly on objects having geographical locations. 
Capitation taxes, requisitions, and taxes on tangible property all satisfy this definition, because in 
all three cases, the subjects are taxed because they are ‘there’ (as opposed to because of what 
they do), and all are geographically located.”  Joseph M. Dodge, What Federal Taxes are Subject 
to the Rule of Apportionment Under the Constitution?, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. 839, 922 (2009) 
(emphasis added).  Section 1501 penalizes individuals because they “are ‘there’” and have not 
taken the affirmative step of buying health insurance, and taxes non-existent health insurance 
policies because they are not there.  See id.  There is no transaction or use of property that makes 
a person subject to the penalty; to the contrary, the penalty applies to all individuals simply 
because they exist unless they can demonstrate that they have taken the affirmative step of 
obtaining a health insurance policy (or that they fall within an exemption).  As such, if Section 
1501’s penalty is characterized as a “tax”, it is a direct tax that must be apportioned throughout 
the United States. 
 In addition, the PPACA’s penalty has key aspects of a capitation tax.  A capitation tax 
(also called a head tax or poll tax) is “a tax on a person because of the person’s existence.”15/  
                                                 
 
14/ Also, Section 1501’s penalty is not an income tax.  A person’s income level is just one 
of many factors that determine whether he or she must pay the penalty and, if so, what the 
amount is.  Among the other factors are the number of people within the taxpayer’s household, 
their age, their state of residence, see PPACA § 1201 (rates will be affected by which “rating 
area” of a state a person lives in), their affiliation with particular religious groups or health care 
sharing ministries, and whether each person in the household is lawfully present in the United 
States. 
 
 
15/ Dodge, 11 U. PA. J. CONST. L. at 841; see also Hylton v. United States, 3 U.S. (3 Dall.) 
171, 175 (1796) (opinion of Chase, J.) (stating that a capitation tax is imposed “without regard to 
property, profession, or any other circumstances”); Ellen Overmyer Lloyd, Comment, The 
                     (Text of footnote continues on following page.) 
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While the penalty imposed by Section 1501 is not identical in all respects to the capitation taxes 
of the 18th century, it has two key elements of a capitation tax.  First, it is “a tax on a person 
because of the person’s existence.”  See id. at 841.  Simply being a person lawfully present in the 
United States triggers the penalty; the onus is on the individual to demonstrate that he or she is 
exempted.  That no affirmative conduct is necessary to trigger Section 1501’s penalty 
distinguishes it from the vast majority of taxes or penalties that are accrued due to some event or 
transaction.  Second, Section 1501 lists specific head tax amounts per person; that some 
individuals will end up paying a greater or smaller amount does not take away from the fact that 
the listed amount is what many Americans will end up having to pay simply because they exist. 
In sum, regardless of whether the penalty is characterized as a capitation tax or other 
direct tax, it is unconstitutional because it is not apportioned in accordance with population. 
III. BECAUSE SECTION 1501 IS NOT SEVERABLE FROM THE REMAINDER OF 
THE PPACA, THE ENTIRE ACT IS INVALID. 
 
Generally, holding one provision of a law unconstitutional does not invalidate the rest of 
the law if the unconstitutional provisions are severable.  Alaska Airlines, Inc. v. Brock, 480 U.S. 
678, 684 (1987).  Section 1501 is not severable, however, so the PPACA is invalid in its entirety 
because Section 1501 is unconstitutional.  
“The inquiry into whether a statute is severable is essentially an inquiry into legislative 
intent.”  Minnesota v. Mille Lacs Band of Chippewa Indians, 526 U.S. 172, 191 (1999).  
“Congress could not have intended a constitutionally flawed provision to be severed from the 
remainder of the statute if the balance of the legislation is incapable of functioning 
independently.”  Alaska Airlines, 480 U.S. at 684.  A court must ask “whether [after removing 
                                                                                                                                                             
Taxman Cometh: The Constitutionality of Taxing Compensatory Damages for Non-Physical 
Injuries, 54 LOY. L. REV. 375, 411 (2008) (noting that a capitation tax under Hylton is “levied on 
a person just for being a person” and is “based on the simple fact of a person’s existence”). 
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the invalid provision] the [remaining] statute will function in a manner consistent with the intent 
of Congress.”  Id. at 685 (original emphasis omitted).  
Two factors demonstrate that Congress did not intend Section 1501 to be severable:  
First, Congress removed a severability clause from an earlier version of health care reform 
legislation; second, the PPACA’s remaining portions cannot function “in a manner consistent 
with the intent of Congress” without Section 1501.  See id.   
The Affordable Health Care for America Act (H.R. 3962), which the House approved on 
November 7, 2009, contained an individual mandate section as well as a provision that stated, 
“[i]f any provision of this Act, or any application of such provision to any person or 
circumstance, is held to be unconstitutional, the remainder of the provisions of this Act and the 
application of the provision to any other person or circumstance shall not be affected.”16/  H.R. 
3962’s severability provision, however, was not included in the final version of the PPACA, 
which lacks a severability clause.  See PPACA.  That Congress decided not to include a 
severability clause in the PPACA as enacted is strong evidence that Congress did not intend for 
the statute’s individual provisions to be severable. 
Moreover, consistent with the Supreme Court’s reasoning in Alaska Airlines, Congress 
could not have intended the individual mandate to be severable if severing it would allow an 
inoperable or counterproductive regulatory scheme to stand.  See 480 U.S. at 684.  For example, 
the PPACA forbids insurance providers from denying health insurance coverage to individuals 
because of preexisting medical conditions.  PPACA § 1201.  As noted previously, Congress 
                                                 
 
16/ H.R. 3962, § 255, 111th Cong., 1st Sess., Bill Summary & Status, 
http://thomas.loc.gov/cgi-bin/bdquery/z?d111:H.R.3962: (click on “Text of Legislation,” then 
the link for “Affordable Health Care for America Act (Engrossed in House [Passed House] - 
EH)”). 
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declared that the ban on exclusion for preexisting conditions would only be viable if individuals 
were forced into the insurance market through Section 1501’s individual mandate.  PPACA § 
1501(a)(2)(I), as amended by § 10106(a); Ex. A, p. 11.  Allowing Section 1201 to stand after 
declaring Section 1501 invalid could have a ruinous impact upon insurance companies, which 
would contradict the PPACA’s purposes.  As such, the most reasonable conclusion to draw is 
that Congress did not intend for the individual mandate to be severable from the rest of the 
PPACA.  In fact, it is fair to say that without the individual mandate, there would be no 
PPACA.17/  These observations, along with the fact that Congress deleted a severability 
provision from an earlier version of the health care reform legislation, lead inexorably to one 
conclusion:  the individual mandate is not severable from the PPACA’s remaining provisions, so 
the entire PPACA is invalid because Section 1501 is unconstitutional. 
IV. THE EXISTENCE AND THREATENED ENFORCEMENT OF SECTION 1501 
OF THE PPACA AGAINST PLAINTIFFS MEAD, SEVEN-SKY, AND LEE 
VIOLATES THEIR RIGHTS UNDER THE RELIGIOUS FREEDOM 
RESTORATION ACT. 
 
 Section 1501 requires Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee to choose between adhering 
to their religious beliefs about relying on God for their continued health and well-being and 
paying significant penalties to the government.  Since application of Section 1501 to these three 
Plaintiffs is not the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling governmental interest, it 
violates their rights as set forth in RFRA, 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb et seq. 
 RFRA states that the federal government “shall not substantially burden a person’s 
exercise of religion even if the burden results from a rule of general applicability,” 42 U.S.C. § 
                                                 
 
17/ This is not to say that the connection between the individual mandate and the rest of 
the PPACA, while relevant to the severability issue, is a basis for concluding that the individual 
mandate is within Congress’s power under the Commerce Clause or Necessary and Proper 
Clause, as illustrated in the previous sections of this memorandum. 
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2000bb-1(a), unless the government “demonstrates that application of the burden to the person . . 
. 1) is in furtherance of a compelling governmental interest; and 2) is the least restrictive means 
of furthering that compelling governmental interest.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(b).  RFRA also 
states that “[a] person whose religious exercise has been burdened in violation of this section 
may assert that violation as a claim or defense in a judicial proceeding and obtain appropriate 
relief against a government.”  42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-1(c).  
 The religious exercise protected by RFRA “includes any exercise of religion, whether or 
not compelled by, or central to, a system of religious belief,” 42 U.S.C. § 2000bb-2 (citing 42 
U.S.C. § 2000cc-5(7)(A)), and RFRA “restore[s] the compelling interest test as set forth in 
Sherbert v. Verner, 374 U.S. 398 (1963) and Wisconsin v. Yoder, 406 U.S. 205 (1972).” 42 
U.S.C. §§ 2000bb(b).  “A substantial burden exists when government action puts ‘substantial 
pressure on an adherent to modify his behavior and to violate his beliefs.’”  Kaemmerling v. 
Lappin, 553 F.3d 669, 678 (D.C. Cir. 2008) (quoting Thomas v. Review Bd., 450 U.S. 707, 718 
(1981)). 
 Section 1501 substantially burdens the religious beliefs of Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, 
and Lee for the reasons set forth in their Statement of Material Facts and accompanying 
declarations.  Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky and Lee strongly object to being required to either 
purchase health insurance coverage or pay penalties because they believe that God will provide 
for their health and financial needs.  Pl. SMF at 7-10.  Their religious exercise is substantially 
burdened because they will be forced to pay penalties, as the cost of adhering to their religious 
principles, because their objection to the insurance mandate is stronger than their objection to 
having to pay penalties.  The substantial burden upon Plaintiffs’ religious beliefs is already 
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affecting them because their current financial decision-making is directly affected by their need 
to prepare to pay penalties under Section 1501.  Pl. SMF at 8-10. 
 The government cannot meet its burden of demonstrating that application of Section 1501 
to Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee is the least restrictive means of furthering a compelling 
government interest.  “RFRA demands that ‘the compelling interest test [be] satisfied through 
application of the challenged law ‘to the person’—the particular claimant whose sincere exercise 
of religion is being substantially burdened.’”  Id. at 682 (emphasis added) (quoting Gonzales v. O 
Centro Espirita Beneficente Uniao Do Vegetal, 546 U.S. 418, 430-31 (2006)).  “A statute or 
regulation is the least restrictive means if ‘no alternative forms of regulation would [accomplish 
the compelling interest] without infringing [religious exercise] rights.’”  Id. at 684 (quoting 
Sherbert, 374 U.S. at 407). 
 The government cannot prove the existence of any compelling government interest that 
can be furthered only by requiring Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee to buy health insurance.  
The justifications offered for Section 1501, such as a desire to lower insurance premiums for 
those who are voluntarily insured, are not “compelling” government interests, and forcing 
Plaintiffs to buy health insurance is not the least restrictive way to further such interests. 
 As discussed previously, Section 1501’s insurance mandate is based upon Congress’s 
assertion of Commerce Clause authority, and its penalty is regulatory in nature, not designed to 
enlarge public revenue.  As such, Plaintiffs’ objection to being required to have health insurance 
is fundamentally different than an objection to being required to pay a general tax that the 
government uses to make payments to persons who are elderly, disabled, or poor.  The 
government’s interest in ensuring that Americans who cannot provide for themselves receive 
public support of some kind is much stronger than its interest in forcing Plaintiffs to have health 
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insurance.  See generally United States v. Lee, 455 U.S. 252, 258-60 (1982) (rejecting a free 
exercise challenge to the payment of Social Security taxes because the tax was indistinguishable 
from the payment of general income taxes, the income tax system could not function if all 
individuals who object to any use of public funds on religious grounds were exempted, and the 
Social Security system could not function if contributions were voluntary). 
CONCLUSION 
 For the foregoing reasons, Plaintiffs respectfully request that this Court grant their 
Motion for Summary Judgment in full (or in part as the Court may deem appropriate). 
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Public Law 111-148
111th Congress
An Act
Entitled The Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act.
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States o f America in Congress assembled,
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS.
(a) SHORT TITLE.--This Act may be cited as the "Patient Protec-
tion and Affordable Care Act".
(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.--The table of contents of this Act
is as follows;
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I--QUALITY, AFFORDABLE HEALTH CARE FOR ALL AMERICANS
Subtitle A---Immediate Improvements in Health Care Coverage for All Americans
Sec. 1001. Amendments to the Public Health Service Act.
"PART A-INDIVIDUAL AND GROUP MARKET REFORMS
"SUBPART II--IMPROVING COVERAGE
"Sec. 2711. No lifetime or annual limits.
"Sec. 2712. Prohibition on rescissions.
"Sec. 2713. Coverage of preventive health services.
"Sec. 2714. Extension of dependent coverage.
"Sec. 2715. Development and utilization of uniform explanation of coverage
documents and standardized definitions.
"Sec. 2716. Prohibition of discrimination based on salary.
"Sec. 2717. Ensuring the quality of care.
"Sec. 2718. Bringing down the cost of health care coverage.
"Sec. 2719. Appeals process.
Sec. 1002. Health insurance consumer information.
Sec. 1003. Ensuring that consumers get value for their dollars.
Sec. 1004. Effective dates.
Subtitle B-Immediate Actions to Preserve and Expand Coverage
Sec. 1101. Immediate access to insurance for uninsured individuals with a pre-
existing condition.
Sec. 1102. Reinsurance for early retirees.
Sec. 1103. Immediate information that allows consumers to identify affordable cov-
erage options.
Sec. 1104. Administrative simplification,
Sec. 1105. Effective date.
Subtitle C-Quality Health Insurance Coverage for All Americans
PART I-HEALTH INSURANCE MARKET REFORMS
Sec. 1201. Amendment to the Public Health Service Act.
"SUBPART I-GENERAL REFORM
"Sec. 2704. Prohibition of preexisting condition exclusions or other discrimina-
tion based on health status.
"Sec. 2701. Fair health insurance premiums.
"Sec. 2702. Guaranteed availability of coverage.
Mar. 23, 2010
H.R. 3590]
Patient
Protection and
Affordable Care
Act.
42 USC 18001
note.
EXHIBIT
I A
p. 1
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"(36) the small employer health insurance credit deter-
mined under section 45R.".
(c) CREDIT ALLOWED AGAINST ALTERNATIVE MINIMUM TAX.-
Section 38 ( c)(4)(B) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 (defining
26 USC 38 . specified credits ) is amended by redesignating clauses (vi), (vii),
and (viii ) as clauses (vii), (viii ), and (ix), respectively, and by
inserting after clause (v) the following new clause:
"(vi) the credit determined under section 45R,".
(d) DISALLOWANCE OF DEDUCTION FOR CERTAIN EXPENSES FOR
WHICH CREDIT ALLOWED.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 280C of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 (relating to disallowance of deduction for certain
expenses for which credit allowed ), as amended by section
1401(b), is amended by adding at the end the following new
subsection:
"(h) CREDIT FOR EMPLOYEE HEALTH INSURANCE EXPENSES OF
SMALL EMPLOYERS.-No deduction shall be allowed for that portion
of the premiums for qualified health plans ( as defined in section
1301(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act), or
for health insurance coverage in the case of taxable years beginning
in 2011, 2012 , or 2013, paid by an employer which is equal to
the amount of the credit determined under section 45R ( a) with
respect to the premiums.".
(2) DEDUCTION FOR EXPIRING CREDITS.-Section 196(c) of
such Code is amended by striking "and" at the end of paragraph
(12), by striking the period at the end of paragraph (13) and
inserting ", and", and by adding at the end the following new
paragraph:
"(14) the small employer health insurance credit deter-
mined under section 45R(a).".
(e) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of sections for subpart
D of part IV of subchapter A of chapter 1 of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following:
"Sec. 45R . Employee health insurance expenses of small employers.".
Applicability. (U EFFECTIVE DATES.-
26 USC 38 note. (1 ) IN GENERAL.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to amounts paid or incurred in taxable years begin-
ning after December 31, 2010.
(2) MINIMUM TAX.-The amendments made by subsection
(c) shall apply to credits determined under section 45R of
the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 in taxable years beginning
after December 31, 2010, and to carrybacks of such credits.
Subtitle F-Shared Responsibility for
Health Care
PART I--INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY
42 USC 18091. SEC. 1501. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.
(a) FINDINGS.-Congress makes the following findings:
(1) IN GENERAL.-The individual responsibility requirement
provided for in this section (in this subsection referred to as
the "requirement ") is commercial and economic in nature, and
substantially affects interstate commerce, as a result of the
effects described in paragraph (2).
p. 2
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(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.--The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:
(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commer-
cial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased.
(B) Health insurance and health care services are a
significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insur-
ance is sold by national or regional health insurance compa-
nies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
(C) The requirement, together with the other provisions
of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to the
health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services. According to the Congres-
sional Budget Office, the requirement will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private • employer-
based health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar require-
ment has strengthened private employer-based coverage:
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
(E) Half of all personal bankruptcies are caused in
part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing health
insurance coverage, the requirement, together with the
other provisions of this Act, will improve financial security
for families.
(F) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance which is in interstate commerce.
(G) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to pur-
chase health insurance until they needed care. By signifi-
cantly increasing health insurance coverage, the require-
ment, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions can be sold.
(H) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
p. 3
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markets. By significantly increasing health insurance cov-
erage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administra-
tive costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insur-
ance markets that do not require underwriting and elimi-
nate its associated administrative costs.
(3) SUPREME COURT RULING.--In United States v. South-
Eastern Underwriters Association (322 U.S. 533 (1944)), the
Supreme Court of the United States ruled that insurance is
interstate commerce subject to Federal regulation.
(b) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 48-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL
COVERAGE
"Sec. 5000A. Requirement to maintain minimum essential coverage.
26 USC 5000A. "SEC. 5000A. REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.
"(a) REQUIREMENT TO MAINTAIN MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COV-
ERAGE.-An applicable individual shall for each month beginning
after 2013 ensure that the individual, and any dependent of the
individual who is an applicable individual, is covered under min-
imum essential coverage for such month.
"(b) SHARED RESPONSIBILITY PAYMENT.---
Penalty. "(1) IN GENERAL.-If an applicable individual fails to meet
the requirement of subsection (a) for 1 or more months during
any calendar year beginning after 2013, then, except as pro-
vided in subsection (d), there is hereby imposed a penalty
with respect to the individual in the amount determined under
subsection (c).
"(2) INCLUSION WITH RETURN.-Any penalty imposed by
this section with respect to any month shall be included with
a taxpayer's return under chapter 1 for the taxable year which
includes such month.
"(3) PAYMENT OF PENALTY.-If an individual with respect
to whom a penalty is imposed by this section for any month-
"(A) is a dependent (as defined in section 152) of
another taxpayer for the other taxpayer's taxable year
including such month, such other taxpayer shall be liable
for such penalty, or
"(B) files a joint return for the taxable year including
such month, such individual and the spouse of such indi-
vidual shall be jointly liable for such penalty.
"(c) AMOUNT OF PENALTY.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The penalty determined under this sub-
section for any month with respect to any individual is an
amount equal to 442 of the applicable dollar amount for the
calendar year.
"(2) DOLLAR LIMITATION.-The amount of the penalty
imposed by this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year
with respect to all individuals for whom the taxpayer is liable
under subsection (b)(3) shall not exceed an amount equal to
300 percent the applicable dollar amount (determined without
p. 4
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regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for the calendar year with or within
which the taxable year ends.
"(3) APPLICABLE DOLLAR AMOUNT.-For purposes of para-
graph (1)-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-Except as provided in subpara-
graphs (B) and (C), the applicable dollar amount is 750.
"(B) PHASE IN.-The applicable dollar amount is $95
for 2014 and $350 for 2015.
"(C) SPECIAL RULE FOR INDIVIDUALS UNDER AGE 18.-
If an applicable individual has not attained the age of
18 as of the beginning of a month, the applicable dollar
amount with respect to such individual for the month shall
be equal to one-half of the applicable dollar amount for
the calendar year in which the month occurs.
"(D) INDEXING OF AMOUNT.-In the case of any calendar
year beginning after 2016, the applicable dollar amount
shall be equal to $750, increased by an amount equal
to-
"(i) $750, multiplied by
"(ii) the cost-of-living adjustment determined
under section 1(0(3) for the calendar year, determined
by substituting `calendar year 2015' for `calendar year
1992' in subparagraph (B) thereof.
If the amount of any increase under clause (i) is not a
multiple of $50, such increase shall be rounded to the
next lowest multiple of $50.
"(4) TERMS RELATING TO INCOME AND FAMILIES.-For pur-
poses of this section-
"(A) FAMILY SIZE.-The family size involved with
respect to any taxpayer shall be equal to the number of
individuals for whom the taxpayer is allowed a deduction
under section 151 (relating to allowance of deduction for
personal exemptions) for the taxable year.
"(B) HOUSEHOLD INCOME.-The term `household
income' means, with respect to any taxpayer for any taxable
year, an amount equal to the sum of-
"(i) the modified gross income of the taxpayer,
plus
"(ii) the aggregate modified gross incomes of all
other individuals who-
"(I) were taken into account in determining
the taxpayer's family size under paragraph (1),
and
"(II) were required to file a return of tax
imposed by section 1 for the taxable year.
"(C) MODIFIED GROSS INCOME.-The term `modified
gross income' means gross income-
"(i) decreased by the amount of any deduction
allowable under paragraph (1), (3), (4), or (10) of section
62(a),
"(ii) increased by the amount of interest received
or accrued during the taxable year which is exempt
from tax imposed by this chapter, and
"(iii) determined without regard to sections 911,
931, and 933.
"(D) POVERTY LINE.-
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"(i) IN GENERAL.-The term `poverty line' has the
meaning given that term in section 2110(c)(5) of the
Social Security Act (42 U.S.C. 1397jj(c)(5)).
"(ii) POVERTY LINE USED.--In the case ' of any tax-
able year ending with or within a calendar year, the
poverty line used shall be the most recently published
poverty line as of the 1st day of such calendar year.
"(d) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.--For purposes of this section-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `applicable individual' means,
with respect to any month, an individual other than an indi-
vidual described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4).
"(2) RELIGIOUS EXEMPTIONS.-
"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION,-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is a member of
a recognized religious sect or division thereof described
in section 1402(g)(1) and an adherent of established tenets
or teachings of such sect or division as described in such
section.
"(B) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-Such term shall not include any
individual for any month if such individual is a member
of a health care sharing ministry for the month.
"(ii) HEALTH CARE SHARING MINISTRY.--The term
`health care sharing ministry' means an organization-
"(I) which is described in section 501(c)(3) and
is exempt from taxation under section 501(a),
"(II) members of which share a common set
of ethical or religious beliefs and share medical
expenses among members in accordance with those
beliefs and without regard to the State in which
a member resides or is employed,
"(III) members of which retain membership
even after they develop a medical condition,
"(IV) which (or a predecessor of which) has
been in existence at all times since December 31,
1999, and medical expenses of its members have
been shared continuously and without interruption
since at least December 31, 1999, and
"(V) which conducts an annual audit which
is performed by an independent certified public
accounting firm in accordance with generally
accepted accounting principles and which is made
available to the public upon request.
"(3) INDIVIDUALS NOT LAWFULLY PRESENT.-Such term shall
not include an individual for any month if for the month the
individual is not a citizen or national of the United States
or an alien lawfully present in the United States.
"(4) INCARCERATED INDIVIDUALS.--Such term shall not
include an individual for any month if for the month the indi-
vidual is incarcerated, other than incarceration pending the
disposition of charges.
(e) EXEMPTIONS.-No penalty shall be imposed under sub-
section (a) with respect to-
"(1) INDIVIDUALS WHO CANNOT AFFORD COVERAGE.--
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"(A) IN GENERAL.--Any applicable individual for any
month if the applicable individual's required contribution
(determined on an annual basis) for coverage for the month
exceeds 8 percent of such individual's household income
for the taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act. For pur-
poses of applying this subparagraph, the taxpayer's house-
hold income shall be increased by any exclusion from gross
income for any portion of the required contribution made
through a salary reduction arrangement.
"(B) REQUIRED CONTRIBUTION.--For purposes of this Definition.
paragraph, the term `required contribution' means-
"(1) in the case of an individual eligible to purchase
minimum essential coverage consisting of coverage
through an eligible-employer-sponsored plan, the por-
tion of the annual premium which would be paid by
the individual (without regard to whether paid through
salary reduction or otherwise) for self only coverage,
or
"(ii) in the case of an individual eligible only to
purchase minimum essential coverage described in sub-
section (f)(1)(C), the annual premium for the lowest
cost bronze plan available in the individual market
through the Exchange in the State in the rating area
in which the individual resides (without regard to
whether the individual purchased a qualified health
plan through the Exchange), reduced by the amount
of the credit allowable under section 36B for the tax-
able year (determined as if the individual was covered
by a qualified health plan offered through the
Exchange for the entire taxable year).
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential cov-
erage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination shall be made by ref-
erence to the affordability of the coverage to the employee.
"(D) INDEXING.--In the case of plan years beginning Applicability.
in any calendar year after 2014, subparagraph (A) shall Determination.
be applied by substituting for `8 percent' the percentage
the Secretary of Health and Human Services determines
reflects the excess of the rate of premium growth between
the preceding calendar year and 2013 over the rate of
income growth for such period.
"(2) TAXPAYERS WITH INCOME UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POV-
ERTY LINE.--Any applicable individual for any month during
a calendar year if the individual's household income for the
taxable year described in section 1412(b)(1)(B) of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act is less than 100 percent
of the poverty line for the size of the family involved (deter-
mined in the same manner as under subsection (b)(4)).
"(3) MEMBERS OF INDIAN TRIBES.--Any applicable individual
for any month during which the individual is a member of
an Indian tribe (as defined in section 45A(c)(6)).
"(4) MONTHS DURING SHORT COVERAGE GAPS.--
"(A) IN GENERAL. Any month the last day of which
occurred during a period in which the applicable individual
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Applicability.
Definition,
was not covered by minimum essential coverage for a
continuous period of less than 3 months.
"(B) SPECIAL RULES.-For purposes of applying this
paragraph--
"(i) the length of a continuous period shall be deter-
mined without regard to the calendar years in which
months in such period occur,
"(ii) if a continuous period is greater than the
period allowed under subparagraph (A), no exception
shall be provided under this paragraph for any month
in the period, and
"(iii) if there is more than 1 continuous period
described in subparagraph (A) covering months in a
calendar year, the exception provided by this para-
graph shall only apply to months in the first of such
periods.
The Secretary shall prescribe rules for the collection of
the penalty imposed by this section in cases where contin-
uous periods include months in more than 1 taxable year.
"(5) HARDSHIPS. Any applicable individual who for any
month is determined by the Secretary of Health and Human
Services under section 1311(d)(4)(H) to have suffered a hardship
with respect to the capability to obtain coverage under a quali-
fied health plan.
"U) MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE,-For purposes of this sec-
tion-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `minimum essential coverage'
means any of the following:
"(A) GOVERNMENT SPONSORED PROGRAMS.-Coverage
under--
"(i) the Medicare program under part A of title
XVIII of the Social Security Act,
"(ii) the Medicaid program under title XIX of the
Social Security Act,
"(iii) the CHIP program under title XXI of the
Social Security Act,
"(iv) the TRICARE for Life program,
"(v) the veteran's health care program under
chapter 17 of title 38, United States Code, or
"(vi) a health plan under section 2504(e) of title
22, United States Code (relating to Peace Corps volun-
teers).
"(B) EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-Coverage under an
eligible employer-sponsored plan.
"(C) PLANS IN THE INDIVIDUAL MARKET.--Coverage
under a health plan offered in the individual market within
a State.
"(D) GRANDFATHERED HEALTH PLAN.-Coverage under
a grandfathered health plan.
"(E) OTHER COVERAGE.-Such other health benefits cov-
erage, such as a State health benefits risk pool, as the
Secretary of Health and Human Services, in coordination
with the Secretary, recognizes for purposes of this sub-
section.
"(2) ELIGIBLE EMPLOYER-SPONSORED PLAN.-The term
`eligible employer-sponsored plan' means, with respect to any
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employee, a group health plan or group health insurance cov-
erage offered by an employer to the employee which is--
"(A) a governmental plan (within the meaning of sec-
tion 2791(d)(8) of the Public Health Service Act), or
"(B) any other plan or coverage offered in the small
or large group market within a State.
Such term shall include a grandfathered health plan described
in paragraph (1)(D) offered in a group market.
"(3) EXCEPTED BENEFITS NOT TREATED AS MINIMUM ESSEN-
TIAL COVERAGE.--The term `minimum essential coverage' shall
not include health insurance coverage which consists of cov-
erage of excepted benefits-
"(A) described in paragraph (1) of subsection (c) of
section 2791 of the Public Health Service Act; or
"(B) described in paragraph (2), (3), or (4) of such
subsection if the benefits are provided under a separate
policy, certificate, or contract of insurance.
"(4) INDIVIDUALS RESIDING OUTSIDE UNITED STATES OR RESI-
DENTS OF TERRITORIES.-Any applicable individual shall be
treated as having minimum essential coverage for any month--
"(A) if such month occurs during any period described
in subparagraph (A) or (B) of section 911(d)(1) which is
applicable to the individual, or
"(B) if such individual is a bona fide resident of any
possession of the United States (as determined under sec-
tion 937(a)) for such month.
"(5) INSURANCE-RELATED TERMS.-Any term used in this
section which is also used in title I of the Patient Protection
and Affordable Care Act shall have the same meaning as when
used in such title.
"(g) ADMINISTRATION AND PROCEDURE.--
"(1) IN GENERAL.--The penalty provided by this section
shall be paid upon notice and demand by the Secretary, and
except as provided in paragraph (2), shall be assessed and
collected in the same manner as an assessable penalty under
subchapter B of chapter 68.
"(2) SPECIAL RULES.--Notwithstanding any other provision
of law--
"(A) WAIVER OF CRIMINAL PENALTIES.-In the case of
any failure by a taxpayer to timely pay any penalty imposed
by this section, such taxpayer shall not be subject to any
criminal prosecution or penalty with respect to such failure.
"(B) LIMITATIONS ON LIENS AND LEVIES.-The Secretary
shall not--
"(i) file notice of lien with respect to any property
of a taxpayer by reason of any failure to pay the
penalty imposed by this section, or
"(ii) levy on any such property with respect to
such failure.".
(c) CLERICAL AMENDMENT.-The table of chapters for subtitle
D of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by inserting
after the item relating to chapter 47 the following new item:
"CHAPTER 4$-MAINTENANCE OF MINIMUM ESSENTIAL COVERAGE.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section 26 USC 5000A
shall apply to taxable years ending after December 31, 2013. note.
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(4) Section 1421(f) of this Act is amended by striking "2010" 26 USC 38 note.
both places it appears and inserting "2009".
(5) The amendments made by this subsection shall take effect 26 USC 45R note.
as if included in the enactment of section 1421 of this Act.
(U Part I of subtitle E of title I of this Act is amended by
adding at the end of subpart B, the following:
"SEC. 1416. STUDY OF GEOGRAPHIC VARIATION IN APPLICATION OF
FPL.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall conduct a study to
examine the feasibility and implication of adjusting the application
of the Federal poverty level under this subtitle (and the amend-
ments made by this subtitle) for different geographic areas so
as to reflect the variations in cost-of-living among different areas
within the United States. If the Secretary determines that an Determination.
adjustment is feasible, the study should include a methodology
to make such an adjustment. Not later than January 1, 2013, Deadline.
the Secretary shall submit to Congress a report on such study Reports.
and shall include such recommendations as the Secretary deter- Rohs menda-
mines appropriate.
"(b) INCLUSION OF TERRITORIES.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The Secretary shall ensure that the
study under subsection (a) covers the territories of the United
States and that special attention is paid to the disparity that
exists among poverty levels and the cost of living in such
territories and to the impact of such disparity on efforts to
expand health coverage and ensure health care.
"(2) TERRITORIES DEFINED.-In this subsection, the term
`territories of the United States' includes the Commonwealth
of Puerto Rico, the United States Virgin Islands, Guam, the
Northern Mariana Islands, and any other territory or possession
of the United States.".
SEC. 10106. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE F.
(a) Section 1501(a)(2) of this Act is amended to read as follows: 42 USC 18091.
"(2) EFFECTS ON THE NATIONAL ECONOMY AND INTERSTATE
COMMERCE.-The effects described in this paragraph are the
following:
"(A) The requirement regulates activity that is commer-
cial and economic in nature: economic and financial
decisions about how and when health care is paid for,
and when health insurance is purchased. In the absence
of the requirement, some individuals would make an eco-
nomic and financial decision to forego health insurance
coverage and attempt to self insure, which increases finan-
cial risks to households and medical providers.
"(B) Health insurance and health care services are
a significant part of the national economy. National health
spending is projected to increase from $2,500,000,000,000,
or 17.6 percent of the economy, in 2009 to
$4,700,000,000,000 in 2019. Private health insurance
spending is projected to be $854,000,000,000 in 2009, and
pays for medical supplies, drugs, and equipment that are
shipped in interstate commerce. Since most health insur-
ance is sold by national or regional health insurance compa-
nies, health insurance is sold in interstate commerce and
claims payments flow through interstate commerce.
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"(C) The requirement, together with the other provi-
sions of this Act, will add millions of new consumers to
the health insurance market, increasing the supply of, and
demand for, health care services, and will increase the
number and share of Americans who are insured.
"(D) The requirement achieves near-universal coverage
by building upon and strengthening the private employer-
based health insurance system, which covers 176,000,000
Americans nationwide. In Massachusetts, a similar require-
ment has strengthened private employer-based coverage;
despite the economic downturn, the number of workers
offered employer-based coverage has actually increased.
"(E) The economy loses up to $207,000,000,000 a year
because of the poorer health and shorter lifespan of the
uninsured. By significantly reducing the number of the
uninsured, the requirement, together with the other provi-
sions of this Act, will significantly reduce this economic
cost.
"(F) The cost of providing uncompensated care to the
uninsured was $43,000,000,000 in 2008. To pay for this
cost, health care providers pass on the cost to private
insurers, which pass on the cost to families. This cost-
shifting increases family premiums by on average over
$1,000 a year. By significantly reducing the number of
the uninsured, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will lower health insurance pre-
miums.
"(G) 62 percent of all personal bankruptcies are caused
in part by medical expenses. By significantly increasing
health insurance coverage, the requirement, together with
the other provisions of this Act, will improve financial
security for families.
"(H) Under the Employee Retirement Income Security
Act of 1974 (29 U.S.C. 1001 et seq.), the Public Health
Service Act (42 U.S.C. 201 et seq.), and this Act, the Federal
Government has a significant role in regulating health
insurance. The requirement is an essential part of this
larger regulation of economic activity, and the absence
of the requirement would undercut Federal regulation of
the health insurance market.
"(I) Under sections 2704 and 2705 of the Public Health
Service Act (as added by section 1201 of this Act), if there
were no requirement, many individuals would wait to pur-
chase health insurance until they needed care. By signifi-
cantly increasing health insurance coverage, the require-
ment, together with the other provisions of this Act, will
minimize this adverse selection and broaden the health
insurance risk pool to include healthy individuals, which
will lower health insurance premiums. The requirement
is essential to creating effective health insurance markets
in which improved health insurance products that are
guaranteed issue and do not exclude coverage of pre-
existing conditions can be sold.
"(J) Administrative costs for private health insurance,
which were $90,000,000,000 in 2006, are 26 to 30 percent
of premiums in the current individual and small group
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markets. By significantly increasing health insurance cov-
erage and the size of purchasing pools, which will increase
economies of scale, the requirement, together with the other
provisions of this Act, will significantly reduce administra-
tive costs and lower health insurance premiums. The
requirement is essential to creating effective health insur-
ance markets that do not require underwriting and elimi-
nate its associated administrative costs.".
(b)(1) Section 5000A(b)(1) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read as 26 USC 5000A.
follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.---If a taxpayer who is an applicable indi-
vidual, or an applicable individual for whom the taxpayer is
liable under paragraph (3), fails to meet the requirement of
subsection (a) for 1 or more months, then, except as provided
in subsection (e), there is hereby imposed on the taxpayer
a penalty with respect to such failures in the amount deter-
mined under subsection (c).".
(2) Paragraphs (1) and (2) of section 5000A(c) of the
Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as so added, are amended
to read as follows:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The amount of the penalty imposed by
this section on any taxpayer for any taxable year with respect
to failures described in subsection (b)(1) shall be equal to the
lesser of-
"(A) the sum of the monthly penalty amounts deter-
mined under paragraph (2) for months in the taxable year
during which 1 or more such failures occurred, or
"(B) an amount equal to the national average premium
for qualified health plans which have a bronze level of
coverage, provide coverage for the applicable family size
involved, and are offered through Exchanges for plan years
beginning in the calendar year with or within which the
taxable year ends.
"(2) MONTHLY PENALTY AMOUNTS.-For purposes of para-
graph (1)(A), the monthly penalty amount with respect to any
taxpayer for any month during which any failure described
in subsection (b)(1) occurred is an amount equal to 1/12 of
the greater of the following amounts:
"(A) FLAT DOLLAR AMOUNT.--An amount equal to the
lesser of-
"(i) the sum of the applicable dollar amounts for
all individuals with respect to whom such failure
occurred during such month, or
"(ii) 300 percent of the applicable dollar amount
(determined without regard to paragraph (3)(C)) for
the calendar year with or within which the taxable
year ends.
"(B) PERCENTAGE OF INCOME.--An amount equal to
the following percentage of the taxpayer's household income
for the taxable year:
"(i) 0.5 percent for taxable years beginning in 2014.
"(ii) 1.0 percent for taxable years beginning in
2015.
"(iii) 2.0 percent for taxable years beginning after
2015.".
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(3) Section 5000A(c)(3) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 5000A. as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended by striking
"$350" and inserting "$495".
(c) Section 5000A(d)(2)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(A) RELIGIOUS CONSCIENCE EXEMPTION.-Such term
shall not include any individual for any month if such
individual has in effect an exemption under section
1311(d)(4)(H) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act which certifies that such individual is-
"(i) a member of a recognized religious sect or
division thereof which is described in section
1402(g)(1), and
"(ii) an adherent of established tenets or teachings
of such sect or division as described in such section.".
(d) Section 5000A(e)(1)(C) of the Internal Revenue Code of
1986, as added by section 1501(b) of this Act, is amended to read
as follows:
"(C) SPECIAL RULES FOR INDIVIDUALS RELATED TO
EMPLOYEES.--For purposes of subparagraph (B)(i), if an
applicable individual is eligible for minimum essential cov-
erage through an employer by reason of a relationship
to an employee, the determination under subparagraph
(A) shall be made by reference to required contribution
of the employee.".
(e) Section 4980H(b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
26 USC 4980H. as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended to read as
follows:
"(b) LARGE EMPLOYERS WITH WAITING PERIODS EXCEEDING 60
DAYS.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any applicable large
employer which requires an extended waiting period to enroll
in any minimum essential coverage under an employer-spon-
sored plan (as defined in section 5000A(f)(2)), there is hereby
imposed on the employer an assessable payment of $600 for
each full-time employee of the employer to whom the extended
waiting period applies.
Definition. "(2) EXTENDED WAITING PERIOD.-The term `extended
waiting period' means any waiting period (as defined in section
2701(b)(4) of the Public Health Service Act) which exceeds
60 days.".
(0(1) Subparagraph (A) of section 4980H(d)(4) of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986, as added by section 1513(a) of this Act,
is amended by inserting ", with respect to any month," after
"means".
(2) Section 4980H(d)(2) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513(a) of this Act, is amended by adding
at the end the following:
"(D) APPLICATION TO CONSTRUCTION INDUSTRY
EMPLOYERS.-In the case of any employer the substantial
annual gross receipts of which are attributable to the
construction industry--
"(i) subparagraph (A) shall be applied by sub-
stituting `who employed an average of at least 5 full-
time employees on business days during the preceding
calendar year and whose annual payroll expenses
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exceed $250,000 for such preceding calendar year' for
`who employed an average of at least 50 full-time
employees on business days during the preceding cal-
endar year', and
"(ii) subparagraph (B) shall be applied by sub-
stituting `5' for ` 50'.".
(3) The amendment made by paragraph (2) shall apply to
months beginning after December 31, 2013.
(g) Section 6056 (b) of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986, as
added by section 1514 ( a) of the Act, is amended by adding at
the end the following new flush sentence:
"The Secretary shall have the authority to review the accuracy
of the information provided under this subsection , including the
applicable large employer 's share under paragraph (2)(C)(iv).".
SEC. 10107. AMENDMENTS TO SUBTITLE G.
(a) Section 1562 of this Act is amended , in the amendment
made by subsection (a)(2)(B)(iii ), by striking "subpart 1" and
inserting "subparts I and II"; and
(b) Subtitle G of title I of this Act is amended-
(1) by redesignating section 1562 (as amended) as section
1563; and
(2) by inserting after section 1561 the following:
"SEC. 1562 . GAO STUDY REGARDING THE RATE OF DENIAL OF COV-
ERAGE AND ENROLLMENT BY HEALTH INSURANCE
ISSUERS AND GROUP HEALTH PLANS.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-The Comptroller General of the United
States (referred to in this section as the `Comptroller General')
shall conduct a study of the incidence of denials of coverage for
medical services and denials of applications to enroll in health
insurance plans , as described in subsection (b), by group health
plans and health insurance issuers.
"(b) DATA.-
"(1) IN GENERAL .-In conducting the study described in
subsection (a), the Comptroller General shall consider samples
of data concerning the following:
"(A)(i) denials of coverage for medical services to a
plan enrollees , by the types of services for which such
coverage was denied; and
"(ii) the reasons such coverage was denied; and
"(B)(i) incidents in which group health plans and health
insurance issuers deny the application of an individual
to enroll in a health insurance plan offered by such group
health plan or issuer; and
"(ii) the reasons such applications are denied.
"(2) SCOPE OF DATA.-
"(A) FAVORABLY RESOLVED DISPUTES.-The data that
the Comptroller General considers under paragraph (1)
shall include data concerning denials of coverage for med-
ical services and denials of applications for enrollment in
a plan by a group health plan or health insurance issuer,
where such group health plan or health insurance issuer
later approves such coverage or application.
"(B) ALL HEALTH PLANS.-The study under this section
shall consider data from varied group health plans and
health insurance plans offered by health insurance issuers,
Applicability.
26 USC 4980H
note.
26 USC 6056.
42 USC
300gg-21.
26 USC 9815; 29
USC 1185d; 42
USC 300gg-1-
300gg-3,
300gg-9,
300gg-11,
300gg-12,
300gg-21-
300gg-23,
300gg-25-
300gg-28,
300gg-62,
300gg-91 , 18120.
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Advisory Panel for the purpose of examining and advising
the Secretary and Congress on workforce issues related to
personal care attendant workers , including with respect to the
adequacy of the number of such workers, the salaries, wages,
and benefits of such workers, and access to the services provided
by such workers.
(2) MEMBERSHIP .-In appointing members to the Personal
Care Attendants Workforce Advisory Panel , the Secretary shall
ensure that such members include the following:
(A) Individuals with disabilities of all ages.
(B) Senior individuals.
(C) Representatives of individuals with disabilities.
(D) Representatives of senior individuals.
(E) Representatives of workforce and labor organiza-
tions.
(F) Representatives of home and community-based
service providers.
(G) Representatives of assisted living providers.
(d) INCLUSION OF INFORMATION ON SUPPLEMENTAL COVERAGE
IN THE NATIONAL CLEARINGHOUSE FOR LONG-TERM CARE INFORMA-
TION; EXTENSION OF FUNDING.-Section 6021(d) of the Deficit
Reduction Act of 2005 (42 U.S.C.1396p note ) is amended-
(1) in paragraph (2)(A)-
(A) in clause (ii), by striking "and" at the end;
(B) in clause (iii), by striking the period at the end
and inserting "; and"; and
(C) by adding at the end the following:
"(iv) include information regarding the CLASS pro-
gram established under title XXXII of the Public
Health Service Act and coverage available for purchase
through a Exchange established under section 1311
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act that
is supplemental coverage to the benefits provided
under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan under that
program , and information regarding how benefits pro-
vided under a CLASS Independence Benefit Plan differ
from disability insurance benefits."; and
(2) in paragraph (3), by striking "2010" and inserting
"2015".
(e) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by subsections
(a), (b), and (d) take effect on January 1, 2011.
(0 RULE OF CONSTRUCTION.-Nothing in this title or the amend-
ments made by this title are intended to replace or displace public
or private disability insurance benefits , including such benefits
that are for income replacement.
TITLE IX-REVENUE PROVISIONS
Subtitle A--Revenue Offset Provisions
SEC. 9001 , EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED HEALTH
COVERAGE.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Chapter 43 of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986, as amended by section 1513, is amended by adding at
the end the following:
42 USC 30011
note.
42 USC 30011
note.
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26 USC 49801. "SEC. 49801 . EXCISE TAX ON HIGH COST EMPLOYER-SPONSORED
HEALTH COVERAGE.
"(a) IMPOSITION OF TAX.-If-
"(1) an employee is covered under any applicable employer-
sponsored coverage of an employer at any time during a taxable
period, and
"(2) there is any excess benefit with respect to the coverage,
there is hereby imposed a tax equal to 40 percent of the excess
benefit.
"(b) EXCESS BENEFIT.-For purposes of this section-
Definition , "(1) IN GENERAL.-The term `excess benefit' means, with
respect to any applicable employer-sponsored coverage made
available by an employer to an employee during any taxable
period , the sum of the excess amounts determined under para-
graph (2) for months during the taxable period.
"(2) MONTHLY EXCESS AMOUNT .-The excess amount deter-
mined under this paragraph for any month is the excess (if
any) of-
"(A) the aggregate cost of the applicable employer-
sponsored coverage of the employee for the month, over
"(B) an amount equal to /12 of the annual limitation
under paragraph (3) for the calendar year in which the
month occurs.
"(3) ANNUAL LIMITATION.-For purposes of this subsection-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-The annual limitation under this
paragraph for any calendar year is the dollar limit deter-
mined under subparagraph (C) for the calendar year.
"(B) APPLICABLE ANNUAL LIMITATION.-The annual
limitation which applies for any month shall be determined
on the basis of the type of coverage ( as determined under
subsection (0(1)) provided to the employee by the employer
as of the beginning of the month.
"(C) APPLICABLE DOLLAR LIMIT.-Except as provided
in subparagraph (D)-
"(i) 2013 .-In the case of 2013, the dollar limit
under this subparagraph is--
"(I) in the case of an employee with self only
coverage, $8,500, and
"(II) in the case of an em ployee with coverage
other than self -only coverage > $23 > 000.
"(ii) EXCEPTION FOR CERTAIN INDIVIDUALS.-In the
case of an individual who is a qualified retiree or
who participates in a plan sponsored by an employer
the majority of whose employees are engaged in a
high-risk profession or employed to repair or install
electrical or telecommunications lines-
"(I) the dollar amount in clause (i)(I) (deter-
mined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $1,350, and
"(II) the dollar amount in clause (i)(II) (deter-
mined after the application of subparagraph (D))
shall be increased by $3,000.
"(iii) SUBSEQUENT YEARS.-In the case of any cal-
endar year after 2013, each of the dollar amounts
under clauses (i) and (ii) shall be increased to the
amount equal to such amount as in effect for the
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"(B) the amount of any salary reduction contributions
to a flexible spending arrangement (within the meaning
of section 125).".
26 USC 6051 (b) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The amendments made by this section
note. shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9003. DISTRIBUTIONS FOR MEDICINE QUALIFIED ONLY IF FOR
PRESCRIBED DRUG OR INSULIN.
(a) HSAs.-Subparagraph (A) of section 223(d )(2) of the Internal
26 USC 223 . Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol-
lowing: "Such term shall include an amount paid for medicine
or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug
(determined without regard to whether such drug is available with-
out a prescription) or is insulin.".
(b) ARCHER MSAS.-Subparagraph (A) of section 220(d)(2) of
26 USC 220 . the Internal Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the
end the following: "Such term shall include an amount paid for
medicine or a drug only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed
drug (determined without regard to whether such drug is available
without a prescription) or is insulin.".
(c) HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGEMENTS AND HEALTH
REIMBURSEMENT ARRANGEMENTS.-Section 106 of the Internal Rev-
26 USC 106 . enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new subsection:
"U) REIMBURSEMENTS FOR MEDICINE RESTRICTED TO PRE-
SCRIBED DRUGS AND INSULIN .-For purposes of this section and
section 105, reimbursement for expenses incurred for a medicine
or a drug shall be treated as a reimbursement for medical expenses
only if such medicine or drug is a prescribed drug (determined
without regard to whether such drug is available without a prescrip-
tion) or is insulin.".
(d) EFFECTIVE DATES.-
26 USC 220 note. (1 ) DISTRIBUTIONS FROM SAVINGS ACCOUNTS .-The amend-
ments made by subsections (a) and (b) shall apply to amounts
paid with respect to taxable years beginning after December
31, 2010.
26 USC 106 note. (2) REIMBURSEMENTS .-The amendment made by sub-
section (c) shall apply to expenses incurred with respect to
taxable years beginning after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9004. INCREASE IN ADDITIONAL TAX ON DISTRIBUTIONS FROM
HSAS AND ARCHER MSAS NOT USED FOR QUALIFIED
MEDICAL EXPENSES.
(a) HSAS.-Section 223 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 is amended by striking "10 percent" and inserting "20
percent".
(b) ARCHER MSAS.-Section 220 (f)(4)(A) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended by striking " 15 percent" and inserting
"20 percent".
26 USC 220 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.-The amendments made by this section
shall apply to distributions made after December 31, 2010.
SEC. 9005 . LIMITATION ON HEALTH FLEXIBLE SPENDING ARRANGE-
MENTS UNDER CAFETERIA PLANS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Section 125 of the Internal Revenue Code
26 USC 125 . of 1986 is amended-
(1) by redesignating subsections (i) and (j) as subsections
(j) and (k), respectively, and
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remuneration ' means , with respect to any applicable indi-
vidual for any disqualified taxable year , the aggregate
amount allowable as a deduction under this chapter for
such taxable year (determined without regard to this sub-
section ) for remuneration (as defined in paragraph (4) with-
out regard to subparagraphs (B), (C), and (D) thereof) for
services performed by such individual (whether or not
during the taxable year). Such term shall not include any
deferred deduction remuneration with respect to services
performed during the disqualified taxable year.
"(E) DEFERRED DEDUCTION REMUNERATION .-For pur-
poses of this paragraph, the term `deferred deduction remu-
neration ' means remuneration which would be applicable
individual remuneration for services performed in a dis-
qualified taxable year but for the fact that the deduction
under this chapter (determined without regard to this para-
graph ) for such remuneration is allowable in a subsequent
taxable year.
"(F) APPLICABLE INDIVIDUAL.-For purposes of this
paragraph, the term `applicable individual ' means, with
respect to any covered health insurance provider for any
disqualified taxable year , any individual-
"(i) who is an officer , director, or employee in such
taxable year, or
"(ii) who provides services for or on behalf of such
covered health insurance provider during such taxable
year.
"(G) COORDINATION .-Rules similar to the rules of sub-
paragraphs (F) and (G) of paragraph (4) shall apply for
purposes of this paragraph.
"(H) REGULATORY AUTHORITY.-The Secretary may pre-
scribe such guidance , rules , or regulations as are necessary
to carry out the purposes of this paragraph.".
26 USC 162 note. (b) EFFECTIVE DATE. -The amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009,
with respect to services performed after such date.
26 USC 3101.
SEC. 9015. ADDITIONAL HOSPITAL INSURANCE TAX ON HIGH -INCOME
TAXPAYERS.
(a) FICA.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 3101(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended-
(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(1) IN GENERAL .-In addition",
(B) by striking "the following percentages of the" and
inserting " 1.45 percent of the",
(C) by striking "(as defined in section 3121(b))-" and
all that follows and inserting "(as defined in section
3121 (b)).", and
(D) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph ( 1) and the preceding subsection , there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation , estate,
or trust ) a tax equal to 0.5 percent of wages which are received
with respect to employment (as defined in section 3121(b))
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during any taxable year beginning after December 31, 2012,
and which are in excess of-
"(A) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(B) in any other case, $200,000.".
(2) COLLECTION OF TAX.-Section 3102 of the Internal Rev-
enue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the fol- 26 USC 3102.
lowing new subsection:
"(f) SPECIAL RULES FOR ADDITIONAL TAx.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In the case of any tax imposed by section
3101(b)(2), subsection (a) shall only apply to the extent to
which the taxpayer receives wages from the employer in excess
of $200,000, and the employer may disregard the amount of
wages received by such taxpayer's spouse.
"(2) COLLECTION OF AMOUNTS NOT WITHHELD.-To the
extent that the amount of any tax imposed by section 3101(b)(2)
is not collected by the employer, such tax shall be paid by
the employee.
"(3) TAX PAID BY RECIPIENT.-If an employer, in violation
of this chapter, fails to deduct and withhold the tax imposed
by section 3101(b)(2) and thereafter the tax is paid by the
employee, the tax so required to be deducted and withheld
shall not be collected from the employer, but this paragraph
shall in no case relieve the employer from liability for any
penalties or additions to tax otherwise applicable in respect
of such failure to deduct and withhold.".
(b) SECA.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-Section 1401(b) of the Internal Revenue
Code of 1986 is amended- 26 USC 1401.
(A) by striking "In addition" and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(1) IN GENERAL.-In addition", and
(B) by adding at the end the following new paragraph:
"(2) ADDITIONAL TAX.-
"(A) IN GENERAL.-In addition to the tax imposed by
paragraph (1) and the preceding subsection, there is hereby
imposed on every taxpayer (other than a corporation,
estate, or trust) for each taxable year beginning after
December 31, 2012, a tax equal to 0.5 percent of the self-
employment income for such taxable year which is in excess
of-
"(i) in the case of a joint return, $250,000, and
"(ii) in any other case, $200,000.
"(B) COORDINATION WITH FICA.-The amounts under
clauses (i) and (ii) of subparagraph (A) shall be reduced
(but not below zero) by the amount of wages taken into
account in determining the tax imposed under section
3121(b)(2) with respect to the taxpayer.".
(2) NO DEDUCTION FOR ADDITIONAL TAX.-
(A) IN GENERAL.-Section 164(f) of such Code is
amended by inserting "(other than the taxes imposed by
section 1401(b)(2))" after "section 1401)".
(B) DEDUCTION FOR NET EARNINGS FROM SELF-EMPLOY-
MENT.-Subparagraph (B) of section 1402(a)(12) is amended 26 USC 1402.
by inserting "(determined without regard to the rate
imposed under paragraph (2) of section 1401(b))" after "for
such year".
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26 USC 164 note. (c) EFFECTIVE DATE.--The amendments made by this section
shall apply with respect to remuneration received, and taxable
years beginning , after December 31, 2012.
SEC. 9016. MODIFICATION OF SECTION 833 TREATMENT OF CERTAIN
HEALTH ORGANIZATIONS.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subsection (c) of section 833 of the Internal
26 USC 833. Revenue Code of 1986 is amended by adding at the end the following
new paragraph:
"(5) NONAPPLICATION OF SECTION IN CASE OF LOW MEDICAL
LOSS RATIO.-Notwithstanding the preceding paragraphs, this
section shall not apply to any organization unless such
organization 's percentage of total premium revenue expended
on reimbursement for clinical services provided to enrollees
under its policies during such taxable year (as reported under
section 2718 of the Public Health Service Act) is not less than
85 percent.".
26 USC 853 note. (b ) EFFECTIVE DATE .-The amendment made by this section
shall apply to taxable years beginning after December 31, 2009.
SEC. 9017 . EXCISE TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL PROCE-
DURES.
(a) IN GENERAL.-Subtitle D of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as amended by this Act, is amended by adding at the
end the following new chapter:
"CHAPTER 49-ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES
"Sec. 5000B. Imposition of tax on elective cosmetic medical procedures.
26 USC 5000B. "SEC. 5000B . IMPOSITION OF TAX ON ELECTIVE COSMETIC MEDICAL
PROCEDURES.
"(a) IN GENERAL.-There is hereby imposed on any cosmetic
surgery and medical procedure a tax equal to 5 percent of the
amount paid for such procedure (determined without regard to
this section), whether paid by insurance or otherwise.
"(b) COSMETIC SURGERY AND MEDICAL PROCEDURE.-For pur-
poses of this section , the term `cosmetic surgery and medical proce-
dure ' means any cosmetic surgery (as defined in section 213(d)(9)(B))
or other similar procedure which-
"(1) is performed by a licensed medical professional, and
"(2) is not necessary to ameliorate a deformity arising
from, or directly related to , a congenital abnormality , a personal
injury resulting from an accident or trauma , or disfiguring
disease.
"(c) PAYMENT OF TAx.-
"(1) IN GENERAL.-The tax imposed by this section shall
be paid by the individual on whom the procedure is performed.
"(2) COLLECTION.-Every person receiving a payment for
procedures on which a tax is imposed under subsection (a)
shall collect the amount of the tax from the individual on
whom the procedure is performed and remit such tax quarterly
to the Secretary at such time and in such manner as provided
by the Secretary.
"(3) SECONDARY LIABILITY.-Where any tax imposed by sub-
section ( a) is not paid at the time payments for cosmetic surgery
and medical procedures are made, then to the extent that
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Public Law 111-152
111th Congress
An Act
To provide for reconciliation pursuant to Title II of the concurrent resolution on Mar. 30, 2010
the budget for fiscal year 2010 (S. Con. Res. 13). [H.R. 4872]
Be it enacted by the Senate and House of Representatives of
the United States o f America in Congress assembled, Health Care and
SECTION 1. SHORT TITLE; TABLE OF CONTENTS. Reconciliation
(a) SHORT TITLE,--This Act may be cited as the "Health Care Act of 2010.
and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010". 42 USC 1305note.(b) TABLE OF CONTENTS.-The table of contents of this Act
is as follows:
Sec. 1. Short title; table of contents.
TITLE I-COVERAGE, MEDICARE, MEDICAID, AND REVENUES
Subtitle A-Coverage
Sec. 1001, Tax credits.
Sec. 1002. Individual responsibility.
Sec. 1003. Employer responsibility.
Sec. 1004. Income definitions.
Sec. 1005. Implementation funding.
Subtitle B-Medicare
Sec. 1101. Closing the medicare prescription drug "donut hole".
Sec. 1102. Medicare Advantage payments.
Sec. 1103. Savings from limits on MA plan administrative costs.
Sec. 1104. Disproportionate share hospital (DSH) payments.
Sec. 1105. Market basket updates.
Sec. 1106. Physician ownership-referral.
Sec, 1107. Payment for imaging services.
Sec. 1108. PE GPCI adjustment for 2010.
Sec. 1109. Payment for qualifying hospitals.
Subtitle C-Medicaid
Sec. 1201. Federal funding for States.
Sec. 1202. Payments to primary care physicians.
Sec. 1203. Disproportionate share hospital payments.
Sec. 1204. Funding for the territories.
Sec. 1205. Delay in Community First Choice option.
Sec. 1206. Drug rebates for new formulations of existing drugs.
Subtitle D-Reducing Fraud, Waste, and Abuse
Sec. 1301. Community mental health centers.
Sec. 1302. Medicare prepayment medical review limitations.
Sec. 1303. Funding to fight fraud, waste, and abuse.
Sec. 1304. 90-day period of enhanced oversight for initial claims of DME suppliers.
Subtitle E-Provisions Relating to Revenue
Sec. 1401. High-cost plan excise tax.
Sec. 1402, Unearned income Medicare contribution.
Sec. 1403. Delay of limitation on health flexible spending arrangements under cafe-
teria plans.
EXHIBIT
B
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(C) by striking subclause (III) and inserting the fol-
lowing:
"(III) 73 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 200
percent but not more than 250 percent of the pov-
erty line for a family of the size involved; and
"(IV) 70 percent in the case of an eligible
insured whose household income is more than 250
percent but not more than 400 percent of the pov-
erty line for a family of the size involved."; and
(2) in paragraph (2)-
(A) in subparagraph (A)-
(i) by striking "90" and inserting "94"; and
(ii) by striking "and";
(B) in subparagraph (B)-
(i) by striking "80" and inserting "87"; and
(ii) by striking the period and inserting "; and";
and
(C) by inserting after subparagraph (B) the following
new subparagraph:
"(C) in the case of an eligible insured whose household
income is more than 200 percent but not more than 250
percent of the poverty line for a family of the size involved,
increase the plan's share of the total allowed costs of bene-
fits provided under the plan to 73 percent of such costs.".
SEC. 1002 . INDIVIDUAL RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) AMOUNTS.-Section 5000A(c) of the Internal Revenue Code
of 1986 , as added by section 1501 (b) of the Patient Protection
Ante, p . 244, 907 , and Affordable Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such
Act, is amended-
(1) in paragraph (2)(B)-
(A) in the matter preceding clause (i), by-
(i) inserting "the excess of before "the taxpayer's
household income"; and
(ii) inserting "for the taxable year over the amount
of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1) with
respect to the taxpayer " before "for the taxable year";
(B) in clause (i), by striking "0.5" and inserting "1.0";
(C) in clause (ii), by striking " 1.0" and inserting "2.0";
and
(D) in clause (iii), by striking "2.0" and inserting "2.5";
and
(2) in paragraph (3)-
(A) in subparagraph (A), by striking "$750" and
inserting "$695";
(B) in subparagraph (B), by striking "$495" and
inserting "$325"; and
(C) in subparagraph (D)-
(i) in the matter preceding clause (i), by striking
"$750" and inserting "$695"; and
(ii) in clause (i), by striking "$750" and inserting
"$695".
(b) THRESHOLD.-Section 5000A of such Code, as so added
and amended, is amended-
(1) by striking subsection (c)(4)(D); and
(2) in subsection (e)(2)-
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(A) by striking "UNDER 100 PERCENT OF POVERTY LINE"
and inserting "BELOW FILING THRESHOLD"; and
(B) by striking all that follows "less than" and inserting
"the amount of gross income specified in section 6012(a)(1)
with respect to the taxpayer.".
SEC. 1003 . EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY.
(a) PAYMENT CALCULATION.-Subparagraph (D) of subsection
(d)(2) of section 498011 of the Internal Revenue Code of 1986,
as added by section 1513 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Care Act and amended by section 10106 of such Act, is amended Ante, p. 253, 907.
to read as follows:
"(D) APPLICATION OF EMPLOYER SIZE TO ASSESSABLE
PENALTIES.-
"(i) IN GENERAL.-The number of individuals
employed by an applicable large employer as full-time
employees during any month shall be reduced by 30
solely for purposes of calculating-
"(I) the assessable payment under subsection
(a), or
"(II) the overall limitation under subsection
(b)(2).
"(ii) AGGREGATION.-In the case of persons treated
as 1 employer under subparagraph (C)(i), only 1 reduc-
tion under subclause (I) or (II) shall be allowed with
respect to such persons and such reduction shall be
allocated among such persons ratably on the basis
of the number of full-time employees employed by each
such person.".
(b) APPLICABLE PAYMENT AMOUNT.-Section 4980H of such
Code, as so added and amended, is amended-
(1) in the flush text following subsection (c)(1)(B), by
striking "400 percent of the applicable payment amount" and
inserting "an amount equal to 1/12 of $3,000";
(2) in subsection (d)(1), by striking "$ 750" and inserting
"$2,000"; and
(3) in subsection (d)(5)(A), in the matter preceding clause
(i), by striking " subsection (b)(2) and (d)(1)" and inserting "sub-
section (b) and paragraph (1)".
(c) COUNTING PART-TIME WORKERS IN SETTING THE THRESHOLD
FOR EMPLOYER RESPONSIBILITY .--Section 4980H(d)(2) of such Code,
as so added and amended and as amended by subsection (a), is
amended by adding at the end the following new subparagraph:
"(E) FULL-TIME EQUIVALENTS TREATED AS FULL-TIME
EMPLOYEES.-Solely for purposes of determining whether
an employer is an applicable large employer under this
paragraph , an employer shall, in addition to the number
of full-time employees for any month otherwise determined,
include for such month a number of full-time employees
determined by dividing the aggregate number of hours
of service of employees who are not full -time employees
for the month by 120.".
(d) ELIMINATING WAITING PERIOD ASSESSMENT .-Section 4980H
of such Code, as so added and amended and as amended by the
preceding subsections, is amended by striking subsection (b) and
redesignating subsections (c), (d), and (e) as subsections (b), (c),
and (d), respectively.
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SEC. 1004 . INCOME DEFINITIONS.
(a) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-
(1) IN GENERAL.-The following provisions of the Internal
Revenue Code of 1986 are each amended by striking "modified
gross" each place it appears and inserting "modified adjusted
gross":
(A) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 36B(d)(2)(A), as added
by section 1401 of the Patient Protection and Affordable
Ante, p. 213. Care Act.
(B) Section 6103(1)(21)(A)(iv ), as added by section 1414
Ante, p . 236, of such Act.
(C) Clauses (i) and (ii) of section 5000A(c)(4), as added
Ante, p . 244. by section 1501 (b) of such Act.
(2) DEFINITION.-
(A) Section 36B(d)(2)(B) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(B) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-
"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(B) Section 5000A(c)(4)(C) of such Code, as so added,
is amended to read as follows:
"(C) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME.-The term
`modified adjusted gross income' means adjusted gross
income increased by-
"(i) any amount excluded from gross income under
section 911, and
"(ii) any amount of interest received or accrued
by the taxpayer during the taxable year which is
exempt from tax.".
(b) MODIFIED ADJUSTED GROSS INCOME DEFINITION.-
(1) MEDICAID .-Section 1902 of the Social Security Act
(42 U.S . C. 1396a) is amended by striking "modified gross
income" each place it appears in the text and headings of
the following provisions and inserting "modified adjusted gross
income":
(A) Paragraph ( 14) of subsection (e), as added by sec-
tion 2002(a) of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care
Act.
(B) Subsection (gg)(4)(A), as added by section 2001(b)
of such Act.
(2) CHIP.-
(A) STATE PLAN REQUIREMENTS .-Section
2102(b)(1)(B)(v) of the Social Security Act (42 U.S.C.
1397bb (b)(1)(B)(v )), as added by section 2101 (d)(1) of the
Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, is amended
by striking "modified gross income " and inserting "modified
adjusted gross income".
(B) PLAN ADMINISTRATION.-Section 2107(e)(1)(E) of the.
Social Security Act (42 U. S.C. 1397gg(e)(1)(E)), as added
by section 2101 (d)(2) of the Patient Protection and Afford-
able Care Act, is amended by striking "modified gross
income" and inserting "modified adjusted gross income".
p. 4
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12-3    Filed 08/10/10   Page 4 of 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD;
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH RUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, I CASE NO. 1:10-CV-00950 (GK)
-vs.-
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN I
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
I
Defendants. I
DECLARATION OF MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD
I, Margaret Peggy Lee Mead, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and
Local Civil Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen, a resident of the State of North Carolina, and a
federal taxpayer. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2. I am sixty-two years of age and am not eligible for Medicare. When I am eligible
for Medicare, I will not enroll in it. I do not qualify for Medicaid.
3. I am single, self-employed as an artist, and also work part-time in a hospital. I am
generally in good health.
4. I could afford health insurance coverage, but I have elected not to purchase such
insurance and desire not to do so now or in the future. I am not covered by anyone else's health
insurance, and I have not had health insurance for approximately eighteen years.
EXHIBIT
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5. Based on information and belief, I do not qualify for any of the exemptions under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("the Act"), and it is highly likely that I will not
be exempted from the individual mandate over the next several years. I strongly object to being
required by the Act to either buy minimum essential• coverage or pay an annual shared
responsibility payment.
6. I am a Christian. I believe in trusting God to protect me from illness or injury and
to heal me of any afflictions, no matter the severity of the health issue, and I do not need, or want
to be forced to buy, health insurance coverage.
7. I have a sincerely-held religious belief that God will provide for my physical,
spiritual, and financial well-being. Being forced to buy health insurance conflicts with my
religious faith because I believe that I would be indicating that I need a backup plan and am not
really sure whether God will, in fact, provide for my needs.
8. I strongly believe that the federal government lacks the authority to force me to
buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.
9. Because I believe in relying on God to preserve my health and provide for my
physical, spiritual, and financial needs, and object to participation in the health insurance system,
I understand, based on information and belief, that the Act will impose direct and substantial
religious and financial burdens upon me by requiring me to either 1) purchase and maintain
minimum essential coverage, without any consideration of my individual needs, Christian faith,
and financial situation, or 2) pay an annual shared responsibility payment.
10. Although I strongly oppose being mandated to purchase minimum essential
coverage as well as being penalized for failing to do so, I refuse to buy health insurance.
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Therefore, the government will, over my strong objection, assess annual penalties against me for
failing to maintain health insurance.
11. As a direct result of the Act's inevitable impact upon my finances and lifestyle, I
am compelled to adjust my finances now, by setting aside money, and will continue to do so, to
pay the annual shared responsibility payment. As a result, I will be unable to use that money for
other purposes now, such as discretionary spending, charitable donations, or paying debts, and
will have to adjust my lifestyle accordingly, all of which will unjustly and adversely burden me
and continue to do so while the Act is in existence, and either is threatened to be enforced, or is
enforced against me.
12. Based on information and belief, under the shared responsibility payment
provisions of the Act, I will be required to pay, at a minimum, $3,$95 to the government through
2020 for my lack of minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared responsibility payment of
$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016, and $695 or greater in 2017 or later). Based on
information and belief, the total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government
will require me to pay through 2020 may be greater depending upon my income levels during
each taxable year, and I will be required to continue making shared responsibility payments in
2021 and beyond.
13. As a direct and proximate result of the Act, I am concretely and continuously
harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the Act against me--through either a
coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment--and also the need to
currently arrange my fiscal affairs now to prepare myself to pay thousands of dollars over the
next several years as required by the Act.
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I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge . Executed on July , 2010,
Margare Peggy L/4Mead
I
4
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12-4    Filed 08/10/10   Page 4 of 4
UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD;
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH BUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, CASE NO . 1 : 10-CV-00950 (GK)
-vs.-
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF CHARLES EDWARD LEE
I, Charles Edward Lee, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Local
Civil Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen , a resident of the State of Texas, and a federal
taxpayer. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned case.
2. I am sixty years of age and not eligible for Medicare. When I am eligible for
Medicare, I will not enroll in it. I do not qualify for Medicaid.
3. I am married, currently unemployed, and generally in good health. My wife is
currently employed and we could afford to buy health insurance coverage for me, but I have
elected not to purchase such insurance, and I do not desire to do so now or in the future.
4. Although my wife is covered by insurance through her employer, I am not
covered by anyone' s health insurance. EXHIBIT
D
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5. Based on information and belief, my household does not qualify for any of the
exemptions under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("the Act"), and it is highly
likely that I will not be exempted from the individual mandate over the next several years. I
object to being required by the Act to either buy minimum essential coverage or pay an annual
shared responsibility payment.
6. I am a Christian. I believe in trusting in God to protect me from illness or injury,
and to heal me of any afflictions, no matter the severity of the health issue. I do not need, or
want to be forced to purchase, health insurance because I rely on prayer and personal life choices
to maintain my health. I have not had health insurance for approximately twenty-two years or
had any major health concerns during that time period as a result of my faith and my personal
life choices regarding health maintenance.
7. I have a sincerely held religious belief that God will provide for my physical,
spiritual, and financial well-being. Being forced to buy health insurance conflicts with my
religious faith because I believe that I would be indicating that I need a backup plan and am not
really sure whether God will, in fact, provide for my needs.
8. I so firmly believe in the importance of relying on God to maintain my health that
I have instructed my family and friends that, should I be stricken with a serious health issue, for
example, a heart attack or traumatic injury, they should only pray for me and not provide me
with emergency medical care. I believe that, if it is God's will for me to continue to be alive and
healthy, God will heal me of any conditions or diseases that may affect me or prevent them from
occurring in the first place.
9. I also strongly believe that the federal government lacks the authority to force me
to buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.
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l0. Because I believe in relying on God to preserve my health and provide for my
physical, spiritual, and financial needs, and object to participation in the health insurance system,
I understand, based on information and belief, that the Act will impose direct and substantial
religious and financial burdens upon me by requiring me to either 1) purchase and maintain
"minimum essential coverage," without any consideration of my individual needs, Christian
faith, and financial situation, or 2) pay the annual shared responsibility payment.
11. Although I strongly oppose both being mandated to purchase minimum essential
coverage and being penalized for failing to do so, I view being forced to pay the annual shared
responsibility payment as the lesser of two evils from a religious and financial standpoint.
Therefore, I will be forced to pay-under strong objection-the annual shared responsibility
payment.
12. As a direct result of the Act's inevitable impact upon my household finances and
lifestyle, my wife and I are compelled to adjust our household finances now, by setting aside
money, and will continue to do so, to pay the annual shared responsibility payment. As a result,
I will be unable to use that money for other purposes now, such as discretionary spending,
charitable donations, retirement, or paying debts, and will have to adjust my lifestyle
accordingly, all of which will unjustly and adversely burden me and continue to do so while the
Act is in existence, and either is threatened to be enforced, or is enforced against me.
13. Based on information and belief, under the shared responsibility payment
provisions of the Act, my wife and I will be responsible to pay, at a minimum, $3,895 to the
government through 2020 for my lack of minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared
responsibility payment of $95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016, and $695 or greater in 2017
or later). The total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government will require
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me to pay through 2020 may be greater depending upon my household income levels during
each taxable year, and I will be required to continue making shared responsibility payments in
2021 and beyond.
14. As a direct and proximate result of the Act, I am concretely and continuously
harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the Act against me-through either a
coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment-and also the need to
currently arrange my household's fiscal affairs now to prepare myself to pay thousands of dollars
over the next several years as required by the Act.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
R
ti
knowledge. Executed on July L, 2010.
Charles Edward Lee
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD;
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH BUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, CASE NO . 1:10-CV-00950 (GK)
-vs.-
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF SUSAN SEVEN-SKY
I, Susan Seven-Sky, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Local Civil
Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen, a resident of the State of New York, and a
federal taxpayer. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2. I am fifty-three years of age and am not eligible for Medicare, and when I am
eligible for Medicare, I will not enroll in it. I do not qualify for Medicaid.
3. I am single, self-employed as a chiropractor and massage therapist, and am
generally in good health.
4. I could afford health insurance coverage, but I have elected not to purchase such
insurance and desire not to do so now or in the future. I am not covered by anyone else's health
EXHIBIT
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insurance, pay for any health care expenses as they arise, and have not had health insurance
coverage for at least six years.
5. Based on information and belief, I do not qualify for any of the exemptions under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("the Act"), and it is highly likely that I will not
qualify for any of the exemptions over the next several years. I strongly object to being required
by the Act to either buy minimum essential coverage or pay an annual shared responsibility
payment.
6. I am a Christian. I believe in natural forms of healing and trusting God to protect
me from illness or injury and to heal me of any afflictions, no matter the severity of the health
issue, and do not need, or want to be forced to buy, health insurance coverage.
7. I have a sincerely-held religious belief that God will provide for my physical,
spiritual, and financial well-being. Being forced to buy health insurance conflicts with my
religious faith because I believe that I would be indicating that I need a backup plan and am not
really sure whether God will, in fact, provide for my needs.
8. I strongly believe that the federal government lacks the authority to force me to
buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.
9. Because I believe in relying on God to preserve my health and provide for my
physical, spiritual, and financial needs, and object to participation in the health insurance system,
I understand, based on information and belief, that the Act will impose direct and substantial
religious and financial burdens upon me by requiring me to either 1) purchase and maintain
"minimum essential coverage," without any consideration of my individual needs, Christian
faith, and financial situation, or 2) pay the annual shared responsibility payment.
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10. Although I strongly oppose being mandated to purchase minimum essential
coverage as well as being penalized for failing to do so, I view being forced to pay the annual
shared responsibility payment as the lesser of two evils from a religious and financial standpoint.
Therefore, I will be forced to pay-under strong objection--the annual shared responsibility
payment.
11. As a direct result of the Act's inevitable impact upon my finances and lifestyle, I
am compelled to adjust my finances now, by setting aside money, and will continue to do so, to
pay the annual shared responsibility payment. As a result, I will be unable to use that money for
other purposes now, such as discretionary spending, charitable donations, paying debts, or
investing in my business, and will have to adjust my lifestyle accordingly, all of which will
unjustly and adversely burden me and continue to do so while the Act is in existence, and either
is threatened to be enforced, or is enforced against me.
12. Based on information and belief, under the shared responsibility payment
provisions of the Act, I will be required to pay, at a minimum, $3,895 to the government through
2020 for my lack of minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared responsibility payment of
$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016, and $695 or greater in 2017 or later). Based on
information and belief, the total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government
will require me to pay through 2020 may be greater depending upon my income levels during
each taxable year, and I will be required to continue making shared responsibility payments in
2021 and beyond.
13. I believe that the Act will also negatively impact my business because health
insurance generally does not cover the services that I provide, and my clients and prospective
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clients will have less money to pay for my services out-of-pocket if they have to buy minimum
essential coverage or pay an annual shared responsibility payment.
14. As a direct and proximate result of the Act, I am concretely and continuously
harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the Act against me-through either a
coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment-and also the present need to
currently arrange my fiscal affairs to prepare myself to pay thousands of dollars over the next
several years as required by the Act.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. Executed on July p.7, 2010.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD; I
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH RUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ, !
Plaintiffs,
!
I CASE NO. 1:10-CV-00950 (GK)
I
-vs.- 1
I
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES I
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN 1
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY; 1
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER, !
i
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF KENNETH RUFFO
I, Kenneth Ruffo, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Local Civil
Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen, a resident of the State of Texas, and a federal
taxpayer. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2. I am forty-nine years of age and am not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid.
3. I am single, self-employed, and generally in good health.
4. I could afford health insurance coverage, but I have elected not to purchase such
insurance and desire not to do so. I am not covered by anyone else's health insurance, pay for
health care expenses as they arise, and have not had health insurance for at least five years.
5. Based on information and belief, I do not qualify for any of the exemptions under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("the Act"), and it is highly likely that I will not
EXHIBIT
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qualify for any of the exemptions over the next several years. I strongly object to being required
by the Act to either buy minimum. essential coverage or pay an annual shared responsibility
payment.
6. I believe in a holistic or eastern approach to health care and do not need, or want
to be forced to purchase, health insurance coverage.
7. I also strongly believe that the federal government lacks the authority to force me
to buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.
8. Based on information and belief, the Act imposes direct and substantial financial
burdens upon me by requiring me to either 1) purchase and maintain minimum essential
coverage, without any consideration of my individual needs and financial situation, or 2) pay a
shared responsibility payment.
9. Although I strongly oppose being mandated to purchase minimum essential
coverage as well as being penalized for failing to do so, I view being forced to pay the annual
shared responsibility payment as the lesser of two evils from a financial standpoint. Therefore, I
will be forced to pay-under strong objection-the annual shared responsibility payment.
10. As a direct result of the Act's inevitable impact upon my finances and lifestyle, I
am compelled to adjust my finances now, by setting aside money, and will continue to do so, to
pay the annual shared responsibility payment. As a result, I will be unable to use that money for
other purposes now, such as discretionary spending, charitable donations, investing in my
business, or paying debts, and will have to adjust my lifestyle accordingly, all of which will
unjustly and adversely burden me and continue to do so while the Act is in existence, and either
is threatened to be enforced, or is enforced against me.
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1 1 . Based on information and belief, under the shared responsibility payment
provisions of the Act, I will be required to pay, at a minimum, $3,895 to the government through
2020 for my lack of minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared responsibility payment of
$95 in 2014, $325 in 2015, $695 in 2016, and $695 or greater in 2017 or later). Based on
information and belief, the total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government
will require me to pay through 2020 may be greater depending upon my income levels during
each taxable year, and I will be required to continue making shared responsibility payments in
2021 and beyond.
12. As a direct and proximate result of the Act, I am concretely and continuously
harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the Act against me--through either a
coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment--and also the need to
currently arrange my fiscal affairs now to prepare myself to pay thousands of dollars over the
next several years as required by the Act.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. Executed on July, 2010.
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEG GY LEE MEAD;
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH BUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, I CASE NO . 1:10-CV-00950 (GK)
-vs.-
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF GINA RODRIGUEZ
I, Gina Rodriguez, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Local Civil
Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen, a resident of the State of Texas, and a federal
taxpayer. I am a plaintiff in the above-captioned lawsuit.
2. I am thirty-six years of age and am not eligible for Medicare or Medicaid.
3. I am a married stay-at-home mother of three minor children, and generally in
good health.
4. I could afford health insurance coverage, but have elected not to purchase such
insurance and desire not to do so. I am not covered by anyone else's health insurance. I pay for
health care expenses as they arise for my family and me, and I have not had health insurance for
about eight years.
EXHIBIT
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5. Based on information and belief, I do not qualify for any of the exemptions under
the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act ("the Act"), and it is highly likely that I will not
qualify for any of the exemptions over the next several years. I object to being required by the
Act to either buy minimum essential coverage or pay an annual shared responsibility payment.
6. I believe in a holistic approach to medical care and do not need, or want to be
forced to purchase, health insurance coverage.
7. Health insurance does not cover many of the medical services and health products
that I currently pay for out of pocket.
8. I strongly believe that the federal government lacks the authority to force me to
buy a health insurance policy or any other good or service.
9. Based on information and belief, the Act imposes direct and substantial financial
burdens upon me by requiring me to either 1) purchase and maintain "minimum essential
coverage" for my family and me, without any consideration of my individual and family needs
and financial situation, or 2) pay annual shared responsibility payments.
10. Although I strongly oppose being mandated to purchase minimum essential
coverage as well as being penalized for failing to do so, I view being forced to pay the annual
shared responsibility payment as the lesser of two evils from a financial standpoint. Therefore, I
will be forced to pay-under strong objection-the annual shared responsibility payment.
11. As a direct result of the Act's inevitable impact upon my household finances and
lifestyle, my family and I are compelled to adjust our finances now, by setting aside money, and
will continue to do so, to pay the annual shared responsibility payment. As a result, I will be
unable to use that money for other purposes now, such as discretionary spending, charitable
donations, paying debts, or including that money in my children's college fund, and will have to
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adjust my lifestyle accordingly, all of which will unjustly and adversely burden my household
while the Act is in existence, and either is threatened to be enforced, or is enforced against me.
12. Based on information and belief, under the shared responsibility payment
provisions of the Act, my husband and I will be responsible to pay-on behalf of ourselves and
three children-at a minimum, $11,685 to the government through 2020 for our lack of
minimum essential coverage (a minimum shared responsibility payment of $285 in 2014, $975 in
2015, $2,085 in 2016, and $2,085 or greater in 2017 or later). Based on information and belief,
the total amount of shared responsibility payments that the government will require me to pay
through 2020 may be greater depending upon my household's income levels during each taxable
year, and I will be required to continue making shared responsibility payments in 2021 and
beyond.
13. As a direct and proximate result of the Act, I am concretely and continuously
harmed by both the specter of the inevitable enforcement of the Act against me-through either a
coerced commercial transaction or a shared responsibility payment-and also the need to
currently arrange my household's fiscal affairs now to prepare myself and family to pay
thousands of dollars over the next several years as required by the Act.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. Executed on July , 2010.
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IN THE UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE EASTERN DISTRICT OF VIRGINIA
Richmond Division
COMMONWEALTH OF VIRGINIA )
EX REL . KENNETH T. CUCCINELLI, II, )
in his official capacity as Attorney )
General of Virginia, )
Plaintiff,
)
V. ) Civil Action No. 3:10CV 188-HEH
)
KATHLEEN SEBELIUS, )
SECRETARY OF THE DEPARTMENT )
OF HEALTH AND HUMAN SERVICES, )
in her official capacity, )
Defendant.
MEMORANDUM OPINION
(Defendant 's Motion to Dismiss)
This is a narrowly-tailored facial challenge to the constitutionality of Section 1501
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , Pub. L. No. 1 1 1-148, 124 Stat.119
(2010). This provision , in essence , requires individuals to either obtain a minimum level
of health insurance coverage or pay a penalty for failing to do so. According to the
Complaint , which seeks declaratory and injunctive relief, the enactment of Section 1501
not only exceeds the power of Congress under the Commerce Clause and General
Welfare Clause ofthe United States Constitution , but is also directly at tension with
Virginia Code Section 38.2-3430 . 1:1(2010), commonly referred to as the Virginia Health
Care Freedom Act.
The case is presently before the Court on Defendant ' s Motion to Dismiss, filed
EXHIBIT
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pursuant to Federal Rules of Civil Procedure 12(b)(1) and (b)(6). Both sides have filed
extensive and thoroughly researched memoranda supporting their respective positions.
The Court heard oral argument on July 1, 2010. Although this case is laden with public
policy implications and has a distinctive political undercurrent , at this stage the sole
issues before the Court are subject matter jurisdiction and the legal sufficiency of the
Complaint.
I.
In the Complaint , the Commonwealth of Virginia (the "Commonwealth") assails
Section 1501(or "Minimum Essential Coverage Provision ") on a number of fronts. First,
the Commonwealth contends that requiring an otherwise unwilling individual to purchase
a good or service from a private vendor is beyond the outer limits of the Commerce
Clause . In the Commonwealth ' s view, the failure-or refusal---of its citizens to elect to
purchase health insurance is not "economic activity" and therefore not subject to federal
regulation under the Commerce Clause . Succinctly put, the Commonwealth defies the
Secretary to point to any Commerce Clause jurisprudence extending its tentacles to an
individual ' s decision not to engage in economic activity. Furthermore , they argue that
since Section 1501 exceeds this enumerated power , Congress cannot invoke either the
Necessary and Proper Clause or its taxation powers to regulate such passive economic
inactivity.
Alternatively , the Commonwealth maintains that Section 1501 is in direct conflict
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with the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act. The Commonwealth argues that the
enactment of Section 1501 therefore encroaches on the sovereignty of the Commonwealth
and offends the Tenth Amendment to the Constitution.
The Defendant in this case is Kathleen Sebelius , in her official capacity as
Secretary of the Department of Health and Human Services (the "Secretary"). The
Secretary 's Motion to Dismiss , filed under both Fed , R. Civ. P . 12(b)(1) and (b)(6), has
several distinct strands . The Secretary argues initially that the Attorney General of
Virginia , in his official capacity, lacks standing to challenge Section 1501, thereby
depriving this Court of subject matter jurisdiction . Because the mandatory insurance
provision is not effective until 2014 , the Secretary also maintains that the issues are not
ripe for immediate resolution.
With respect to the merits, the Secretary contends that the Complaint lacks legal
vitality and therefore fails to state a cause of action. She asserts that the Minimum
Essential Coverage Provision is amply supported by time-honored applications of
Congress ' s Commerce Clause powers and associated regulatory authority under the
Necessary and Proper Clause . The theoretical foundation for the Secretary's position is
predicated on factual findings by Congress that Section 1501 is the central ingredient of a
complex health care regulatory scheme . Its core underpinning is the notion that every
individual will need medical services at some point. Everyone , voluntarily or otherwise,
is therefore either a current or future participant in the health care market.
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To underwrite this health care scheme and guarantee affordable coverage to every
individual, the cost of providing these services must be defrayed from some source,
particularly as to the individuals who are uninsured . To address the annual deficit caused
by uncompensated medical services, which according to the Secretary is approximately
$43 billion , Congress included the penalty provision in Section 1501 to coax all
individuals to purchase insurance . Because Section 1501, like the Act as a whole,
regulates decisions about how to pay for services in the health care market and the
insurance industry, the Secretary reasons that it necessarily affects interstate commerce.
Lastly , the Secretary contends that Section 1501 is a valid exercise of Congress's
independent authority to use its taxing and spending power under the General Welfare
Clause . Therefore, she argues that this action is barred by the Anti4njunction Act.
II.
Turning first to the standing issue, relying on Massachusetts v. Mellon, 262 U.S.
447, 43 S. Ct. 597 (1923 ), the Secretary argues that the Attorney General ' s prosecution of
this case , on behalf of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, is barred by the
long-standing doctrine of "par•ens patriae." Id . at 485 , 43 S. Ct. at 600 . In Mellon, the
U.S. Supreme Court noted that because citizens of an individual state are also citizens of
the United States, "[i]t cannot be conceded that a State , as parens patriae , may institute
judicial proceedings to protect citizens of the United States from the operation of the
statutes thereof." Id. The Court further stated in Mellon that "it is no part of [a State's]
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duty or power to enforce [ its citizens '] rights in respect of their relations with the federal
government ." Id. at 485-86 , 43 S. Ct . at 600. Therefore , the Secretary contends that a
state does not have standing as parens patriae to bring an action against the federal
government . Id.; see A lfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc. v . Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S.
592, 610 n.16,102 S . Ct. 3260, 3270 (1982).
The Secretary further maintains that the congressional enactment at issue, Section
1501, imposes no obligation on the Commonwealth as a sovereign. The Secretary
marginalizes the conflict between Section 1501 and the Virginia Health Care Freedom
Act as a political policy dispute manufactured for the sole purpose of creating standing.
The resulting abstract policy dispute causes no imminent injury to the sovereign and is
thus insufficient to support standing to challenge a federal enactment . Mellon , 262 U. S.
at 484-85, 43 S . Ct. at 600.
On the other hand , the Commonwealth views the task at hand differently. In
prosecuting the immediate action, the Commonwealth , through its Attorney General, is
not simply representing individual citizens , it is defending the constitutionality and
enforceability of its duly enacted laws. The Commonwealth maintains that its standing to
defend its legislative enactments is a fossilized principle uniformly recognized by the
U.S. Supreme Court, citing Diamond v. Charles, 476 U .S. 54 (1986).
"[T]he power to create and enforce a legal code, both civil and criminal" is
one of the quintessential functions of a State . Alfred L . Snapp & Son, Inc. v.
Puerto Rico ex rel. Barez, 458 U.S . 592, 601 , 102 S. Ct . 3260 , 3265-66, 73
L. Ed. 2d 995 (1982 ). Because the State alone is entitled to create a legal
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code , only the State has the kind of "direct stake " identified in Sierra Club
V. Morton , 405 U . S. [727,] 740, 92 S. Ct. [1 361 ,] 1369 [(1972)], in
defending the standards embodied in that code.
Diamond, 476 U .S. at 65,106 S. Ct . at 1705.
The Commonwealth draws a clear distinction between this case and those relied
upon by the Secretary . The Commonwealth argues that it is not prosecuting this case in a
parens patriae , or quasi -sovereign capacity . In the immediate case , the Commonwealth is
exercising a core sovereign power because the effect of the federal enactment is to require
Virginia to yield under the Supremacy Clause . Unlike Mellon , irrespective of its
underlying legislative intent , the Virginia statute is directly in conflict with Section 1501
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,'
A subsidiary element of the Secretary ' s argument that this Court lacks subject
matter jurisdiction is the alleged absence of any imminent injury to sovereign interest.
The Commonwealth counters that the conflict between federal and state law is
"immediate and complete with respect to the legal principles at issue ." (Pl.'s Mem.
'In 1945 , Congress passed the McCarran-Ferguson Act, 15 U.S.C. § 1011, et seg., in
reaction to the U . S. Supreme Court' s decision in United States v . South-Eastern Underwriters
Assn, 322 U.S. 533 , 64 S. Ct. 1162 (1944). The Act expressly declared that the continued
regulation and taxation of the business of insurance , and all who engage in it, should be subject
to the laws of the several states unless Congress specifically states the contrary . Life Partners,
Inc, v. Morrison , 484 F.3d 284, 292 (4th Cir. 2007), cert. denied, 2007 U.S. Lexis 12349 (Dec. 3,
2007); see also Prudential Ins. Co. v, Benjamin , 328 U .S. 408 , 430, 66 S. Ct.1142, 1155 (1946).
The Secretary argues that the language of Section 1501 is sufficient to imply an intent on the part
of Congress to in effect preempt any state regulation to the contrary . The Commonwealth
appears to disagree. (Tr. 48-49, July 1, 2010 .) The demarcation between state and federal
responsibility in this area will require further development in future proceedings in order to
adequately address the Commonwealth ' s Tenth Amendment argument.
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Opp'n Mot . Dismiss 4.) By way of further elucidation , the Commonwealth contends that
it has already begun taking steps to prepare for the implementation of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act . It asserts that "officials are presently having to
deviate from their ordinary duties to begin the administrative response to the changes in
federal law as they cascade through the Medicaid and insurance regulatory systems."
(PL's Mem . Opp'n Mot . Dismiss 4,)
The next facet of the Secretary's challenge to the Court's subject matter
jurisdiction in this case invokes the Anti-Injunction Act, 26 U . S.C. § 7421 (a).2 The Anti-
Injunction Act provides, in pertinent part, that "no suit for the purpose of restraining the
assessment or collection of any tax shall be maintained in any court by any person,
whether or not such person is the person against whom such tax was assessed." 26 U.S.C.
§ 7421(a). The Secretary argues that the restraining effect of this Act is broad enough to
include payments which are labeled a "penalty rather than a tax," as the Secretary styles
the assessment in this case for failure to purchase the requisite insurance coverage.
(Def.'s Mem. Supp . Mot. Dismiss l6.) Because the Secretary maintains that the
immediate action constitutes an abatement of a tax liability or penalty, she claims the
2 By implication , this argument would also include parallel provisions in the Declaratory
Judgment Act , 28 U.S.C. § 2201(a). "Though the Anti-Injunction Act concerns federal courts'
subject matter jurisdiction and the tax -exclusion provision of the Declaratory Judgment Act
concerns the issuance of a particular remedy , the two statutory texts are, in underlying intent and
practical effect, coextensive ." In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d 573, 583 (4th Cir.
1996). "In light of the two provisions ' coextensive nature , a finding that one of the two statutes
does not bar the debtors in the instant cases from seeking and obtaining free and clear orders will
necessitate a finding that the other statute does not pose an obstacle either ." Id. at 584.
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District Court lacks jurisdiction . The Secretary ' s position is that the only appropriate
relief vehicle for a citizen seeking to challenge the penalty provisions of Section 1501
would be to pay the required penalty and sue for a refund. See Bob Jones Univ, v. Simon,
416 U.S . 725, 736 , 94 S. Ct. 2038 , 2046 ( 1974).
The Commonwealth urges a more narrow interpretation of the Anti
-Injunction Act,
The Commonwealth contends that the word "person" used in the operative portion of the
Anti-Injunction Act does not include a state. The U.S. Supreme Court , as well as the
Fourth Circuit, has almost uniformly held that the word "person " appearing in a federal
statute should not be interpreted as including a state . There is a "longstanding
interpretive presumption that `person ' does not include the sovereign ." Vt. Agency of
I natural Res. v. United States ex rel. Stevens, 529 U . S. 765, 780,120 S. Ct.1858, 1866
(2000); see also Va . of ce for Prot. & Advocacy v. Reinhard, 405 F . 3 d 185 , 189 (4th Cir.
2005). "The presumption is, of course , not a hard and fast rule of exciusion, but it may be
disregarded only upon some affirmative showing of statutory intent to the contrary." Vt.
Agency of Natural Res., 529 U.S. at 781,120 S. Ct . at 1867 (internal citations omitted).
The Commonwealth argues that the Secretary has failed to overcome the requisite
presumption because she cannot point to any persuasive authority that the Anti
-Injunction
Act applies to states . Therefore, the Commonwealth argues that the Anti-Injunction Act
does not apply to its prosecution of this case.
Alternatively , the Commonwealth contends that the claims advanced in this case
8
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fall squarely within an exception to the Anti-Injunction Act recognized in South Carolina
V. Regan , 465 U.S. 367,104 S . Ct.1107 (1984). In Regan , the Supreme Court observed
that the Anti-Injunction Act was not intended to bar "actions brought by aggrieved parties
for whom [Congress ] has not provided an alternative remedy ." Id, at 378 , 104 S. Ct. at
1114. Because the Commonwealth contends that only the sovereign has standing to seek
judicial vindication of its own statutes , it claims the effect of the Anti -Injunction Act
would be to deny the Commonwealth a remedy to address the effect of the federal
enactment at issue.
Although the Commonwealth ' s contention that the term "person" in the Anti-
Injunction Act does not apply to states may be well-founded , this Court believes it is clear
that the Regan exception applies in this case.3 As the Supreme Court held in Regan, the
Anti-Injunction Act "was intended to apply only when Congress has provided an
alternative avenue for an aggrieved party to litigate its claims on its own behalf." Id. at
381,104 S. Ct. at 1115 ; see also In re Leckie Smokeless Coal Co., 99 F.3d at 584.
Additionally, the Regan Court emphasized that, "the indicia of congressional intent-the
[Anti-Injunction ] Act's purposes and the circumstances of its enactment demonstrate that
Congress did not intend the Act to apply where an aggrieved party would be required to
depend on the mere possibility of persuading a third party to assert his claims." Regan,
3 This Court can also not ignore the fact that the Commonwealth ' s Complaint does not
challenge the penalty provision of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act , though the
two undeniably act in tandem . Instead , the Complaint exclusively attacks the constitutionality of
the mandate to purchase health care insurance.
9
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465 U . S. at 381 , 104 S. Ct. at 1115. However, "[b]ecause of the strong policy animating
the Anti -Injunction Act , and the sympathetic , almost unique, facts in Regan, courts have
construed the Regan exception very narrowly ...." Judicial Watch , Inc. v. Rossotti, 317
F.3d 401, 408 n . 3 (4th Cir . 2003).
Despite this narrow interpretation , this Court finds the justification for allowing an
exception to the Anti -Injunction Act in Regan applies with equal strength to the
circumstances in this case . First, the Supreme Court found that "instances in which a
third party may raise the constitutional rights of another are the exception rather than the
rule." Regan, 465 U . S. at 380 , 104 S. Ct . at 1115 (citing Singleton v. Wulf; 428 U.S.106,
114, 96 S . Ct. 2868 , 2874 ( 1976)). Thus , in this case , without standing to defend the
constitutionality of a state ' s right to create and enforce its own legal code , an individual
taxpayer would be unable to assert the constitutional rights of the Commonwealth.
Second , "to make use of this remedy the State `must first be able to find [an individual]
willing to subject himself to the rigors of litigation against the Service, and then must rely
on [him] to present the relevant arguments on [its] behalf." Id. (citing Bob Jones, 416
U.S. at 747 n.2 I , 94 S. Ct. at 2051 ). Due to the magnitude, cost, and sui generis interest
of Virginia in this case , even if standing was not an issue , it appears the Commonwealth
would be hard-pressed to find a suitable party to argue the case on its behalf.
Third , and perhaps most importantly, "[b]ecause it is by no means certain that the
State would be able to convince a taxpayer to raise its claims, reliance on the remedy
10
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suggested by the Secretary would create the risk that the Anti-Injunction Act would
entirely deprive the State of any opportunity to obtain review of its claims." Id. at 380-
8 1 , 104 S . Ct. at 1115. Applying this logic to the Commonwealth , as a sovereign entity
not required to purchase insurance under Section 1501, Virginia will never be assessed
the fine imposed under the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act, and consequently,
never afforded an opportunity to pay the penalty and request a refund . Therefore, this
Court concludes that "[b]ecause Congress did not prescribe an alternative remedy for the
plaintiff in this case , the Act does not bar this suit ." Id. at 381 , 104 S. Ct. at 1115-16.
Although this lawsuit has the collateral effect of protecting the individual interests
of the citizens of the Commonwealth of Virginia, its primary articulated objective is to
defend the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act from the conflicting effect of an allegedly
unconstitutional federal law. Despite its declaratory nature , it is a lawfully-enacted part
of the laws of Virginia . The purported transparent legislative intent underlying its
enactment is irrelevant . The mere existence of the lawfully-enacted statute is sufficient to
trigger the duty of the Attorney General of Virginia to defend the law and the associated
sovereign power to enact it.4 As the U.S. Supreme Court noted in Alfred L. Snapp & Son,
Inc., it is common ground that states have an interest as sovereigns in exercising "the
power to create and enforce a legal code ." Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U .S. at 601,
4Federal courts have long recognized the duty of state Attorneys General to defend the
laws of their states . See Fed. R. Civ. P. 5.1(a)(2) (requiring that any party challenging the
constitutionality of a state statute serve notice on the state Attorney General).
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102 S. Ct. at 3265. With few exceptions, courts have uniformly held that individuals do
not have standing to bring a Tenth Amendment claim. Kennedy v. Al/era, -- F.3d --, 2010
wL 2780188, at8 (4th Cir. July 15, 2010) (citing Brooklyn Legal Servs. Corp. B v.
Legal Servs. Corp., 462 F.3d 219, 234-36 (2d Cir. 2006)).
The power of the Attorney General to prosecute claims on behalf of the state he or
she represents remains unsettled despite centuries of legal debates This is particularly
true in cases involving suits against the federal government . See Alaska v. US. Dep'1 of
Transp., 868 F.2d 441, 443 n.1(D.C. Cir.1989). Reviewing courts, in their standing
analysis , have distinguished cases where the individual interests of citizens are purely at
stake from those in which the interest of the state , as a separate body politic, is implicated.
The former is distinguished by legal commentators from the latter as quasi-sovereignty as
opposed to sovereignty, while standing jurisprudence in the area of quasi -sovereign or
parens patriae standing defies simple formulation, courts have uniformly held that
"where a harm is widely shared, a sovereign , suing in its individual interest , has standing
to sue where that sovereign ' s individual interests are harmed , wholly apart from the
alleged general harm ." Ctr, for Biological Diversity v. US. Dept of Interior, 563 F.3d
466, 476-77 (D.C. Cir. 2009) (citing Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497,127 S. Ct.
SGiven the stake states have in protecting their sovereign interests, they are often accorded
"special solicitude" in standing analysis . Massachusetts v. EPA, 549 U.S. 497, 520,127 S. Ct.
1438,1455 (2007).
12
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1438(2007)).6
Closely analogous to the immediate case is Wyoming ex rel. Crank v. United
States , 539 F.3d 1236 (10th Cir. 2048). There the State of Wyoming sought declaratory
and injunctive relief against a decision of the United States Bureau of Alcohol , Tobacco,
Firearms and Explosives, which determined that a Wyoming statute purportedly
establishing a procedure to expunge domestic violence misdemeanor convictions , in order
to restore lost firearms rights , would not have the intended effect under federal law. As in
the immediate case , the United States challenged the Article III standing of the State of
Wyoming to seek judicial relief from the conflicting federal regulation . The Tenth
Circuit held that Wyoming's stake in the controversy was sufficiently adverse to warrant
Article III standing.
Relying on the teachings ofAlf •ed L, Snapp & Son , Inc., the Tenth Circuit
observed that the states have a legally protected sovereign interest in "the exercise of
sovereign power over individuals and entities within the relevant jurisdiction[, which]
involves the power to create and enforce a legal code ." Wyoming, 539 F.3d at 1242
(quoting Alfred L. Snapp & Son, Inc., 458 U.S. at 601,102 S. Ct . at 3265). "Federal
regulatory action that preempts state law creates a sufficient injury-in -fact to satisfy this
prong . Accordingly , we conclude that Wyoming has sufficiently alleged an injury - in-fact
60f course, Article III standing has other elements. A plaintiff must demonstrate: (i) an
injury-in-fact that is both concrete and particularized , as well as actual or imminent ; (ii) an injury
that is traceable to the conduct complained of; and (iii) an injury that is redressable by a decision
of the court . Lujan v. Defenders ofWildlife, 504 U. S. 555 , 560-61 , 112 S. Ct. 2130, 2136 (1992).
13
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...." Id. at 1242 ( internal citations omitted).
This Court finds the Tenth Circuit 's standing analysis in Wyoming to be sound and
adopts its principled and logical reasoning in this case . The Commonwealth, through its
Attorney General , satisfies Article III's standing requirements under the facts of this case.
III.
Resolution of the standing issue resolves only a single strand of the case or
controversy requirements of Article III subject matter jurisdiction. The matter must also
be ripe for adjudication . In other words , the claim must be sufficiently mature and issues
sufficiently defined and concrete to create an actual justiciable controversy. See
Blanchette V. Conn. Gen. Ins. Corps. (Reg '1 Rail Reorganization Act Cases), 419 U.S.
102, 138-39, 95 S. Ct. 335, 356 (1974). "[ R]ipeness is peculiarly a question of timing
...." Id. at 140, 95 S. Ct. at 357. It implicates both constitutional limitations and
prudential consideration . Reno v. Catholic Soc. Servs. Inc., 509 U.S. 43, 57 n.18 ,1135 S.
Ct. 2485, 2496 ( 1993). In determining whether a claim is ripe for judicial review, courts
evaluate " the fitness of the issues far judicial decision ' and `the hardship of withholding
court consideration ." Stolt-Nielsen S.A. v. AnimalFeeds Intl Corp., 130 S. Ct.1758,
1767 n.2 (2010) (quoting Nat '1 Park Hospitality Assn v. Dept of Interior, 538 U .S. 805,
808,123 S. Ct. 2026, 2031(2003 )). "The burden of proving ripeness falls on the party
bringing suit." Miller v. Brown, 462 F.3d 312, 319 (4th Cir. 2006).
This element of the Secretary 's argument is closely intertwined with her contention
14
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that Virginia has not demonstrated that it will suffer a hardship from the provision it
challenges because the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision does not go into effect
until 2014. This lack of immediate impact , in her view , renders the Commonwealth's
challenge premature. To support this contention, the Secretary relies principally on South
Carolina v . Katzenbach, 383 U . S. 301, 86 S. Ct. 803 ( 1966). Katzenbach involved a suit
to enjoin enforcement of certain provisions of the Voting Rights Act of 1965 , particularly
those sections providing civil and criminal sanctions against interference with the
exercise of rights guaranteed by the Act . The Katzenbach Court found those sections of
the statute imposing criminal penalties to be premature for constitutional review, but held
that the regulatory portions were ripe for judicial consideration.
It is important to note that the Supreme Court has historically drawn a distinction
between the ripeness analysis employed for criminal statutes as opposed to other
regulatory enactments . Reg '1 Rail Reorganization Act Cases, 419 U.S. at 143 n.29, 95 S.
Ct. at 358 . Unlike a regulatory statute , the decision to initiate criminal prosecutions
resides within the discretion of prosecutors--and allows for citizens to voluntarily bring
their conduct within the bounds of the law. Id. The Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision presently before the Court lacks criminal remedies . In fact, it specifically
waives criminal prosecution or sanctions for failure to pay a penalty levied by the Act. 26
U.S.C. § 5000A(g)(2)(A). Therefore , neither prosecutorial discretion nor self-regulated
citizen conduct considerations are present here . With certain delineated exceptions, 26
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U.S.C. § 5000A (a) mandates that a citizen purchase, or otherwise obtain insurance, or
face a monetary assessment . The central issue in this case is the Commonwealth's
sovereign interest in upholding the Virginia Health Care Freedom Act. The issues
presented are purely legal and further development of the factual record would not clarify
the issues for judicial resolution . Thomas v. Union Carbide Agric. Prods . Co., 473 U.S.
568, 581,105 S. Ct, 3325, 3333 (1985).
While the mandatory compliance provisions of the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision do not go into effect until 2014 , that does not mean that its effects will not be
felt by the Commonwealth in the near future . This provision will compel scores of people
who are not currently enrolled to evaluate and contract for insurance coverage.
Individuals currently insured will be required to be sure that their present plans comply
with this regulatory regimen . Insurance carriers will have to take steps in the near future
to accommodate the influx of new enrollees to public and private insurance plans.
Employers will need to determine if their current insurance satisfies the statutory
requirements.
More importantly , the Commonwealth must revamp its health care program to
ensure compliance with the enactment ' s provisions , particularly with respect to Medicaid.
This process will entail more than simple fine tuning . Unquestionably, this regulation
radically changes the landscape of health insurance coverage in America.
The Supreme Court , and the preponderance of reviewing courts of appeals, have
16
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not been reticent to consider the constitutionality of legislative enactments prior to their
date of effectiveness when the resulting alleged injury is impending and more than a
"mere possibility." See Pierce v. Soc'y of Sisters, 268 U.S. 510, 45 S. Ct. 571(1925)
(ruling a year prior to the challenged law's date of effectiveness was permissible); see
also Virginia v. Am. Booksellers Ass 'ii., 484 U.S. 383, 392-93,108 S. Ct. 636, 642-43
(1988) (upholding a pre-enforcement challenge to a state law on First Amendment
grounds). Again, the alleged injury in this case is the collision between state and federal
law. Neither the White House nor Congress has given any indication that the Minimum
Essential Coverage Provision at issue will not be enforced, and the Court sees no reason
to assume otherwise. Am. Booksellers Ass'n., 484 U.S. at 393,108 S. Ct. at 643. Nor do
the facts before the Court here present a "hypothetical" case, United States v. Raines, 362
U.S.17, 22, 80 S. Ct. 519, 523 (1960), or a "remote and abstract .. , inquiry." Intl
Longshoremen's Union, Local 37 v. Boyd, 347 U.S. 222, 224, 74 S. Ct. 447, 448 (1954).
The issues in this case are fully framed, the underlying facts are well settled, and
the case is accordingly ripe for review. The Commonwealth has therefore satisfied all
requirements of Article III standing.
IV.
Turning to the merits of the Complaint , it is important to keep in mind that the
Court ' s mission at this stage is narrow . To survive a Rule 12(b)(6) challenge , a complaint
need only state a legally viable cause of action. "A motion to dismiss under Rule 12(b)(6)
17
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tests the sufficiency of a complaint; importantly, it does not resolve contests surrounding
the facts, the merits of a claim, or the applicability of defenses." Republican Party of
N.C. V. Martin, 980 F.2d 943, 952 (4th Cir.1992), cert. denied, 510 U.S. 828,114 S. Ct.
93 (1993). In reviewing a 12(b)(6) motion, the complaint must be construed in the light
most favorable to the plaintiff, assuming its factual allegations to be true. Hishon v. King
& Spalding, 467 U.S. 69, 73,104 S. Ct. 2229, 2232 (1984).
This time^honored standard is a bit more difficult to apply in the context of this
case. The congressional enactment under review-the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision--literally forges new ground and extends Commerce Clause powers beyond its
current high watermark. Counsel for both sides have thoroughly mined relevant case law
and offered well reasoned analyses. The result, however, has been insightful and
illuminating, but short of definitive. While this Court's decision may set the initial
judicial course of this case, it will certainly not be the final word.
The historically-accepted contours of Article I Commerce Clause power were
restated by the Supreme Court in Perez v. United States, 402 U.S.146,150, 91 S. CL.
1357,1359 (1971). First, Congress can regulate the channels of interstate commerce. Id.
Second, Congress has the authority to regulate and protect the instrumentalities of
interstate commerce and persons or things in interstate commerce. Id. Third, Congress
has the power to regulate activities that substantially affect interstate commerce. Id. It
appears from the argument and memoranda of counsel that only the third category is
18
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implicated in the case at hand.
In arguing that an individual's decision not to purchase health insurance is in effect
"economic activity," the Secretary relies on an aggregation theory . In other words, the
sum of individual decisions to participate or not in the health insurance market has a
critical effect on interstate commerce . The Secretary's argument is drawn in large
measure from the teachings of the Supreme Court in Gonzales v. Raich, 545 U . S.1,125
S. Ct. 2195 (2005 ), wherein the Court noted:
[OJur case law firmly establishes Congress ' power to regulate purely local
activities that are part of an economic "class of activities" that have a
substantial effect on interstate commerce.... When Congress decides that
the "total incidence" of a practice poses a threat to a national market, it may
regulate the entire class .... In this vein , we have reiterated that when "a
general regulatory statute bears a substantial relation to commerce, the de
minimis character of individual instances arising under that statute is of no
consequence."
Gonzales , 545 U.S. at 17,125 S. Ct. at 2205-06 (quoting United States v. Lopez, 514 U.S.
549, 558,115 S. Ct. 1624,1629 (1995)).
In the Secretary 's view, without full market participation, the financial foundation
supporting the health care system will fail, in effect causing the health care regime to
"implode ." At oral argument, the Deputy Assistant Attorney General of the United
States, on behalf of the Secretary, described the collective effect of the Minimum
Essential Coverage Provision as the critical element of the national health care scheme,
"[a]nd what the [congressional ] testimony was, was if you do the preexisting condition
exclusion and no differential health care status, without a minimum coverage type
19
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provision , it will inexorably drive that market into extinction . And what somebody said
more succinctly was, the market will implode ." (Tr. 33:7-13, July 1, 2010.)
To support this argument , the Secretary compared the market impact of the
universal insurance requirement to regulation of wheat harvested for personal
consumption or marijuana grown for personal use. In Wickard v. Wilburn, 317 U.S.111,
63 S. Ct. 82 (1942), acknowledged by most constitutional scholars as the most expansive
application of the Commerce Clause , the Supreme Court upheld the power of Congress to
regulate the personal cultivation and consumption of wheat on a private farm. The Court
reasoned that the consumption of such non-commercially produced wheat reduced the
amount of commercially produced wheat purchased and consumed nationally , thereby
affecting interstate commerce . The Court concluded:
[The fact that] appellee ' s own contribution to the demand for wheat may be
trivial by itself is not enough to remove him from the scope of federal
regulation where , as here , his contribution , taken together with that of many
others similarly situated, is tar from trivial.... But if we assume that it is
never marketed , it supplies a need of the man who grew it which would
otherwise be reflected by purchases in the open market.
Wickard, 317 U.S. at 127-28, 63 S. Ct. at 90-91.
Similarly, in Gonzales v. Raich, the Supreme Court concluded that the aggregate
effect of personal growth and consumption of marijuana for medicinal purposes, pursuant
to California law, had a sufficient impact on interstate commerce to warrant regulation
under the Commerce Clause. "Like the farmer in Wickard, respondents are cultivating,
for home consumption , a fungible commodity for which there is an established , albeit
20
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illegal, interstate market. ... 1-Iere too , Congress had a rational basis for concluding that
leaving home-consumed marijuana outside federal control would similarly affect price
and market conditions ." Gonzales, 545 U.S. at 1819, S . Ct. at 2206-07.
In response , the Commonwealth highlights what it perceives to be the critical
distinction between the line of cases relied upon by the Secretary and the Commerce
Clause application presently before the Court . What the Supreme Court deemed to be
"economic activity" in Wickard and Raich necessarily involved a voluntary decision to
perform an act , such as growing wheat or cultivating marijuana . The Commonwealth
argues that this critical element is absent in the regulatory mechanism established in the
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision. This provision , the Commonwealth maintains,
requires a person to perform an involuntary act and as a result , submit to Commerce
Clause regulation . The Commonwealth continues that neither the U.S. Supreme Court
nor any circuit court of appeals has upheld the extension of Commerce Clause power to
encompass economic inactivity.
Drawing on the logic articulated in United States v. Lopez , 514 U.S . 549,115 S.
Ct.1624 (1995), and United States v. Morrison, 529 U . S. 598 , 120 S. Ct . 1740 (2000),
which limited the boundaries of Commerce Clause jurisdiction to activities truly
economic in nature and that actually affect interstate commerce , the Commonwealth
contends that a decision not to purchase a product, such as health insurance, is not an
economic activity . It is a virtual state of repose.-or idleness ----the converse of activity.
21
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12-9    Filed 08/10/10   Page 21 of 32
Case 3 : 10-cv-00188 -HEH Document 84 Filed 08/02/10 Page 22 of 32
At best , Section 150 l regulates future activity in anticipation of need.
In United States v. Morrison , the Court acknowledged that its "interpretation of the
Commerce Clause has changed as our Nation has developed.... [E)ven [our] modern-era
precedents which have expanded congressional power under the Commerce Clause
confirm that this power is subject to outer limits." Morrison , 529 U.S . at 607-08,120 S.
Ct. at 1748 -49 (quoting NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp ., 301 U.S . 1, 57 S. Ct. 615
(1937)). The Court in Morrison also noted that "the existence of congressional findings
is not sufficient, by itself, to sustain the constitutionality of Commerce Clause
legislation ." Morrison, 529 U.S . at 614,120 S. Ct. at 1752. Finally, in Morrison, the
Court rejected "the argument that Congress may regulate noneconomic, violent criminal
conduct based solely on that conduct ' s aggregate effect on interstate commerce." Id, at
617,120 S. Ct. at 1754.
The Commonwealth further maintains that the Secretary's position finds no
sustenance in the Necessary and Proper Clause . U.S. Const . art. I, § 8. This clause grants
Congress broad authority to pass laws in furtherance of its constitutionally -enumerated
powers. The Commonwealth draws the Court's attention to several observations of the
Supreme Court in the recent case of United States v. Comstock, 130 S. Ct.1949 (2010).
The Court in Comstock began its analysis by quoting Chief Justice Marshall in McCulloch
V. Maryland, 17 U.S. (4 wheat.) 316 (1819 ): "Let the end be legitimate, let it be within
the scope of the constitution, and all means which are appropriate , which are plainly
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adapted to that end , which are not prohibited , but consistent with the letter and spirit of
the constitution , are constitutional." Comstock, 130 S. Ct . at 1956 (quoting McCulloch,
17 U.S. (4 wheat.) at 421 ).
In commenting on Chief Justice Marshall ' s remarks , the Court in Comstock noted
that:
[W]e have since made clear that, in determining whether the Necessary and
Proper Clause grants Congress the legislative authority to enact a particular
federal statute , we look to see whether the statute constitutes a means that is
rationally related to the implementation of a constitutionally enumerated
power.... [T]he relevant inquiry is simply whether the means chosen are
reasonably adapted to the attainment of a legitimate end under the
commerce power or under other powers that the Constitution grants
Congress the authority to implement.
Id. at 1956-57 ( internal citations omitted).
The Commonwealth maintains that even if a congressional enactment is noble and
legitimate , the means adapted to enforce it under the Necessary and Proper Clause must
be within the letter and spirit of the Constitution . In other words , it must have a firm
constitutional foundation rooted in Article I. The goals of those portions of the Patient
Protection and Affordable Care Act directly pertinent to health care, i.e., universal health
insurance coverage, no exclusion of persons with preexisting conditions , a requirement
that all people receiving health care pay for such services in a timely fashion , etc., are
laudable . The Commonwealth argues , however, that the Necessary and Proper Clause
cannot be employed as a vehicle to enforce an unconstitutional exercise of Commerce
Clause power , no matter how well intended. If a person's decision not to purchase health
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insurance at a particular point in time does not constitute the type of economic activity
subject to regulation under the Commerce Clause, then logically, an attempt to enforce
such provision under the Necessary and Proper Clause is equally offensive to the
Constitution.
In rebuttal , the Secretary reiterates her position that a person cannot simply elect to
avoid participation in the health care market . It is inevitable, in her view, that every
person today or in the future healthy or otherwise---will require medical care. The
Minimum Essential Coverage Provision simply provides a vehicle for prompt and
dependable payment for such services if and when rendered . The Secretary also rejects
the notion that the imposition of a monetary penalty for failing to perform a lawful act is
alien to the spirit of the Constitution. The Secretary points out that sanctions have
historically been imposed for failure to timely file tax returns or truthfully report or pay
taxes due, as well as failure to register with the Selective Service or report for military
duty. These examples, as the Commonwealth aptly notes, are directly tethered to a
specific constitutional provision empowering Congress to assess taxes and provide and
maintain an Army and Navy . U.S. Const. art. I, § $. No specifically articulated
constitutional authority exists to mandate the purchase of health insurance or the
assessment of a penalty for failing to do so.
As previously mentioned, the Commerce Clause aspect ofthis debate raises issues
of national significance . The position ofthe parties are widely divergent and at times
24
Case 1:10-cv-00950-GK   Document 12-9    Filed 08/10/10   Page 24 of 32
Case 3:10-cv-00188 -HEH Document 84 Filed 08/02/10 Page 25 of 32
novel . The guiding precedent is informative, but inconclusive . Never before has the
Commerce Clause and associated Necessary and Proper Clause been extended this far.
At this juncture , the Court is not persuaded that the Secretary has demonstrated that the
Complaint fails to state a cause of action with respect to the Commerce Clause element.
This portion of the Complaint advances a plausible claim with an arguable legal basis.
V.
The final aspect of the Secretary's Rule 12(b)(6) challenge raises an even closer
and equally unsettled issue under congressional taxing powers . Contrary to pre-
enactment representations by the Executive and Legislative branches , the Secretary now
argues alternatively that the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is a product of the
government's power to tax for the general welfare . (Tr. I9:16-17 , July 1, 2010 .) This is
of course supported by the placement of the penalty provisions within the Internal
Revenue Code . Because the Secretary contends that the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision is an exercise of the less bridled power of Congress to tax, this element of the
argument presents a much closer question than the preceding Commerce Clause debate.
The Secretary suggests that the constitutional analysis under the Tax Clause
involves only two factors . Relying on United States v. Aiken , 974 F.2d 446 (4th Cir.
1992), she asserts that the power of Congress to lay and collect taxes , duties , and excises,
under Article I, Section 8 of the U .S. Constitution , requires only that it be a revenue-
raising measure and that the associated regulatory provisions bear a reasonable relation to
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the statute ' s taxing purpose . 1d. at 448; see also Sonzinsky v. United States, 300 U.S. 506,
513, 57 S. Ct. 554 , 555-56 (1937); United States v. Dorernus, 249 U . S. 86, 39 S. Ct. 214
(1919). According to the Secretary , the power of Congress to tax for the general welfare
is checked only by the electorate . "Unless there are provisions , extraneous to any tax
need , courts are without authority to limit the exercise of the taxing power." United
States V. Kahriger , 345 U.S. 22, 31, 73 S . Ct. 510, 515 ( 1953), overruled on other
grounds, Marchetti V . United Sates, 390 U.S . 39, 88 S. Ct. 697 (1968). The Secretary
points out that the power of Congress to use its taxing and spending power under the
General Welfare Clause has long been recognized as extensive. McCray v. United States,
195 U.S . 27, 56-59, 24 S. Ct. 769 , 776-78 ( 1904). Furthermore , the Secretary notes that
Congress may use its power under the Tax Clause even for purposes that would exceed its
powers under other provisions ofArticle I. United States v. Sanchez, 340 U . S. 42, 44, 71
S. Ct.108 , 110 (1950).
Therefore, the Secretary argues that because the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision in fact generates revenue and its regulatory features are rationally related to the
goal of requiring every individual to pay for the medical services they receive , "that's the
end of the baligame ." (Tr. 44: 11, July 1, 2010.)
Initially, in response , the Commonwealth contends that the noncompliance penalty
provision in Section 1501 does not meet the historical criteria for a tax .' Aside from
'"[A] tax is a pecuniary burden laid upon individuals or property for the purpose of
supporting the Government ." United States V. Reorganized CF&1 Fabricators of Utah, Inc., 518
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being referred to in Section 1501 at Section 5000A(b)(1) as a "penalty," the clear purpose
of the assessment is to regulate conduct, not generate revenue for the government.8 In
fact, the Commonwealth adds that if there is full compliance if everyone purchases
health insurance as required this provision will generate no revenue. The
Commonwealth ' s doubt as to its purported purpose is heightened further by the prefatory
language of Section 1501 which describes it as a derivative ofthe Commerce Clause,
The Solicitor General of Virginia correctly noted during oral argument that the power of
Congress to exact a penalty is more constrained than its taxing authority under the
General Welfare Clause it must be in aid of an enumerated power . Sunshine Anthracite
Coal Co . V. Adkins, 310 U.S . 381, 393 , 60 S. Ct . 907, 912 ( 1940); United States v . Butler,
297 U . S.1, 61, 56 S . Ct. 312, 317 ( 1936).
Although the Commonwealth concedes that the power of Congress to tax exceeds
its ability to regulate under the Commerce Clause , it is not without limitation . "[T]he law
is that Congress can tax under its taxing power that which it can't regulate, but it can't
regulate through taxation that which it cannot otherwise regulate ." (Tr. 81:18-21 , July 1,
2010 (citing Bailey v. Drexel Furniture Co. (Child Labor Tax Case), 259 U . S. 20, 37,42
U.S. 213, 224 , 116 S. Ct. 2106, 2112 (1996 ) ( internal citations omitted). On the other hand, a
penalty imports the notion of a punishment for an unlawful act or omission . Id. "The two words
[tax vs. penalty ] are not interchangeable ... and if an exaction [is] clearly a penalty it cannot be
converted into a tax by the simple expedient of calling it such." United States v. La Franca, 282
U.S. 568 , 572, 51 S. Ct. 278 , 280 (1931).
8In contrast , the Commonwealth points out that elsewhere in the Act, Congress
specifically described levies as taxes, such as Sections 9001, 9004, 9015, and 9017.
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S. Ct. 449, 450 (1922).) To amplify its point, the Commonwealth focuses the Court's
attention on a series of cases in which the Supreme Court struck down certain "regulatory
taxes" as an unconstitutional encroachment on the state's power of regulation under the
Tenth Amendment. See Butler , 297 U. S. at 68 , 56 S. Ct. at 320; Linder v. United States,
268 U . S. 5,17-18 , 45 S. Ct . 446, 449 (1925); Child Labor Tax Case , 259 U . S. at 35, 42 S.
Ct. at 451. In commenting on the limitations on the power of Congress to levy taxes to
promote the general welfare , the Court in Butler noted that, "despite the breadth of the
legislative discretion, our duty to hear and to render judgrnent remains . If the statute
plainly violates the stated principle of the Constitution , we must so declare ." Butler, 297
U.S. at 67 , 56 S. Ct. at 320 ; see also Kahriger , 345 U.S . at 29, 73 S. Ct. at 513.9
By analogy , the Commonwealth argues that the Minimum Essential Coverage
Provision not only invokes rights reserved to the states , but also seeks to compel activity
beyond the reach of Congress . As discussed above , the division of responsibility for
regulating insurance between the Commonwealth and the federal government, to the
extent relevant , is yet to be adequately staked out in this case.
The centerpiece of the Complaint at issue is its contention that Congress lacks the
authority to regulate economic inactivity . Lacking such power to regulate a person's
decision not to participate in interstate commerce , logically, the Commonwealth argues,
9Citing commentaries from a number of constitutional scholars, the Secretary maintains
that this line of cases has fallen into desuetude. The Commonwealth counters that none of these
cases have been overruled by the U.S. Supreme Court.
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Congress would not have the power to tax or impose a penalty for such inactivity. This,
of course , is the core issue in this case.
To bolster its position , the Commonwealth suggests that a careful survey of
constitutional history yields no basis for such extension of Tax Clause powers. In its
Memorandum in Opposition to Motion to Dismiss , the Commonwealth observes that
"historically, direct taxes were taxes on persons or things , while duties , imposts, and
excises have never meant a tax on a decision not to purchase or not to do something
unrelated to a larger voluntary business or other undertaking." (Pl. Mem . Opp'n Mot.
Dismiss 32.)
In her opposition , the Secretary rejoins that the Commonwealth misinterprets the
limitations of Congress ' s power under the Tax Clause . "[A] tax statute [does not]
necessarily fall because it touches on activities which Congress might not otherwise
regulate ." Sanchez, 340 U . S. at 44 , 71 S. Ct. at 110. For example , the Secretary argues
that Congress can tax inheritances even though the regulation of estates and inheritances
is beyond Congress ' s Commerce Clause powers. Knowlton v. Moore, 178 U.S . 41, 59-
60, 20 S. Ct. 747, 755 (1900 ). The Secretary stresses that "[i]t is beyond serious question
that a tax does not cease to be valid merely because it regulates, discourages , or even
definitely deters the activities taxed ." Sanchez, 340 U.S. at 44 , 71 S. Ct. at 110. "[A] tax
is not any the less a tax because it has a regulatory effect ...." Sonzinsky , 340 U.S. at
513, 57 S. Ct. at 556 (internal citations omitted).
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Casting aside many aspects of the Commonwealth ' s argument, the Secretary
contends that in the final analysis, the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision falls within
Congress 's extensive general welfare authority . She also underscores that decisions of
how best to provide for the general welfare are for the representative branches, not for the
courts . Helvering v. Davis, 301 U.S . 619, 640 , 57 S. Ct. 904, 908 (1937). "Inquiry into
the hidden motives which may move Congress to exercise a power constitutionally
conferred upon it is beyond the competency of courts ." Sonzinsky, 300 U . S. at 513-14, 57
S. Ct. at 556,
In enacting Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act,
Congress made extensive findings on the substantial effect of decisions to purchase health
insurance on the vast interstate health care market. These findings alone, in the
Secretary's view , provide more than adequate support for her contention that the penalty
(or tax) at issue is rationally related to the objective of maintaining a financially viable
health care market by requiring everyone to pay for the services they receive . She adds,
through counsel, "[t]hat consuming health care services without paying for them is
activity, plain and simple ." (Tr. 92 : 12-14, July 1, 2010.) In this context, a consumer's
failure to act is a clear burden on interstate commerce.
The Secretary appeared to concede during oral argument , however, that if the
ability to require the Minimum Essential Coverage Provision is not within the letter and
spirit of the Constitution , than the penalty necessarily fails. As the Deputy Assistant
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Attorney General of the United States appeared to note in his response to the Court, "if it
is unconstitutional , then the penalty would fail as well ." (Tr. 21:10-11 , July 1, 2010.)
VI.
While this case raises a host of complex constitutional issues, all seem to distill to
the single question of whether or not Congress has the power to regulate and tax--a
citizen 's decision not to participate in interstate commerce . Neither the U.S . Supreme
Court nor any circuit court of appeals has squarely addressed this issue . No reported case
from any federal appellate court has extended the Commerce Clause or Tax Clause to
include the regulation of a person's decision not to purchase a product , notwithstanding
its effect on interstate commerce . Given the presence of some authority arguably
supporting the theory underlying each side's position , this Court cannot conclude at this
stage that the Complaint fails to state a cause of action.1Q
The Secretary ' s Motion to Dismiss will therefore be denied . Resolution of the
controlling issues in this case must await a hearing on the merits.
1°"It is well-established that defendants bear the burden of proving that plaintiffs' claims
fail as a matter of law." Benneu v. MIS C'orp., 607 F.3d 1076, l 091(6th Cir. 2010). "Under
Rule I2(b)(6), the party moving for dismissal has the burden of proving that no claim has been
stated ." James Wm, Moore, et al., Moore 'c Federal Practice § I2.34(1)(a) (3d ed. 2010).
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An appropriate Order will accompany this Memorandum Opinion.
Henry E. Hudson
United States District Judge
Date: Q U$. .,215! d
Richmond, VA
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UNITED STATES DISTRICT COURT
FOR THE DISTRICT OF COLUMBIA
MARGARET PEGGY LEE MEAD;
CHARLES EDWARD LEE; SUSAN
SEVEN-SKY; KENNETH RUFFO; and
GINA RODRIGUEZ,
Plaintiffs, CASE NO . 1:10-CV-00950 (GK)
-vs.-
ERIC H. HOLDER, JR.; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF HEALTH AND
HUMAN SERVICES; KATHLEEN
SEBELIUS; UNITED STATES
DEPARTMENT OF THE TREASURY;
and TIMOTHY F. GEITHNER,
Defendants.
DECLARATION OF EDWARD L. WHITE III
I, Edward L. White III, make this declaration pursuant to 28 U.S.C. § 1746 and Local
Civil Rule 5.1(h) based on my personal knowledge unless otherwise noted:
1. I am an adult United States citizen and co-counsel for Plaintiffs in the above-
captioned lawsuit.
2. Exhibit A and Exhibit B filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary
Judgment are true and correct copies of excerpts of, respectively, the Patient Protection and
Affordable Care Act and the Health Care and Education Reconciliation Act of 2010 that I printed
off the Government Printing Office website on August 3, 2010; page numbers were added to the
exhibits thereafter for ease of reference.
EXHIBIT
i
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3. Exhibit H filed in support of Plaintiffs' Motion for Summary Judgment is a true
and correct copy of the August 2, 2010, Memorandum Opinion on Defendant's Motion to
Dismiss in Commonwealth of Virginia v. Sebelius, Case No. 3 :1 OCV 188-HEH, United States
District Court for the Eastern District of Virginia, Richmond Division, that I printed off that
court's CM/ECF system on August 3, 2010.
I declare under penalty of perjury that the foregoing is true and correct to the best of my
knowledge. Executed on August 3, 2010.
/s/ Edward L. White III
Edward L. White III
American Center for Law & Justice
5068 Plymouth Road
Ann Arbor , Michigan 48105
Tel. 734-662-2984; Fax. 734-302-1758
Email: ewhite@aclj.org
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PROPOSED 
ORDER GRANTING PLAINTIFFS’ MOTION FOR SUMMARY JUDGMENT 
 
 Before this Court is the Motion for Summary Judgment filed by Plaintiffs Margaret 
Peggy Lee Mead, Charles Edward Lee, Susan Seven-Sky, Kenneth Ruffo, and Gina Rodriguez.  
This Court has considered the arguments of the parties and the applicable law and determines 
that there are no genuine issues of material fact and that Plaintiffs’ Motion should be granted as a 
matter of law.   
 Accordingly, this Court GRANTS Plaintiffs’ Motion for Summary Judgment in full, for 
the reasons set forth in Plaintiff’s Memorandum of Points and Authorities, and GRANTS 
Plaintiffs the following relief: 
 A. The Court declares unconstitutional Section 1501 of the Patient Protection and 
Affordable Care Act as exceeding the powers of Congress;  
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B. The Court declares that the application of the Patient Protection and Affordable 
Care Act to Plaintiffs Mead, Seven-Sky, and Lee violates their rights under the Religious 
Freedom Restoration Act; 
C. The Court enters a permanent injunction against the enforcement of Section 1501 
of the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act;  
D. The Court invalidates the Patient Protection and Affordable Care Act in its 
entirety and enjoins its enforcement because Section 1501 of the Act is not severable from the 
rest of the Act;  
E. Judgment shall be entered in favor of Plaintiffs; and 
F. Plaintiffs shall submit, pursuant to the Federal Rules of Civil Procedure and the 
Local Civil Rules of this Court, an application for attorneys’ fees, costs, and expenses. 
IT IS SO ORDERED on this _____ day of ___________, 2010, in Chambers in 
Washington, D.C. 
      ________________________________ 
      Hon. Gladys Kessler  
      Senior U.S. District Court Judge 
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